



Cover

The Death of Brock at Queenston Heights, by Charles William Jefferys, 1908.
Credit : Archives of Ontario.
Government of Ontario Art Collection Accession # 619871



STRATEGIC TRUST AND COOPERATION IN THIS MARITIME CENTURY



THE COMMAND TEAM: A VALUABLE EVOLUTION OR DOCTRINAL DANGER?

- 3 EDITOR'S CORNER
5 VALOUR

MARITIME STRATEGY

- 7 STRATEGIC TRUST AND COOPERATION IN THIS MARITIME CENTURY
by Paul Maddison

MILITARY LEADERSHIP

- 15 THE COMMAND TEAM: A VALUABLE EVOLUTION OR DOCTRINAL DANGER?
by Alan Okros

LANGUAGE TRAINING

- 23 LANGUAGE AND INTEROPERABILITY IN NATO: THE BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE CO-ORDINATION (BILC)
by Rick Monaghan

PEACEKEEPING, PEACEBUILDING, AND RELIGIOUS LEADER ENGAGEMENT

- 33 AFTER AFGHANISTAN: CANADA'S RETURN TO UN PEACEKEEPING
by Michael Byers
40 RELIGIOUS LEADER ENGAGEMENT: AN EMERGING CAPABILITY FOR OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
by Steven Moore

MILITARY HISTORY

- 52 PATRIOTISM AND ALLEGIANCES OF THE 22ND (FRENCH CANADIAN) BATTALION, 1914-1918
by Raphaël Dallaire Ferland

VIEWS AND OPINIONS

- 61 CANADA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE NATO TRAINING MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN: A SAILOR'S EXPERIENCE
by Hugues Canuel
67 FORWARD OPERATING LOCATION NANISIVIK – HALIFAX'S GATEWAY TO CANADA'S ARCTIC
by Sylvain Lescoutre

COMMENTARY

- 69 WARRIOR NATION?
by Martin Shadwick
72 BOOK REVIEWS

Canadian Military Journal / Revue militaire canadienne is the official professional journal of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence. It is published quarterly under authority of the Minister of National Defence. Opinions expressed or implied in this publication are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Forces, Canadian Military Journal, or any agency of the Government of Canada. Crown copyright is retained. Articles may be reproduced with permission of the Editor, on condition that appropriate credit is given to Canadian Military Journal. Each issue of the Journal is published simultaneously in print and electronic versions; it is available on the Internet at www.journal.forces.gc.ca.

ISSN 1492-465X



How to Contact Us

Canadian Military Journal /
Revue militaire canadienne
Canadian Defence Academy
PO Box 17000, Station Forces
Kingston, Ontario
CANADA, K7K 7B4
Fax: (613) 541-6866
E-mail: cmj.rmc@forces.gc.ca



LANGUAGE AND INTEROPERABILITY IN NATO: THE BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE CO-ORDINATION (BILC)



PATRIOTISM AND ALLEGIANCES OF THE 22ND (FRENCH CANADIAN) BATTALION, 1914-1918



FORWARD OPERATING LOCATION NANISIVIK – HALIFAX'S GATEWAY TO CANADA'S ARCTIC

CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL

www.journal.forces.gc.ca

Editor-in-Chief

David L. Bashow
(613) 541-5010 ext. 6148
bashow-d@rmc.ca

Publication Manager

Claire Chartrand
(613) 541-5010 ext. 6837
claire.chartrand@rmc.ca

Translation

Translation Bureau, Public Works and
Government Services Canada

Commentary

Martin Shadwick

Layout

17 Wing Publishing Office, National Defence,
Winnipeg, Canada

Oversight Committee

Chairman

Major-General Pierre Forgues, Commander, Canadian Defence Academy (CDA)

Members

Mr. David L. Bashow, Editor-in-Chief,
Canadian Military Journal (CMJ)

Brigadier-General Éric Tremblay, Commandant
Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC)

Dr. Joel Sokolsky, Principal,
Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC)

Colonel Bernd Horn, Chief of Staff Strategic Training
and Education Programs (COS STEP), Canadian
Defence Academy (CDA)

Colonel Jim Cottingham, representing
Chief of the Air Staff (CAS)

Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Waters,
Director Canadian Forces Military Law Centre
(CFMLC), Canadian Defence Academy (CDA)

Commander Hugues Canuel, representing
Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS)

Ms. Hanya Soliman, representing Chief of the
Defence Intelligence (CDI)

Major Andrew Godefroy, representing Director
General Land Capability Development (DGLCD)

Editorial Board

Dr. Douglas Bland

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret'd) David Last

Major (ret'd) Michael Boire

Dr. Chris Madsen

Major Sylvain Chalifour

Dr. Sean Maloney

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret'd) Douglas Delaney

Professor Brian Mc Kercher

Dr. Rocky J. Dwyer

Dr. Paul Mitchell

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret'd) Michael Goodspeed

Dr. Nezhir Mrad

Major John Grodzinski

Dr. Scot Robertson

Dr. David Hall

Professor Stéphane Roussel

Professor Michael Hennessy

Professor Elinor Sloan

Professor Hamish Ion

Chief Warrant Officer C.J. Thibault

Philippe Lagassé

Colonel (ret'd) Randall Wakelam

NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for "translation of original quote", indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.

EDITOR'S CORNER

Welcome again to yet another frosty winter edition of the *Canadian Military Journal*. That said, as these words are being penned from the Hurricane (Superstorm) *Sandy*-ravaged north-eastern corner of the continent, I believe that all of us in this particular 'neck of the woods' are looking forward to some relatively predictable environmental behaviour for the upcoming season in the Great White North.

In this issue, we close our cover commemorative series of the War of 1812 in North America with Charles William Jefferys' 1908 depiction of the death of Major General Sir Isaac Brock, Knight of the Bath (KB), at Queenston Heights in October 1812.

After Brock's resounding victory at Fort Detroit, embodied in General William Hull's surrender to Brock on 16 August, American national honour was shaken, and their military launched a full-scale response against Queenston Heights on the Niagara peninsula two months later. After crossing the Niagara River, the invading American force was pinned down below the cliffs that led to the Heights themselves. However, this force of approximately 1200 managed to discover a fisherman's path up the cliff, and they subsequently captured the Heights and took possession of the upper ground. Sir Isaac immediately attempted to recapture the high ground. "He felt that Queenston Heights was the key to Upper Canada; if it fell, the province would quickly follow. [However,] Brock's distinctive scarlet uniform made him a natural target, and a sniper shot him in the middle of the chest, killing him instantly."¹

As it materialized, a native band led by Joseph Brant's son John and his adopted nephew, John Norton, attacked the Americans repeatedly, then, bolstered by British reinforcements, they mounted a spirited attack, driving the Americans back to the brink of a mountain that overhangs the river, where the invaders fell in numbers. There would be no support forthcoming from American forces massed on the other side of the river. "Their capitulation was finally recognized in time to avert a wholesale slaughter. Nine hundred and twenty-five Americans surrendered, and there were two hundred and fifty casualties. On the Canadian side there were only fourteen dead and seventy-seven wounded. But one of the dead was Isaac Brock, a grievous loss. An ambitious sol-

dier and brilliant tactician, he had personified the Canadian resistance, an elegant symbol of defiance."²

On a much lighter note, on 29 October *this* year in Ottawa, His Excellency the Right Honourable David Johnston, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, presided over the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) change of command ceremony between the outgoing chief, General Walter Natynczyk, and the incoming chief, General Thomas Lawson. During the event, His Excellency noted that 'General Walt,' as he is affectionately and respectfully known throughout the Department and the Canadian Forces since assuming the role of CDS in 2008, "... has shown extraordinary leadership, vision and humanity... that in leading the Canadian Forces as an institution, the Chief of the Defence Staff is also a leader of people, and in this, he grasps an essential truth of the Canadian military." 'General Walt' has always been supportive of the *Canadian Military Journal*, and we here at CMJ want to take this opportunity to wish him and his wife Leslie all the best that life has to offer as they head into retirement. I am now taking a little editorial licence by re-printing below my favourite picture of the general, taken during a visit to Halifax in 2009, since I feel it really captures General Natynczyk's love of people, large and small.



DND photo HS2009-0315-034 by Master Corporal Robin Muirgridge

General Tom Lawson now takes the CDS helm after many years of varied and distinguished service, most recently as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). Our paths have crossed many times over the years, both as fellow fighter pilots and in the course of various staff duties. Best of all, I am honoured to call him a friend, and we at the CMJ wish him and his wife Kelly all the best as he embarks upon this exceptionally important call to service.

EDITOR'S CORNER

DND photo GG2012-0582-040 by Sergeant Ronald Duchesne



And now, very briefly, on to the current issue. Vice-Admiral Paul Maddison, the current Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, ‘takes the point’ with a discussion of international strategic trust and cooperation in this maritime century from a senior Canadian sailor’s perspective. Admiral Maddison stresses the extremely complex, ambiguous and “legally constrained” working environment that challenges today’s military operations, with particular emphasis upon operations “... in that relatively narrow zone astride the world’s coastlines where the vast majority of humanity resides – the littorals.” He is followed by Captain (N) [ret’d] Alan Okros, Deputy Director of Academics at the Canadian Forces College, who discusses a new leadership initiative recently embraced by the CF, the Command Team, the combination of Commander and his senior Chief Warrant Officer (or equivalent). While the article presents a strong endorsement of this initiative, Okros opines that some of the definitions contained therein can be “... professionally confusing and ultimately doctrinally dangerous,” and he offers suggestions to address those doctrinal conflicts.

Next, the Canadian Defence Academy’s Doctor Rick Monaghan discusses language training, standards, and interoperability within the NATO alliance. Specifically, Rick homes in on the “... little understood Bureau for International Language Coordination (BILC). This short history of BILC will look at the early years and the efforts to set linguistic standards, the expansion of BILC following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the challenges facing the organization in the next decade.” Professor Michael Byers, the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia, then argues that, with the termination of the combat role in Afghanistan, peace-

keeping should represent a greater proportion of Canada’s discretionary military operations than is currently the case. “To that end, I question some of the arguments made in favour of Canada’s disengagement from peacekeeping by examining them within an updated context, since much has changed during the last decade, including in the way in which the UN approaches peacekeeping.” Next, Padre (ret’d) Steven Moore discusses the Religious Leader Engagement (RLE) initiative as “... a successful form of civic engagement in active combat zones, in peace support operations, with its emphasis on stability and reconstruction, and in post-conflict environments, where brokered cease-fires led to mission mandates enforcing fledgling peace agreements between former belligerents.” In the last of our major articles for this issue, history graduate student Raphaël Dallaire Ferland “... explores the patriotic sentiment and the allegiances” expressed within Canada’s 22nd Battalion, the fabled ‘Vandoos,’ during the First World War. Specifically, the author examines how these soldiers viewed their mother country, France, their adopted mother country, Britain, their homeland, Canada, and their French-Canadian nation.

Finally, we offer a brace of opinion pieces, Martin Shadwick’s regular thought-provoking commentary, this time on the concept of Canada as a warrior nation, and close with a healthy selection of book reviews to pique the interest of our readership.

Until the next time.
David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal



DND photo IS2012-1034-10 by Sergeant Matthew McGregor

NOTES

1. Don Gillmor & Pierre Turgeon, *Canada – A People’s History* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2000), p. 168.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 169.



DND photo GG2012-0493-029 by Master Corporal DanyVeillette, Rideau Hall

His Excellency the Governor General addresses recipients and honoured guests at the 19 September 2012 presentation ceremony at the Citadelle of Québec.

Canada's three military valour decorations, namely, the Victoria Cross, the Star of Military Valour, and the Medal of Military Valour, were created by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Queen of Canada, on 1 January 1993. All the decorations may be awarded posthumously.

The **Victoria Cross** is awarded for the most conspicuous bravery, a daring or pre-eminent act of valour or self-sacrifice, or extreme devotion to duty in the presence of the enemy.

The **Star of Military Valour** is awarded for distinguished or valiant service in the presence of the enemy.

The **Medal of Military Valour** is awarded for an act of valour or devotion to duty in the presence of the enemy.

Additionally, the **Mention in Dispatches** was created to recognize members of the Canadian Forces on active service and other individuals working with or in conjunction with the Canadian Forces for valiant conduct, devotion to duty, or other distinguished service. Recipients are entitled to wear a bronze oak leaf on the appropriate campaign or service medal ribbon. Like the military valour decorations, the Mention in Dispatches may be awarded posthumously.

On 19 September 2012, His Excellency the Right Honourable David Johnston, Governor General and

Commander-in-Chief of Canada, presented 4 **Military Valour Decorations** and 23 additional decorations and honours to deserving Canadians at the Citadelle of Québec. The Governor General said, in part:

“I am delighted to be with you today for this very special event at the Citadelle... As governor general, I have the great privilege of bestowing a variety of awards and honours on extraordinary Canadians. Our gathering today is unique in that it brings us together, within the context of a single ceremony, to recognize those who have given of themselves in so many different ways. Each of you has made a remarkable contribution to your communities and to this country, and in the wonderful diversity of your achievements, you resemble the great promise of Canada... As members of the Canadian Forces, you have demonstrated great military valour and provided exemplary service in the exercise of your duties... On behalf of all Canadians, I would like to thank each of you for your contributions to your communities and to our country. We are truly grateful.”

MILITARY VALOUR DECORATIONS Star of Military Valour

Corporal Jean-François Roger Donald **Belzil**, SMV - Montréal, Quebec

VALOUR

Medal of Military Valour

Corporal Marc-André **Cousineau**, MMV -
Greenfield Park, Quebec
Sergeant Joseph André Steve **Poulin**, MMV, CD -
Québec, Quebec
Corporal Marco **Tremblay**, MMV - Jonquière, Quebec

CITATIONS

Corporal Jean-François Roger Donald **Belzil**, SMV
Star of Military Valour
Corporal Marc-André **Cousineau**, MMV
Medal of Military Valour

On April 9, 2011, upon intercepting enemy radio transmissions, 3 Platoon, A Company, awaited an attack on the security cordon established to the north of Zangabad, Afghanistan. When the first insurgent shot rang out, Corporal Belzil and Corporal Cousineau moved in that direction with the anti-tank gun, coming across a Canadian section and its Afghan counterpart pinned down under enemy fire, as well as a seriously wounded Afghan soldier lying out in the open. Thanks to Corporal Cousineau's effective covering fire, and despite heavy enemy fire, Corporal Belzil succeeded in destroying the stronghold from which the deadly insurgent shots originated. They both then pulled the wounded soldier to cover and administered first aid. Corporal Belzil's and Corporal Cousineau's composure and disregard for personal danger helped to push back the enemy attack and save the life of an Afghan soldier.

Sergeant Joseph André Steve **Poulin**, MMV, CD
Medal of Military Valour

Sergeant Poulin distinguished himself through his bravery as a tank commander by ensuring security during a road construction project in Afghanistan. On several occasions, notably December 18, 2010, February 17, 2011, and April 23, 2011, he placed his tank in dangerous positions to protect civilians, coalition colleagues and Afghan security forces. Sergeant

Poulin's courage and professionalism were instrumental in ensuring the success of this operation.



DND photo GG2012-0493-003 by Master Corporal Dany Veillette, Rideau Hall

Master Corporal Belzil receives his Star of Military Valour from His Excellency the Governor General.

Corporal Marco **Tremblay**, MMV
Medal of Military Valour

On May 18, 2011, during an enemy ambush in Sperwan Ghar, Afghanistan, Corporal Tremblay demonstrated courage and determination. When first enemy shots were fired, a Canadian soldier was hit in the leg and unable to take cover. Keeping calm under continuous fire, Corporal Tremblay reached the soldier, immediately applied a tourniquet to stop the bleeding, and, during a lull, dragged the soldier to safety. Corporal Tremblay's bravery enabled him to save the life of a Canadian soldier.



Victoria Cross



Star of Military Valour



Medal of Military Valour

DND photo HS2011-E001-006 by Corporal Chris Ringius



HMCS *Charlottetown* transits the Mediterranean Sea to join NATO's Standing Naval Maritime Group 1 in March 2011 as part of the Canadian military's contribution to the Government's response to the conflict in Libya.

STRATEGIC TRUST AND COOPERATION IN THIS MARITIME CENTURY

by Paul Maddison

DND photo



Vice-Admiral Paul Maddison


Shortly after taking command of the Royal Canadian Navy last year, I attended the International Sea Symposium at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, for what remains the largest-ever gathering of heads of international navies. I was

privileged to be offered the opportunity to speak at that Symposium to well over 100 of my fellow naval leaders, and chose as my key message a theme captured in the title of this article. I have since offered this message to other international audiences, including hemispheric naval leaders at the most recent Inter-American Naval Conference, and during a return visit to Newport at the invitation of the College President. On this latter occasion, I added a second theme in my address to several hundred future leaders from the American services and partner navies from around the world, relating to 'anticipatory transformation' centred on my view of future maritime operations in the contested littorals. What follows, reproduced below, was originally published in the Autumn 2012 edition of the *Naval War College Review*.¹

– P.A. Maddison
Vice-Admiral

Commander Royal Canadian Navy

Vice-Admiral Paul Maddison, CMM, MSM, CD, *has been a sailor for more than three decades. He has held a host of both sea and shore appointments, and is currently the Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy. Since assuming this appointment in July 2011, Admiral Maddison has been very active in promoting his "One Navy" vision along the following key lines: Purpose (the role of the RCN as a treasured national institution for a maritime nation in a maritime century), Platforms (the renewal of the fleet as ignited by the Government's National Shipbuilding and Procurement Strategy), People (our dedicated sailors and their families), and Pride (a legacy of naval service to Canada).*



The Battle Network

means of leveraging their own conventional and asymmetric capabilities. Given the disruptive synergies involved in using such proxies, and the perceived benefits of plausible deniability, these states may continue to see strong incentives to improve their irregular maritime forces.

Accordingly, we must be prepared now, and as part of future coalitions, to be confronted both at sea and ashore by a wider range of potential threats and challenges than we have ever dealt with before, in addition to the ever-latent but rising potential of state-on-state conflict at sea that has been our traditional focus in naval warfare.

Such operations will take place in a highly complex, politically ambiguous, and legally constrained environment, more often than not in that relatively narrow zone astride the world's coastlines where the vast majority of humanity resides—the littorals. This is where the consequences of massive social change and disruption are already beginning to play out, as we are witnessing today in the Middle East and elsewhere. The contested littorals are where the future sea-land-air-special operations joint force must be

prepared to counter, not only irregular or state-centred threats and challenges, but also to be prepared to confront both at the same time.

The Future Joint Operating Environment

While the underlying and very human nature of conflict will not change, the means of warfare will certainly continue to evolve both ashore and at sea. Over the past 20 years, operations ashore have been conducted against adversaries that have learned with increasing effectiveness to blend all forms of violence—ranging from the purely criminal, through the irregular, to the conventional—to political purpose, while using superior knowledge of their local physical, social, and cultural terrains to fight from a position of maximum relative advantage.

“I foresee, for example, that a greater emphasis will need to be directed towards influence activities prior to the onset of combat operations, as well as during them.”

Across the width and depth of a littoral theatre, joint and combined forces ashore will be engaged, often simultaneously, in operations designed not only to defeat our adversaries, but also to favourably influence populations and protect them, while also creating the conditions for other agencies and partners to restore civil services and governance.

Given how closely coupled the actions of a joint force will be in the littoral context, naval forces in the future, including Canada's, are likely to play a much greater role in supporting these influence, combat and stability operations ashore.

Such adversaries have not yet mastered the maritime domain to the extent required to challenge modern navies. However, the trend towards improved capabilities and competence at sea is clearly evident in some notable successes throughout the past decade: the suicide attack on the USS *Cole* in 2000; the attack by Al-Qaeda on the French oil tanker *Limburg* in 2002; Hezbollah's attack on the Israeli corvette *Hanit* using a variant of the silkworm anti-ship missile in 2006; and terrorist attacks launched at Mumbai, in 2008, from the sea.

In addition, certain states have already demonstrated the capacity to orchestrate the actions of maritime non-state actors as a



The Information Grid

I foresee, for example, that a far greater emphasis will need to be directed towards influence activities prior to the onset of combat operations, as well as during them. Indeed, such activities, which some have termed “the battle of the strategic narrative,” will be central to all future campaigning—essential, not only for the purposes of isolating the adversary in political, economic, and military terms, but also for establishing and maintaining the legitimacy of intervention among the domestic and international communities, as well as with populations within the theatre of operations.

Maritime forces will play a key role in such diplomatic and influence activities; not only in supporting forces ashore, but also through the finely calibrated supportive and deterrent effects they create by their operational manoeuvre offshore.

The complex and dynamic inter-relationships between influence, combat, and stabilization activities may lead to new and more adaptive approaches to campaign planning, as well as more flexible command organizations at the tactical and operational levels, both at sea and ashore. Fighting forces themselves will undoubtedly become much more extensively networked to meet the demands of a highly cluttered, confused, complex, and legally constrained battlespace.

Such trends are likely to increase the role played by maritime forces—and not solely those of the major naval powers—in contributing towards combat operations ashore. Such contributions include: the insertion, support, sustainment, and extraction of special operations forces; joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance preparations from the sea; the provision of joint and tactical maritime supporting fires from the sea; and the protection of forces and populations ashore from an extension of a naval formation’s force-level defensive capabilities.

mobility for strategic and operational as well as tactical advantage—by placing an adversary’s forces at risk along exposed flanks, and by using deception to present operational dilemmas to the adversary.

Finally, the logic of joint seabasing is likely to become more compelling in an increasingly urbanized littoral environment, as ways are sought to reduce a joint and combined force’s footprint ashore, as well as its associated force protection liabilities. This will also require such seabases to be defended in depth from adversaries at sea as well as attacks launched from ashore.

Few joint campaigns are likely to be possible without achieving sea control: that ability to control events which derives from a capacity for decisive action on, above, and below the surface of the sea.

Achieving sea control in a contested littoral will require extensive intelligence preparations at the strategic and operational levels, as well as detailed and ongoing environmental analysis to predict and compensate for the complex atmospheric, topographic, and hydrographic effects upon maritime weapons and sensors, whose performance in coming decades will need to be substantially improved to deal with clutter and background noise from human activity that is orders of magnitude greater inshore than far at sea.

Future maritime adversaries will attempt to exploit their initial advantage of local knowledge by challenging maritime forces with a range of conventional, irregular, and high-end asymmetric threats. Such adversaries will initially seek to avoid engaging the maritime force to its strengths, working all levers at their disposal to indirectly deny access through political action or popular will. Mines and submarines will certainly remain their most effective means for delaying or denying access to a joint force, given the significant resources and level of effort required to address these particular threats.

In more openly hostile situations, the enemy may launch ‘swarming’ attacks, using relatively unsophisticated but very fast and highly manoeuvrable speed boats in large numbers, armed with optically sighted hand-held weapons. Others will employ shore-based rocket artillery, as we witnessed off Libya, and some—such as Hezbollah demonstrated in 2006—may have access to subsonic but capable anti-ship missiles that can be launched from commercial vehicles ashore.

An increasing number of adversaries in the future will be able to complement such capabilities with highly advanced weapons launched at sea and from ashore, including hypersonic anti-ship missiles and very fast super-cavitating torpedoes. In



HMCS *Charlottetown* provides protection during Operation *Unified Protector* as the Belgian mine hunter, M923 *Narcis*, conducts mine countermeasure operations in Misratah harbour off the coast of Libya in May 2011.

All these joint actions will be greatly enhanced by the ability of maritime forces to manoeuvre operationally once sea control is achieved—that is to say, to use their inherent

DND photo HS2011-E011-001 by Corporal Chris Ringius

addition to such ‘kinetic’ weapons, some adversaries will have also developed advanced weapons that operate through their effects upon maritime sensors, as well as those that target key network nodes in physical or cyberspace to impair the performance of our battle networks.

Engagements may well be fought in proximity with an adversary’s non-conventional, irregular, and asymmetric elements, and fought at range when an adversary attempts to bring high-end capabilities to bear. A sophisticated adversary will undoubtedly attempt both concurrently. Engagements may develop suddenly and be conducted with intensity along multiple lines of attacks at sea and from ashore, followed by attempts to disengage into the littoral background.

In the face of such an adversary, maritime warfare will need to emphasize offensive action, enabled through extensive preparations to counter an adversary’s expected actions; by thwarting how the adversary would prefer to fight; and by eliminating or neutralizing an adversary’s capabilities before they can be brought into action. Maritime warfare will require fully integrated offensive and defensive joint action across all physical dimensions in the maritime domain—from the seabed to space—as well as full use of the electromagnetic and informational environments.

At that juncture of the Libyan civil war, the port town of Misratah had become a crucial battleground between the rebels and forces still loyal to the former Libyan dictator.

NATO minesweepers were operating to keep the port open for resupply, as well as to evacuate civilians, while Charlottetown protected them from attacks by small, fast boats manned by Gadhafi’s maritime Special Forces.

But Charlottetown’s efforts went further than that. She played a key role in keeping the city from falling under the control of Gadhafi’s ground forces, where the safety of its citizens hung in the balance. Using special resources that required her to operate close inshore, Charlottetown was able to identify and locate the enemy’s manoeuvre forces to guide the delivery of highly accurate NATO air-strikes against them.

Her ability to achieve these effects at sea and ashore was based, not solely on the ship’s physical capabilities or fitted systems, but rather in how her sensors, weapons, and communications systems were ‘plugged into’ a larger information grid shared by all NATO assets.

In Charlottetown’s case, that grid served to greatly extend the ship’s sensing horizon. It provided the ship’s captain and his combat team with a highly tailored and all-source intelligence

and surveillance picture, and permitted him to pass the high-quality information being acquired on targets ashore to NATO’s air-strike planners.

As a result, such operations in the future will require far more than the bringing together of a coalition at the time of crisis—they will require ever-higher degrees of interoperability to effect a merging of allied and coalition maritime forces at the technical, tactical, and doctrinal levels, as well as a degree of understanding, confidence and trust

among warfare commanders that is achieved only through years of working closely with one another.

Strategic Cooperation

And that brings me to the imperative for strategic cooperation—an imperative that is tagged by a sense of urgency due, I believe, to the fact that we may very well be on the cusp of historic and momentous change in the global maritime domain.

“Maritime warfare will require fully integrated offensive and defensive joint action across all physical dimensions in the maritime domain.”



DND photo HS2012-0071-562 by Lieutenant (N) Darren Puttock

HMCS Charlottetown’s boarding party conducts a search of a dhow boat while a Sea King helicopter provides cover in the Gulf of Aden while participating in Operation Artemis during May 2012.

Many observers, I believe, will look back at NATO’s Libya campaign as the prototype air-sea battle of the 21st Century, even as we anticipate the littorals in the future being contested by much more formidable maritime adversaries than HMCS Charlottetown faced last year.

Charlottetown was the first Canadian ship to come under hostile fire since the Korean conflict. But what was she doing so close to shore that caused her to be fired upon by Gadhafi’s shore-based rocket artillery?

DND photo IS2007-7710 by Master Corporal Kevin Paul



As part of their NATO presence patrol in the Indian Ocean in 2007, an away team from HMCS *Toronto* meets with a group of Yemini shark fishermen at their dhow some 60 kilometres offshore.

Whether or not that international consensus will continue to hold in the face of building pressures on coastal states, both large and small, is one of the abiding strategic issues of this 21st Century.

To understand why, we need only look to the Arctic, where we are likely to see more change in the coming three decades than has occurred since Europeans first arrived in Greenland.

Visitors to Canada today very quickly come to realize that the Arctic plays a major role in our national psyche. “The true north strong and free” resonates as much for Canadians when they sing their national anthem, as do the words “the rockets red glare” for Americans. And yet, few Canadians

Today’s rules-based maritime order sits upon a delicate balance between two central and essentially competing ideas that have existed in a state of constructive tension for some 500 years, since they were first disputed by the English and the Dutch in the 17th Century:

- The first—*mare liberum*—the idea that the seas cannot be made sovereign and hence are free for all to use; and
- The second—*mare clausum*—the idea that the seas can be made sovereign to the limits of effective state control.

This delicate balance was achieved, not in bloodshed, but rather, through an unprecedented degree of international consultation and collaboration in the closing decades of the 20th Century. The result was a unique global convergence of maritime interests that was codified within the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The Convention was forged out of a compelling need to reconcile the economic and national interests of the world’s coastal states with the traditional defence and security interests of the great maritime powers. That makes the 1982 Convention among the crowning achievements of international law, but what made it possible was the fact that both the maritime powers and the coastal states risked suffering equally from the perpetuation of an unregulated, disputed, and unstable maritime order.

have directly witnessed our High North’s abiding beauty, or experienced its climatic extremes.

Canada’s Arctic Archipelago is one of the world’s largest, and it is a very long way from anywhere. The Northwest Passage, for example, is further from the homes of our east and west coast fleets in Halifax and Victoria than are London and Tokyo respectively.

The Arctic’s physical and social geography make it undisputedly a maritime theatre. There is not now, nor is there likely to be, an explosion of road and rail connections to drive forward and sustain development of the High North, as was the case in the 19th and 20th Centuries with the great movement of settlers into the west of North America.



HMCS *Summerside* sails past an iceberg in the Davis Strait during Operation *Nanook* 2011.

DND photo HS2011-H003-091 by Corporal Rick Ayer



HMCS *Corner Brook* in relatively close proximity to an iceberg during Operation *Nanook* 2007.

near the eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage, as well as unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles, all supported by a wide-area surveillance system, from seabed to space.

Nonetheless, the prospects of commercially viable sea passage across the Arctic Basin—connecting the rich economies of northern Europe and Asia—is perhaps still decades off. But as the navigable season gradually extends in length, recent and anticipated improvements in extraction technologies may eventually make Arctic seabed resources commercially exploitable, with prospects of greatly increased ‘destination’ shipping going in and out of the Arctic, rather than through it.

Northern communities, as they develop, will be connected to the south largely by air and sea. They will be supplied and sustained by ship, not by rail car, and only briefly each year by 18-wheelers when ice roads permit their hazard-filled travel northwards across the tundra in the western portion of the region.

And the economic stakes are potentially enormous. Believed to be awaiting each of the five Arctic coastal states in their offshore estates are precious inheritances for decades to come—vast energy and mineral reserves that have been already discovered or are believed to lie in the Arctic Basin and its periphery.

“Canada’s High North is an ocean space, a vast archipelago enveloped in an oceanic icefield that both defines and dominates the environment.”

Canada’s High North is an ocean space, a vast archipelago enveloped in an oceanic icefield that both defines and dominates the environment. But unlike any other ocean space in the world, it is virtually inaccessible but for a short season in the late summer and early fall. Even then, the sea ice within the Arctic Archipelago becomes, at best, partially navigable by vessels that are specially designed to operate within it.

All of this will eventually bring new and unprecedented levels of human activity in the high North, and with it increased risks of marine incident and environmental accident.

That is one of the key reasons why the Canadian Forces is in the North today, along with other federal agencies, to begin mastering the competencies we will eventually need to operate successfully in the high North – and by that I mean within the sea ice of the Canadian archipelago itself, rather than to the limit of the ice-edge that today resides far to the south in the Davis Strait.

For much of the remainder of the year, winter retains the High North in an icy grip. Nowhere else on earth, with the exception of Antarctica, is less forgiving to the unprepared. Despite its surreal and almost alien beauty, the Arctic brooks no mistake, leaves little margin for error, and so demands exceptional forethought and planning in order to work and to survive there.

For these reasons, it is a truly strategic decision to not just look north, but to go there—but go there we most assuredly will, as Canada’s Government hastens the delivery of joint sea, land, and air capabilities that will permit the Canadian Forces to operate in the north persistently, effectively, and safely during a gradually lengthening navigable season.

For the Royal Canadian Navy, these investments include the new Arctic / Offshore Patrol Ships, as well as a deep-water berthing and fueling facility in Nanisivik at the top of Baffin Island



© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (2009)

Rendering of a concept design of the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship

There is much, and in my view, misplaced attention drawn to disagreements in the North—the status of the Northwest Passage being one—and insufficient attention being paid to the extensive international cooperation that actually takes place.

Canada’s relations with our northern neighbours are very positive. From an institutional perspective, northern issues are systematically being addressed through the Arctic Council, as attested by the Search and Rescue Treaty recently concluded by the member states.

Canada is cooperating on the scientific work required to delineate the extent of our continental shelf with the US and Denmark, and it is contributing towards similar multi-national efforts with Russia and Norway as well. Direct military cooperation is also evident in the invitations Canada has extended to its northern neighbours to observe and participate in its annual northern maritime security exercises.

In short, despite a range of factors that have emerged to deepen the economic, political, and legal stakes at issue in the Arctic, the intensification of ocean politics in that region has been moderated thus far by strategic cooperation.

Although the Arctic states, including Canada, hold to different interpretations regarding the various provisions of UNCLOS, none of these positions appear to be incompatible with the logic that underpins the convention itself. From the geopolitical perspective, strategic cooperation aligns with the core long-term national interests of each of the Arctic coastal states, as it reinforces the 1982 Convention from which they each stand so much to gain.

Elsewhere in the world, intensifying ocean politics have been met by significant inter-state tension and confrontation. Nowhere is this more apparent right now than in the Asia-Pacific. The South China Sea in particular, much like the Arctic Basin, is a region rich in seabed resources. Yet, unlike the Arctic, its importance to global commerce is real *today* rather than emergent *tomorrow*. To the southwest, it is served by one of the world’s most important maritime transit ways—the Malacca Strait—through which passes a substantial portion of global maritime commerce, including much of the oil and gas resources upon which regional economies depend.

From the legal perspective, the region is overlaid

with multiple and largely overlapping territorial claims, especially by the states that enclose the South China Sea, a factor that has, for the most part, defied diplomatic and legal efforts at resolution. Many observers suggest that future solutions, however distant their prospects, will be political rather than legal in nature, adding complexities at the geopolitical level.

In this context, China has identified its maritime claims in the South China Sea as a core national interest, at a time when ocean policy has become increasingly central to the Sino-American relationship in two crucial respects: first, in relation to the United States as an Asia-Pacific power that is vested deeply in regional stability and security; and second, in relation to the role played by the United States as the world’s pre-eminent maritime power. In both instances, how China and the United States approach their differences in ocean policy will be crucial to the trajectory of the 21st Century.

China is not alone in making such claims. That it does so may simply signal the need for a new international dialogue concerning adjustments to be achieved between coastal states’ needs for regulation and stewardship of their ocean approaches, and the international community’s rights of free movement and access.

That alone would be a development of cardinal importance to the global system. However, it may also portend something even more profound, should the international consensus through which the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea was derived begin to unravel, and with it, the period of relative stability in ocean politics that the convention has achieved.



HMCS Athabaskan leads this formation, followed by HMCS Montréal (left), then HMCS Charlottetown (centre) and HMCS Fredericton (right) during a Task Group exercise conducted in the Atlantic Ocean in 2010.

DND photo HS2010-T003-018 by Corporal Johanie Mahew

The consequences of such an unravelling would be enormous, and potentially could lead to a far darker world than the one we now inhabit. This is not a future to which I believe any of us would want to aspire, but rather one in which I and my fellow naval officers, guided by strategic trust, should be prepared to stand against, for the common vital interest of our nations, and for the greater good of all.

There are areas where we and other like-minded navies are already working towards that greater good. In the Caribbean Basin and the Pacific approaches to Central and South America, a range of nations from the Americas and Europe are cooperating effectively to stem the flow of narcotics at sea through the auspices of the Joint Interagency Task Force South.

Off the Horn of Africa, we have witnessed, since 2008, a largely spontaneous but nonetheless remarkable assembly of naval power to suppress piracy, while the international community continues to seek more enduring solutions.

Conclusion

In other words, navies are not only a means of military action, employed in pursuit of national interests as states

interpret them. They are also the principal guarantor of good order in that wide common upon which men may pass in all directions, as the great American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan described it. Every naval officer, as first and foremost a professional mariner, understands that our oceans remain crucial to sustaining life on this planet.

“There are areas where we and other like-minded navies are already working towards that greater good.”

Each one of us understands that the ocean’s riches are crucial to the future of all coastal states, many of which are struggling to secure a better life for their citizens. Each one of us understands how a regulated ocean commons underpins the global economy, upon which our prosperity, and indeed, our very way of life, depends.

This is the point at which *national self-interest* and *common global interest* converge fully. I am speaking of choices that are ours to make, today’s leaders and the leaders of tomorrow, that requires strategic trust to be established and sustained among pragmatic, determined men and women of action. I believe it to be within our collective grasp to realize its great purpose. Indeed, there may be no higher purpose. All we need to do is resolve ourselves to achieve it.



BMT Fleet Technology Ltd.

Rendering of a concept design of the Canadian Surface Combatant ship

NOTES

1. Editor’s Note. Passages added specifically for the CMJ readership in this issue are indicated by use of italicized text.



DND photo GG2010-0672-024 by Sergeant Serge Gouin

Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer, Petty Officer First Class Robert Cléroux and Chief of the Defence Staff, General Walter Natynczyk, lay a wreath at the Remembrance Day ceremony, 11 November 2010.

THE COMMAND TEAM: A VALUABLE EVOLUTION OR DOCTRINAL DANGER?

by Alan Okros

Introduction

In order to ensure effectiveness in operations, the military relies upon cohesive small teams that are highly motivated to accomplish specific tasks. To generate this capacity, the Canadian Forces (CF) expects those in positions of responsibility to exercise command and leadership. Simplistically, *command* provides the structures, and *leadership* provides the motivations which, together, shape operational effectiveness. Thus, the concepts of leadership, command and teams are integral to how the military functions. A corollary is that the CF must ensure consistency and clarity in how key concepts and leader responsibilities are understood and put into practice.

In recent years, a concept which has moved from isolated reference to common usage and now formal definition is the 'Command Team,' which has been presented in *Beyond Transformation: The CPO1/CWO Strategic Employment Model* (hereafter, the *CWO Model*) as follows:

The CF Command Team construct is generally defined as "... a distinguishable set of two or more people who entered, dynamically, interdependently

and adaptively toward a common and valued goal / objective / mission, who have been assigned specific roles or functions to perform and who have a limited life-span of membership."¹

Subsequent amplification in this document states that the Command Team "... is widely accepted as the combination of a Commander and CPO1 or CWO," and explains that, while the Command Team is to be understood as applicable at the tactical and operational levels, at the strategic level "... the Command Team evolves into a Senior Leadership Team."²

This articulation of the Command Team as the combination of a Commander and CPO1 or CWO can be linked to previous CF analyses and strategic guidance, and, in particular, considerations of the evolving role of the NCM cadre.

Captain (N) [ret'd] Alan Okros, OMM, CD, PhD, is the Deputy Director Academics at the Canadian Forces College, where he teaches Leadership and Command. He was responsible for the teams that developed Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada and Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations. He continues to conduct scholarly work on military leadership, and he lectures on this subject in Canada and at a number of international professional military education centres.

However, a challenge in these statements is that, while the CF has endorsed a new concept, the Command Team, and has expanded the role of senior NCMs, what has been described is a conflation of leadership with command, and a blurring of the roles and responsibilities of appointed officers and CWOs. Failure to clearly articulate how the 'Command Team' is to be understood, and to ensure consistency with current definitions of leadership and command, can be professionally confusing and ultimately doctrinally dangerous.

This article is concurrently a strong endorsement of the intent of the *CPOI/CWO Strategic Employment Model* (henceforth, for simplicity, the *CWO Model*), but also a critique in that the language used is incorrect. This argument will be developed by working from evolution in the roles of the Officer and NCM Corps through understandings of leadership and command, to the implications of the Command Team, with suggestions to address the doctrinal conflicts.

Officer-NCM Roles and Relationships

At one level, nothing has been more enduring in the organization and functioning of the military than the concept of an officer and NCM cadre. However, the relative roles and the inter-relationships between officers and non-officers continue to evolve based upon changes in military requirements, and in broader society. Importantly, although it is common for most armed forces to be seen as professions, the dominant view in many nations has been that it is the officers who are the professionals, and that 'non-officers' are not. The influential conservative American political scientist Samuel Huntington's differentiation in the US military stated:

The enlisted personnel have neither the intellectual skills nor the professional responsibility of the officer. They are specialists in the application of violence not the management of violence. Their vocation is a trade not a profession.³

At a June 1999 symposium on non-commissioned officers in the Canadian Army, a CF colonel echoed Huntington's philosophy by arguing that the officers were the 'thinkers,' and NCMs the 'doers.'⁴

This desire to retain traditional roles was, however, being rejected as the CF recognized the requirement for significant evolutions to ensure success in future missions. In fact, June 1999 also saw the formal acknowledgement in *Defence Strategy 2020* that the CF needed to undertake significant strategic change initiatives, including the generalized theme of innovation, to ensure that each member of the CF could make the maximum contribution to CF effectiveness.⁵ The application of this broad departmental strategy for NCMs was articulated in 2003 in *NCM Corps 2020*, with Strategic Objectives which emphasized professionalism, intellectual skills, leadership capacity, and a strong Officer/NCM team. These were subsequently reflected in the doctrinal publica-

“At one level, nothing has been more enduring in the organization and functioning of the military than the concept of an officer and NCM cadre.”

tion *Duty with Honour*, which clearly rejected the Huntingtonian view by stating that all members of the CF, regardless of rank, are members of the profession of arms.⁶ Further, this publication forecast:


“The old paradigm that emphasized the decision-making role of the officer and the applied, technical role of the NCM will likely shift. ... Authority will be increasingly delegated and an even greater degree of responsibility assigned to NCOs and warrant officers to permit the officer/NCM team to dominate the operational theatre across great distances of time and space. In some cases, officers, NCOs and warrant officers may share these authorities and responsibilities; i.e., some roles will increasingly overlap.”⁷

To a large extent, from *Defence Strategy 2020*, through *NCM Corps 2020*, to *Duty with Honour*, the CF had clearly articulated the requirement for a significant shift in the role and status of the NCM Corps, and in the increased overlap of officer and NCM responsibilities. In doing so, however, the references to Officer/NCM teams, and the requirements to enhance NCM leadership capacity, appear to have morphed into the articulation of an Officer-CWO Command Team. To understand the potential doctrinal difficulties that have been created, it is necessary to review how leadership and command are understood and practiced.



Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington during an interview with Reuters in Chile, 7 August 2002.

Reuters RTRPLK by Claudia Daut



DND

Leadership

The concept of leadership is generally well articulated in the academic and professional military literatures. Conceptually, leadership is best understood as a form of social influence. Within a work context, the basis of social influence is seen as being some form of *personal* power and *position* power.

Thus, organizational leadership can be understood as the purposeful use of individually-acquired personal power and organizationally-conferred position power to influence others to achieve goals valued by the organization. When applied to the CF, the definition of effective military leadership is presented in Conceptual Foundations as:

“Directing, motivating, and enabling others to accomplish the mission professionally and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mission success.”⁸

The reference to ‘developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mission success’ leads to the differentiation between *Leading People* and *Leading the Institution*. The focus of leading people is on developing individuals as members of teams and

ensuring that they accomplish assigned tasks, while the focus of leading the institution is attending to broader, system-wide responsibilities, so as to set the conditions for small team success. An important differentiation between the two is that leading people is very much focused upon influencing one’s own subordinates and teams. Thus, leadership is mainly exercised ‘down and in.’ Leading the institution, on the other hand, addresses inter-related domains, and often involves exercising leadership ‘across, up and out,’ including into the societal and political arenas in which the profession of arms must function.⁹

The articulation of two foci of leadership also reflects a shift away from the earlier CF perspective that leadership is best differentiated as strategic, operational, and tactical. Further, leading the institution places a greater emphasis upon facets of longer range, pan-organizational leadership with, importantly, the understanding that this function is not restricted solely to the purview of the most senior General and Flag Officers (GO/FO). The very clear intent of the CWO Model publication is to provide Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) direction to confirm that the most senior CWOs are expected to make a significant contribution to leading the institution, and much of this document presents the career development implications of providing the path to success for senior appointment CWOs.

Integrated in leading the institution is the requirement for military leaders to pay increased attention to aligning their internal practices and culture with the expectations of the citizenry.¹⁰ As described in *Duty with Honour*, the profession of arms must attend to both functional and societal imperatives. Simply stated, leaders must achieve the objectives assigned by the government of the day, but in a manner that retains public confidence and support. A further complication is that there are significant differences between the private and public sectors, and between the civilian public service and the military.¹¹ Particularly in the context of the leading the institution domain, some of these factors are of importance when military leaders need to determine what they are to achieve when influencing others.



General Walter Natynczyk, Governor General Michaëlle Jean, and Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer Greg Lacroix in Kandahar, Afghanistan, 8 September 2009.

DND photo GG2009-0359-003 by Sergeant Serge Gouin

While military leadership must always ‘get the job done,’ the CF must, in fact, have the potential to get a *number* of very different jobs done, occasionally with limited advanced warning from government, and often with a high degree of risk. This requires that leaders generate flexibility, adaptability, and resilience. Additionally, as the government is the guardian of the social good, and must answer to the ‘people’ for the use of public resources, there is a greater emphasis placed upon accountability. Due to this emphasis, the *bureaucratic* ideology values *efficiency* over *effectiveness*, while the *professional* ideology does the reverse.¹² Further, the Federal Government has undertaken to ensure that the government workforce proportionately represents key Canadian demographics, and that workplace practices be aligned with certain social values. This philosophy is illustrated in the concept that the military must reflect the society it serves.

As articulated in the *Conceptual Foundations*, the key functions of leadership, hence, of the leaders, is to achieve an appropriate balance across a range of competing outcome and conduct values. These were developed by incorporating the views of an authority on the subject, the University of Michigan Professor Robert Quinn’s organizational behaviour research on competing (outcome) values,¹³ and the *Duty with Honour* framework of professional and ethical (conduct) values, to produce the *Canadian Forces Effectiveness Framework* highlighted below.

This framework highlights that leaders must attend to tensions amongst competing outcome (what should we focus on doing) and conduct (how should we do it) values. Further, this framework also extends the consequences of leader influence beyond the confines of the military to recognizing that leaders at all levels can influence second order outcomes such as public and political confidence, trust and support for the institution.¹⁴

This summary of the CF approach to leadership demonstrates that, while leadership is still seen as an influence process, and that much of the traditional focus of military leadership remains focused upon ensuring that small teams achieve mission objectives, the 2003 doctrinal framework serves to expand the nature and scope of leadership from a predominant focus upon ‘down and in,’ to also incorporate the requirements to influence ‘across, up and out,’ including movement into the political and societal

domains in which the profession of arms must function. To a large extent, the strategic objectives articulated in *NCM Corps 2020* and now the *CWO Model* publications are intended to ensure that all members of the CF, and, in particular, those CPO1/CWOs selected for senior appointments, are prepared, empowered, and supported in taking on the full range of leader responsibilities.

There is, however, one clear source of confusion introduced in the *CWO Model*. The adoption of *Leading People vs. Leading the Institution*, and, more specifically, the rejection of the idea that there should be three types of leadership to align with the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, leads to an obvious doctrinal conflict with the *CWO Model* articulation, which states, “... there are three defined leadership levels within the CF: tactical, operational, and strategic.”¹⁵ The more accurate statement is that there are three levels at which military activities are organized and controlled. Hence, these levels apply to *command*, not *leadership*. The following section will examine the nature of command to explain the differentiation between the two, and, in doing so, will highlight the fundamental doctrinal issues with the Command Team construct.

Command

Although command is central to how the military functions, has a strong legal basis, and is prominent in the military lexicon and doctrine, it tends to become a somewhat confused concept.¹⁶ References to command can be linked to a function (exercising command), an appointment (being the Commander) or a process (command decision making). Further, the processes of exercising command are often seen as being conducted by a Commander and staff. Additionally, descriptions of the responsibilities and activities of commanders often con-



The Chief of the Defence Staff, General Walter Natynczyk, Lieutenant-General André Deschamps, Chief of the Air Staff, and Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer Greg Lacroix at a media conference at CFB Trenton, 10 February 2010.

DND photo/N2010-0074-04 by Private Gisèle LeBlanc

flate command with leadership and/or management. Those holding staff appointments often refer to their positions as being in command particularly when the CF has applied the title Commanding Officer as referring to certain legal responsibilities but not extending to command *per se*. Finally, doctrine and definitions are not clear with command, often confused with control and with Command and Control (C2).¹⁷ To a large extent, the articulation of the Command Team in the *CWO Model* publication reflects the doctrinal and professional confusion surrounding command.

The NATO and CF definition of command is "... the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination, and control of military forces."¹⁸ To expand and clarify further, the function of command can be understood as the activities undertaken by an individual to provide the structure required to apply military capabilities in order to achieve politically mandated objectives in a lawful manner.¹⁹ There are several key implications to this phrasing. First, command is vested in an individual, and is based upon formally delegated authority. Second, this delegated authority is derived from law starting with the National Defence Act although other regimes of national and international law apply, depending upon the context. Third, the purpose of command is to provide structure and, in particular, leads to the related concepts of control and C2. Fourth, the reference to politically-mandated objectives means that command is applied in the context of conducting military operations. Conversely, however, as clearly articulated by defence research scientists Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, only humans command. Their 'reconceptualization' of the human in command led to these alternate definitions:

- Command: the creative expression of human will necessary to accomplish the mission;
- Control: those structures and processes devised by command to enable it and to manage risk; and
- C2: the establishment of common intent to achieve coordinated action.²⁰

To extend this understanding of command, CF doctrine describes command as follows:

"Command may also be described in terms of an array of functions associated with an appointment or as a set of activities related to those functions. As functions or activities performed by a military commander, command typically includes, but is not limited to, such things as planning, problem-solving and decision making, organizing, informing, directing and leading, allocating and managing resources, developing, co-ordinating, monitoring, controlling, and so on. But the essence of command is the expression of human will, an idea that is captured in the concept of commander's intent. Nearly everything a commander does – planning, directing, allocating resources, monitoring – is driven and governed by the commander's vision, goal, or mission, and the will to realize or attain that vision, goal, or mission. As such, com-

mand is the purposeful exercise of authority – over structures, resources, people, and activities."²¹

This presentation of command serves to illustrate why the three constructs of command, leadership and management can become conflated. The references to planning, organizing, problem solving, coordinating, controlling and resource management are all classic components of management while the inclusion of developing, directing, and leading, along with the notion of human will, are clearly linked to leadership. Thus, to develop a more complete understanding of command (as a uniquely military construct), it is necessary to consider the inter-relationship of management and leadership in a general organizational context.

An integration of the literatures on public administration, socio-technical systems and sociologist Eliot Freidson's *bureaucratic vs. professional* ideologies provides a means to understand the three concepts.²² Organizations function through the integration of formal, structural systems (bureaucracy) and informal, social systems (the human dimensions). The structural systems represent those elements that are intentionally created and assumed to operate on a linear, rational basis to achieve efficiency.

These elements include rules sets, standard operating procedures, job descriptions, work plans and, in the military, doctrine and training. The function used to regulate the structural systems in order to achieve efficiency is management, and thus covers standard activities of planning, organizing, and controlling all resources, including capital, equipment, information, and the competencies resident in the workforce. The social systems represent those elements that are emergent and operate on a combination of cognitive and affective bases to achieve those outcomes (ends) using those processes (means) that are valued by the individuals and groups that belong to the social system(s). As a result, organizations can only influence social systems, not control them. Thus, the function used to do so is leadership.

To return to the previous comments that leadership influence can be applied 'across, out and up' as much as 'down and in,' a key understanding of management can also be multi-directional, but is based upon formal authorities and pertains to specific functions (hence the reference in Defence to 'functional authorities').²³ As a *general* concept underlying management, and a *specific* intent within government bureaucracy, management is intended to be exercised as a form of 'checks and balances,' based upon the principle that no one person has unrestricted power over key resource decisions.

This description of *management* (controlling the structural systems) and *leadership* (influencing the social systems) is characteristic of many organizations, including government bureaucracies. The exercise of management as the basis of checks and balances leads to inevitable delays in obtaining requisite approvals. However, this is seen as an appropriate restriction in order to ensure due diligence.²⁴ While bureaucratic management can work well in contexts of predictability and stability, this approach becomes less and less effective in

"First, command is vested in an individual, and is based upon formally delegated authority."

more dynamic situations. Hence, the military has drawn upon centuries of experience to create the concept of command, which is seen as a concentration of powers and authorities in one individual that is deemed required under certain circumstances, usually characterized by high risk, a complex environment, and significant time pressures.²⁵ Thus, command is a fusion of authorities and, as such, aspects of both management and leadership are subsumed under the function of command.

Based upon these supporting mechanisms, the Commander can concentrate on a narrow(er) domain of key activities and rely upon the four broad sets of enablers to act as substitutes for command attention or multipliers of command effect. These four are: command decision processes; leadership; culture and management enablers. Using Quinn and the *CF Effectiveness Framework*, command gives priority to mission accomplishment with both leadership and cultural enablers

that concurrently attend to individual commitment and member wellbeing. When incorporated within command, management gives priority to internal integration and the focus on efficiency through bureaucratic control, while leadership gives priority to member well-being and the focus on generating effort to achieve (command-directed) mission objectives. Thus, one can talk about command-related management and command-related leadership as specific forms of management and leadership that are used when command is also being exercised.

Of importance, command can function the way it does precisely because command is embedded within the

broader context of institutional effectiveness. It is because others outside the command domain (strategic [military] staff in higher headquarters and strategic [political] decision makers) attend to the other two Quinn quadrants (balancing requisite consistency, bureaucracy, and standardization under Internal Integration with requisite flexibility, creativity, and disruption to the status quo under External Adaptability). Thus, it must be understood that the nature of leadership and management *outside* the command domain is different (more expansive) than *within*.

This discussion of command has highlighted that it is a unique military function created to overcome the delays created by the 'checks and balances' of bureaucratic management with, importantly, a fusion of significant authority and responsibility in

the position of the commander. Despite the huge potential for commanders to be overloaded with demanding decision making in the context of uncertainty, turbulence, and high risk, those charged with exercising command can do so effectively by relying upon a number of command enablers, which include competent, motivated staff.



DND photo WA2011-0140-068 by Master Corporal Holly Cowan

The Chief of the Land Staff, Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin (left) and Army Sergeant Major Chief Warrant Officer Giovanni Moretti speak with a soldier working at the Manitoba flood mitigation, 15 May 2011.

In this context, the purpose of command is to provide an individual (the commander) with the authority and capabilities to apply a high degree of independence to ensure necessary action within (generally) predefined parameters to achieve (broadly) proscribed objectives under dynamic conditions involving significant numbers of interdependent teams and high consequences of failure. Based upon these considerations, it is proposed that, conceptually, *command* is the authority to *initiate* action; *management* is the authority to *amend* action; and *leadership* is the capacity to *influence* action. To expand, command involves the principle-based initiation of action through control networks; management involves the rules-based amendment of action through bureaucratic networks; and leadership involves values-based sense making through social networks. Those exercising command, leadership, or management are aided by supporting mechanisms (both social and structural) with: command enablers designed to restrict command effort to what is essential; leadership enablers designed to amplify the effects of leader influence and management enablers designed to optimize managerial effort.²⁶

“Thus, command is a fusion of authorities and, as such, aspects of both management and leadership are subsumed under the function of command.”

To return to the focus of this article, this command staff most definitely *does* and *should* include the most senior non-commissioned members working for the commander. However, in articulating an expanded role and greater responsibilities for senior NCMs, the reference to a command team in the *CWO Model* publication has created the potential to undermine current doctrine and law. The label used, and some of the text presented in this publication, can give the impression that command responsibilities can or should be shared between the commander and CWO. The understanding that command authority and responsibility rests solely with the appointed commander should remain an inviolate tenet of military effectiveness. Under current doctrine, command cannot be shared, nor can it be delegated. While ‘unity of effort’ can be used to describe the requirements to work horizontally to harness the capacities resident in other units, or even other departments, this does not displace the requirement for ‘unity of command.’ Further, the ‘chain of command’ represents a very clear hierarchy of nested command responsibilities, with each subordinate commander given clear authorities through formal appointment. Failure to retain these principles can lead to the notion expressed elsewhere that the commander commands the officers, and the senior NCM commands the troops.²⁷

“Barring a doctrinal rewrite, this conflict can be resolved with a slight rewording of how the command team is to be understood.”

Leadership Team at that level, and the Strategic Leadership Cadre, to represent the collective stewardship responsibilities of all of the General and Flag Officers, and all the senior appointment CWOs/CPO1s.


The second option would be to draw upon the common usage of ‘mission command,’ which is, in fact, a short form of the ‘mission command leadership philosophy.’³⁰ Thus, the CF could use the command team, in short form, with the understanding that this represents the command team leadership philosophy. While this can be endorsed as a phrase that is acceptable in everyday use, there should be a clearly articulated doctrinal basis which defines the command team leadership philosophy, and which describes in detail how command and how leadership in support of command are to be understood and exercised. By doing so, and in implementing the recommendations contained in the *CWO Model* publication, the CF will be well placed to enable all members of the profession of arms, officers and NCMs, to make the contributions necessary to ensure mission success in the future.

CMJ

Resolving the Doctrinal Dilemma

As stated in the introduction, the generalized intent of the *CWO Model* publication is fully supported. The expansion of the responsibilities of NCMs, and, in particular, those of the most senior CWOs and CPO1s is essential for the CF to meet the challenges faced in the contemporary security environment. The corollary conclusion is that the CF needs to invest in developing NCMs to their fullest potential, which includes expanding the depth and breadth of career learning, including shifting from professional development (PD), to professional military education (PME).²⁸ The challenge, however, is that in articulating this requirement, the description of the command team contradicts Canadian Forces doctrine and Canadian military culture.

One evident (yet difficult) solution is to redefine the basis of command to that of leadership by indicating that command could be based upon legal authority or personal authority.²⁹ Barring a doctrinal rewrite, this conflict can be resolved with a slight rewording of how the command team is to be understood. One option would be to expand the reference to be the ‘commander’s leadership team.’ Thus, rather than suggesting that the command team construct applies at the tactical and operational level, and shifts to being a Senior Leadership Team at the strategic level, it would be better to refer to the Unit Leadership Triad at the tactical level (CO, DCO, RSM; CO, XO, Coxn, and so on); the Operational Commander’s



DND

NOTES

1. Chief of the Defence Staff, *Beyond Transformation: The CPO1/CWO Strategic Employment Model* (Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, 2012). This quote is from Section 2.4, with italics in the original.
2. *Ibid.* Again, italics in the original.
3. S.P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), pp. 17-18.
4. Douglas L. Bland, *Backbone of the Army: Non-Commissioned Officers in the Future Army*. Queen's Policy Studies Series #18. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2000).
5. Government of Canada, *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*. [Defence Strategy 2020]. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1999).
6. Chief of the Defence Staff, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. (Ottawa/Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003); p 11.
7. *Ibid.* p. 75.
8. Chief of the Defence Staff, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), p. 30.
9. These broader domains are also reflected in the secondary outcomes of CF leader effectiveness which address the profession's external reputation, and level of external trust, confidence, and support (*Conceptual Foundation* pp. 19 and 23).
10. See A.C. Okros, "Rethinking Diversity and Security," in Christian Leuprecht (ed), *Defending Democracy and Securing Diversity* (London: Routledge, 2010).
11. See A.C. Okros "Becoming an Employer of Choice: Human Resource Challenges within DND and the CF," in Craig Stone (ed), *The Public Management of Defence in Canada*. (Toronto: Breakout Educational Network, 2009.).
12. *Ibid.*
13. R.E.Quinn, and J. Rohrbaugh, "A Spatial Model of Effectiveness Criteria: Towards a Competing Values Approach to Organizational Analysis," in *Management Science*, Vol. 29 (1983), pp. 363-377.
14. *Conceptual Foundation*, pp 18-23.
15. *CWO Model* Section 2.3.
16. Ross Pigeau, and Carol McCann, "Re-conceptualizing Command and Control," in *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2000, pp. 53-62.
17. See Ross Pigeau, and Carol McCann, "Redefining Command and Control," in C. McCann and R. Pigeau (eds.), *The Human in Command*. (New York, NY: Plenum Publishers, 2000).
18. Canadian Forces Joint Publication *Canadian Military Doctrine* (CFJP-01), para 0505.
19. The logic behind this statement is contained in CFJP-01 Chapter 5.
20. R.Pigeau and C. McCann, (2000); pp 163-184.
21. *Conceptual Foundations*, p. 8; italics in the original.
22. A.C. Okros, J. Verdon, and P. Chouinard, *The Meta Organization: A Research and Conceptual Landscape* (DRDC CSS TR 2011-13). (Ottawa: Defence Research and Development Canada – Centre for Security Science, 2011). See DAOD 1000-0.
23. See DAOD 1000-0.
24. With a greater emphasis on fiscal prudence than operational effects, as explained in Okros (2009).
25. A simple way of differentiating complicated vs complex environments is that complicated ones contain many variables, complex ones contain many unknowns.
26. A.C. Okros, *Leadership in the Canadian Military Context*, (CFLI Monograph 2010-01. (Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2010).
27. This application of the command team concept has been described by some CF and US members of JCSP and NSP as occurring on occasion in the US military.
28. PD can be seen as ensuring a well-practiced response to a predicted situation, while PME allows a well-reasoned response to an unpredicted situation.
29. See R. Pigeau and C. McCann, "What is a Commander?" in B. Horn and S. Harris (eds.), *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Press, 2001), pp. 79-104.
30. See A. Pecher, *The Erosion of Mission Command Leadership in the 21st Century? - Theoretical Considerations on a Military Leadership Philosophy in Western Societies*. Masters of Defence Studies research paper, Royal Military College of Canada, 2008.



DND photo SU2012-0875-21 by Corporal Heather MacRae.

Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Andy Dalcourt, Chief of Military Personnel (CMP) CWO, Mr. Clifford Chadderton, Second World War veteran, and Chief Executive Officer of the War Amps, and Rear-Admiral Andrew Smith, CMP, lay a wreath during the 2012 Remembrance Day ceremonies held at the Beachwood National Military Cemetery in Ottawa.



NATO photo_62582

NATO Headquarters, Brussels, in the snow, 02 December 2010.

LANGUAGE AND INTEROPERABILITY IN NATO: THE BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE CO-ORDINATION (BILC)

by Rick Monaghan

Introduction

The complexity of mounting operations in a multinational context is enormous. Experience in Libya has underlined some of the more obvious problems – coordination of supply chains, compatibility of refuelling systems, and coherence in gathering and communicating intelligence, as examples. But challenges to effective interoperability have existed within NATO from the start. In theory, communications ought to be seamless, and all systems, hard and soft, should be compatible. But in operations, the seemingly irrelevant kinks and crevices become threats to both internal security and the security of non-combatants. At the basic level of language, establishing and maintaining a shared communication system is fundamental. After more than a half-century in being, and given the new memberships and affiliations in the Alliance, NATO is still wrestling with the issue of language itself. This is not surprising, given that language is the most complex of human behaviours. However, there has been steady progress and increasingly positive results after years of coordinated effort and commitment.

Multinational exercises in the 1950s brought language standards to the fore. NATO started flexing its muscles with a series of international exercises to demonstrate its capacity to respond to Soviet aggression in north-western and south-eastern Europe. Exercise *Rainbow* (1950) involved the US, UK, and France, and was followed by *Holdfast* (1952) with the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, France, and the US participating. *Mainbrace* (1952), conceived by Eisenhower, identified some significant gaps in the joint language of command and led to identification of a need for standards in gunnery, refuelling, and supply at sea. In 1957, an ambitiously-massive series of exercises and simulations stretched in a 8000 kilometre arc from northern Norway to south-western Turkey, and it involved the US, UK, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and Norway in *Strike Back*. This naval exercise comprised 200 ships, over 600 aircraft, and 75,000 personnel in the North Atlantic. *Deep Water* saw the landing of 10,000 US Marines at

Dr. Richard D. Monaghan is the Senior Staff Officer Language Planning and Policy at the Canadian Defence Academy in Kingston. He chairs the Bureau for International Language Co-ordination (BILC), and has extensive experience in language education and assessment as a college and university teacher, manager, and administrator.

Gallipoli, and *Counter Punch* tested air operations and air defence operations in central Europe. There were dozens of exercises conducted by NATO forces throughout the decade. At the time, the stakes were high. Both antagonists had nuclear capability, other nations were developing that capability, and the ideological war was erupting in the discrete conflicts of Korea and south-east Asia, while both super powers jockeyed for power and influence in the Middle East and Africa. Concerted and joint international exercises were seen as preparation for the inevitable operations that loomed in an uncertain future, and the lessons learned from these exercises initiated a rigorous development of standards in all aspects of military engagement and collaboration.

Today, those exercises continue; the pace has not slackened, but more of these exercises are now conducted virtually and demanding different communication strategies and skills. While threats from stable states have diminished considerably, NATO operations continue to demand a high level of commitment to standardizing materiel, equipment, command structures, rapid and precise communication, and collaborative training and education. NATO forces contribute substantially to UN operations, and KFOR, ISAF, *Unified Protector* are daily reminders of NATO's own operational tempo.

In 2012, the future of NATO is as challenging as it has been for decades. Defence allocations have declined dramatically, and continue to decrease in Europe and North America. In 2011, former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called for a much greater commitment from European partners with respect to their own defence.

Looking ahead, to avoid the very real possibility of collective military irrelevance, member nations must examine new approaches to boosting combat capabilities – in procurement, in training, in logistics, in sustainment. While it is clear NATO members should do more to pool military assets, such 'Smart Defense' initiatives are not a panacea. In the final analysis, there is no substitute for nations providing the resources necessary to have the military capability the Alliance needs when faced with a security challenge. Ultimately, nations must be responsible for their fair share of the common defense.¹



NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 20 October 2012

NATO photo _90663

“In 2012, the future of NATO is as challenging as it has been for decades”

In the summer of 2011, the Secretary-General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, reminded the international community of the constant need for readiness in the face of destabilizing influences, and the Chicago Summit of May 2012 emphasized the immediate need for a shift to Smart Defense.² Of interest to those hundreds of managers and educators engaged in language education and training throughout the Alliance as they watched their concerted efforts threatened by budgetary restrictions, the Chicago Summit referred specifically to an expansion of education and training: “We will expand education and training of our personnel, complementing in this way essential national efforts.”³

By 2013, it is expected that the Alliance's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) will have taken on the responsibility for all training and education within NATO.⁴

An integral component of enhanced interoperability is the standardization of language training, education, and assessment on the one hand, and accurate Standardized Language Profiles in NATO units on the other. The key contributor in this enterprise is the little understood Bureau for International Language Coordination (BILC). This short history of BILC will look at the early years and the efforts to set linguistic standards, the expansion of BILC following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the challenges facing the organization on the next decade.



The Canadian Press, AP, 2559951 by Lionel Cironneau

Berliners celebrate as East Germans flood through the partially-dismantled Berlin Wall at Potsdamer Platz, 12 November 1989.

BILC is an association of representatives from nations and NATO bodies that co-ordinates language policy, programs, standards, management, and assessment within the Alliance. It has been active since its inception almost a half-century ago in sharing best practices in language education and training among its members and in advising NATO on ways and means of standardizing language practices to improve effectiveness and efficiency in operations and staffing. From 1978 to 2011, BILC was associated with NATO's Joint Services Sub-Group (JSSG), but the reorganization of the NATO Training Group (NTG) in 2011 put an end to that arrangement. BILC is now an advisory body attached directly to Joint Force Trainer (JFT) at SACT Headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia.

BILC Early Years

Eltham Palace is located just south of Greenwich on the road from London to Kent. From 1944 until 1992, it was occupied by British Army educational units. The Institute of Army Education was designated by the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) Memorandum 15/06/7, dated 26 July 1966, as the home of the Secretariat of a new language advisory body comprised of NATO members. The formation of the Bureau for International Language Co-ordination (BILC) as "... an international body committed to fostering common interests in

language training" was a response to a need recognized several years earlier for a co-ordination of efforts. The name itself was proposed at a previous conference at Mannheim, Germany, "... after multi-lateral private discussion, as a neutral, self-explanatory title with an easily remembered and pronounceable abbreviation."⁵ I suspect that the name was coined over several pints and the proposed acronym, with its less-than-reassuring homonym, initially drew beery guffaws. Nevertheless, the name and the organization have withstood the test of time.

Eltham Palace was the home of BILC from 1967 to until 1973. From 1962 through 1966, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) recognized the need to help each other in language training. The numbers of language teachers and managers is quite small, relative to national defence resources, and the constant design and redesign of language learning materials, approaches to teaching and learning, and even awareness of rapidly changing concepts of what language *is* and how it *is learned* require more resources than any single nation can support. Collaboration broadened expertise and experience, and reduced duplicated effort, as well as costs for research and development. The United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and SHAPE hosted conferences which focused upon language training in 1962, 1963, and 1964, and two more conferences were hosted at Eltham Palace in 1965 and 1966. It was agreed by the delegates to the 1966 conference that a formal body to coordinate military language training efforts in the community of NATO be established. SHAPE was seen by some as the ideal sponsor of a language training advisory body, but the UK MoD stepped in when SHAPE demurred at the additional toll on its limited resources.⁶ The responsibilities of the new body were to publish an annual bulletin, convene an annual conference, and encourage members to share reports on research and development with respect to language education and management. Today's BILC⁷ continues to fulfill that core intention.

Five nations agreed to participate in 1966,⁸ and they were followed quickly by three more in 1967.⁹ The first two BILC conferences were held at Eltham Palace in January and December 1967. In 1981, the Secretariat of BILC passed from the UK to Germany. Current membership, excluding observer nations and NATO bodies, with their year of joining, is as follows:

- 1966: founding members are France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- 1967: Belgium, Canada, Netherlands
- 1975: SHAPE and IMS/NATO (non-voting members)
- 1978: Portugal
- 1983: Turkey
- 1984: Denmark and Greece
- 1985: Spain
- 1993: Norway



Language issues were the least of the embryonic NATO alliance's problems in early-postwar Europe – Berlin Airlift, June 1948-May 1949.

The first few years of the *BILC Bulletin* are revealing. Reflecting the context of NATO during that period, presentations were delivered in either English or French, with a summary paragraph in the other language. Topics were largely academic. Reading the reports, one gets the impression of a post-graduate seminar. Major themes over the first decade and a half were the training and development of instructors, systems approaches to training, proficiency levels, and setting standards, characterizing the learner, and integrating technology.¹³ The topics and themes demonstrate the struggle to achieve some form of standard in language training and accreditation, a daunting task within nations themselves, but exponentially more difficult among nations and NATO bodies. The very first conference in January 1967 consisted of seven national reports. The report of France was, naturally, in French, as was the civilian portion of the Canadian report. The report on Canadian Forces (CF) practice and intent was delivered in English.

The 1960s witnessed a new Europe emerging, simultaneous with the Cold War, the Berlin Blockade, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the dismantling of Empire, and nuclear proliferation. The Cuban Missile Crisis brought focus upon the North Atlantic as a whole, and the need for interoperability of forces became more than a topic of debate. It became urgent that fluency in the languages of friends and enemies, English, French, German and Russian, be addressed by training establishments. In the words of one British delegate, "...the British reputation for shouting more loudly to assist the foreigner to understand, which had been so surprisingly effective in the past, suddenly appeared to raise a few problems."¹⁰ Lessons were learned from massive joint exercises through the 1950s, and a shift in focus from formal instruction in syntax and morphology to actually using a shared operational language was under way. It was somewhat of a relief for training establishments that the language of training for exercises and operations defaulted to English when the French withdrew from NATO military structures in 1966.¹¹ To be sure, it was a different NATO then than the one that presently exists.

Unremarkably, each nation was applying its own standards and all used different learning materials (textbooks, workbooks, audio-tapes, and handouts) yet similar methodologies. At this point, these consisted of teacher-centred instruction supplemented by language labs – the approach was labelled audio-lingual and audio-visual. Canada, adapting to the newly-minted bilingual policy of the federal government, was the exception in that it was in the process of customizing imported learning materials and methodologies. It had purchased French learning material, *Voix et image de France (VIF or the méthode de Saint-Cloud)*, and was redeveloping those materials for the *laboratoire de langues*, while

From the outset, the responsibilities of BILC were straightforward: the publication of the *BILC Bulletin* to disseminate "information on developments in the field of language training,"¹² and organizing an annual conference. Each nation was to submit an occasional report on its language training organization, instructional techniques, and its production of language learning materials.



SHAPE Headquarters, Casteau, Belgium

exploring another methodology developed in Canada (*Langue française internationale* or *LFI*) and a range of other materials, none of which alone could quite meet the needs of its clientele.¹⁴ In Canada, the English language materials and their embedded teaching methods were purchased from Harvard.¹⁵ The British training establishments were using their own rudimentary texts (phrase books developed by the British Army of the Rhine), the French had developed a sound academic curriculum (*VIF*), and the Americans were ‘ahead of the pack’ in establishing standards of assessment, as well as learning materials. By 1966, the English Language School had been subsumed by the Defence Language Institute, and had produced some 50 texts in *The American Language* series, complemented by about six hundred audio tapes.¹⁶ The American experience in assessment, from yet another branch of the US government, informed NATO language standards proposed by BILC over the course of the decade between 1966 and 1976. Today, STANAG 6001 *Language Proficiency Levels* is in its fourth iteration.

The *BILC Bulletin* was edited by the staff at Eltham Palace, but published by the *Übersetzerdienst der Bundeswehr* in Mannheim, and subsequently, by the *Bundessprachenamt*. This easy collaboration between

and among national authorities is a hallmark of BILC. The hefty volumes have been replaced in recent years by CDs initially, and now flash drives, but almost all are available on-line at the BILC website.¹⁷ The shift in technology has also led to the temporary demise of the *BILC Bulletin*. It is now an annual scholarly publication, and the annual report is morphing into a database of language training and education opportunities for the Alliance.

Advances in methodology and the development of learning materials are chronicled in the *Bulletin*. The move from the audio-lingual approach (lots of drill) to the communicative approach (lots of collaborative talking and listening) was gradual, but the latter approach, complemented by traditional formal teaching for written language, has become embedded in most NATO military language education and training centres. Each new learning technology challenges prevailing methodology and initiates a new iteration of program design and implementation. Current work being conducted by the Defense Language Institute Foreign

“With the standing up of the Partners for Peace (PfP) programs and subsequent agreements and initiatives, the active membership of BILC doubled over a relatively short period.”

Language Center in Monterey, California is reducing training time through new learning techniques and more effective program management, improving retention rates, and improving the maintenance of acquired skills. Canada is conducting research in the use of virtual environments to encourage learning and maintaining proficiency. Other education and training establishments will incorporate lessons learned by the US Defense Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) and other military establishments as they develop their own responses to national and international language requirements and expectations.



Eltham Palace

English Heritage Photo Library, Image Reference #5136379, by Damian Grady

Expansion 1989 onward

The dismantling of the Warsaw Pact ushered in a series of requests to join both NATO and the European Union (EU). Criteria for joining NATO are formal and strict, and to include developing programs to teach and assess English language for international operations and staffing. With the standing up of the Partners for Peace (PfP) programs and subsequent agreements and initiatives, the active membership of BILC doubled over a relatively short period. New NATO nations joined as full members as soon as they could, but had begun working with BILC well beforehand. Twelve nations have joined NATO since 1999:

- 1999 - Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
- 2004 - Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia
- 2009 - Albania, Croatia

With the goal of standardizing practice, in 1994, BILC initiated Professional Seminars for NATO and PfP nations, covering themes such as *Co-operation in Language Training with Emphasis on Testing and Proficiency Testing; Designing and Instructing Military Language Materials for Special Purposes; Language Training for Multinational Peace Support Operations and Testing Issues; Management of Language Programs; Task-Based Approaches in Language for Operational Purposes (LOP) and Performance Based Testing; Languages: The Key to Interoperability; and On the Threshold of a Decade of PfP: Lessons Learned in Language Training*. In Canada, as Force Compression took hold in the mid-1990s, excess capacity was quickly taken up by Associate Deputy Minister-Policy (ADM[Pol]) to provide English language education and training programs, and eventually teacher training, to PfP nations. Since then, we have seen about 5000 graduates of these programs return to their home countries, or to international postings.

Under the current terms of reference (dated 2012, but currently under review), PfP nations, Mediterranean Dialogue nations, nations from the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Global Partners (Australia in particular) and NATO bodies attend as observers, and, although welcome to contribute to the discussions of the Steering Committee, they are excluded from voting. All, however, are quite active in the business of standardizing language education, training, and assessment for general linguistic proficiency, as well as for specialized uses, and they regularly contribute papers and presentations at conferences, professional seminars, and workshops. All are equally concerned with governance and management of language programs.

Linguistics 101

The challenge of assessing linguistic proficiency arose early in the *Bulletin*, and it remains a challenge. With the expansion of NATO and partners, the issue of language assessment became urgent and challenging. What is to be measured, how, why, and by whom? A little background may be helpful to our readers at this juncture.

Languages are complex communicative behaviours that bind communities. A language is a matrix of conventions developed over time. A language community can be quite small, such as some of the First Nations languages in North America or elsewhere in the world that are dying out, or massive, such as English, which appears to be growing daily. They are unique expressions of communities and cultures, but they exhibit general characteristics. Primarily, language is spoken or signed. Writing is a technological innovation that attempts to freeze expression into an artefact. (If you do not consider writing or reading to be a technological innovation, try writing something without an instrument of some sort.) Spoken language consists of **phonemes**, conventions of noises that are understood by others in the community, and shaped by the movement of breath through throat and mouth and nasal passages, and stopped or impeded by muscle and bone, what are referred to as the points of articulation (tongue, teeth, vocal chords, hard and soft palate, and glottis). Depending upon where you are in the world, English has

about 45 phonemes, 20 of which are vowels. Think of the distinction between the central Canadian pronunciation of *route*, and the central-US or general-Australian pronunciation of the same word to recognize that there is a range of conventional noises associated with meaning. French phonemes differ from English phonemes; an English speaker will often have difficulty hearing distinctions in sounds (and thus cannot replicate those sounds) that a French speaker recognizes immediately. With respect to Finnish, the length of the medial vowel sound will distinguish between two vastly different meanings of the word *thule* (*fire* and *ice*); most English speakers cannot even hear the distinction because they are not accustomed to listening for it. **Morphemes** are the smallest units of speech and they change (morph) internally, or by the addition or removal of infixes, prefixes, and suffixes to indicate number, gender, tense, voice, mood, or function in an utterance. The [s] or [z] morpheme added to English words usually indicates either plurality of a nominal or the third-person singular form of a verb. The **syntax** of a language is the arrangement of elements to make sense. In English, one marches words along in an expected order to express the relationships between them. Modifiers usually precede the words they modify, and noun phrases normally precede verbs of which they are the subjects. In French, the order is similar but different, in that modifiers often *follow* rather than *precede* the words they modify, and verb placement is less rigid. The **lexis** of a language is the word-hoard from which speakers draw upon. It can be quite narrowly defined by a community that seeks to distinguish itself from the larger mass – such as teens or sociologists – or it can comprise a wealth of expressions understood by most speakers. A word is often associated with other words or concepts or has a ritual meaning that becomes a part of the **semantics**, or symbolic dimension of a language. The phrase ‘Henderson’s goal’ calls up a particular meaning for Canadians of a certain age that is lost on English speakers of different cultures and different age ranges. **Tonics**, or the tones of a language, usually referred to as ‘suprasegmentals,’ alter meaning as well. Finally, language is defined by its **graphics**, the conventional representation of the sounds or meanings with which speakers are familiar and expect to hear. The spelling of English appears chaotic if one is not aware that printing, which virtually froze the convention of spelling, was introduced to London just as the dialects that were recognized as English were undergoing another radical shift in pronunciation. We are thus left with frozen forms like *knight*, or *brought*, or *dough* that defy logic unless one realizes that the old spelling accurately represented the sounds of the words for the merchant class of London in the middle to the end of the 15th Century. The **construct** of a language is analysed through the lenses of phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and lexis and graphics, but the *use* of a language is analysed through many other lenses: psycholinguistics (the broad field of psychological and neurobiological analyses of how language is acquired and used), and sociolinguistics (which, broadly speaking, analyses how language effects social distinctions), are the dominant approaches to decoding language skills for evaluative purposes, while cognitive sciences and management of language policy inform language program design and delivery. This side-trip into the terminology of language analysis serves as an introduction to the subject of language assessment.

Assessment

The first challenge faced by the membership of BILC was defining for themselves what they meant by an appropriate level of language for operational purposes.¹⁸ What was appropriate, how could it be defined, and, more importantly, how could it be accurately and appropriately measured? Could the same definitions be applied to all languages; could the same measurement tools be used? In the case of the language of military operations, where lives of combatants and onlookers are at stake, what level of precision needs to be applied to ensure accurate and meaningful ratings of military members assigned to tasks? What is the real cost of unclear policy and poorly worded direction?

During the 1960s and 1970s, both Canada and the US had been wrestling with language standards and had some concrete recommendations to make to BILC. The Canadian Public Service had been obliged to define adequate proficiency in both English and French, and to develop reliable assessment instruments that had immediate impact upon careers, and were thus liable to legal challenge. Meanwhile, the US had been developing definitions of linguistic proficiency and assessment instruments for foreign languages. Both nations provided BILC with the groundwork that was further developed into the first edition of STANAG 6001 issued in 1978. Martha Herzog from DLIFLC chronicled the process in the Conference Proceedings of the 1999 BILC meeting held in the Netherlands.¹⁹

But once a standard has been set, the problems of how to interpret and apply that standard come into play. The level descriptors that constitute STANAG 6001 are guidelines for national language training and testing units. They identify the components of language (outlined earlier) that are simultaneously targets for training and assessment baselines, but they do so in the context of communication. In the sample descriptor below, you will note that there is no specific military reference. The descriptor, and tests that derive from it, are designed to identify general language proficiency – the ability to communicate over a broad range of subjects in different circumstances, with different audiences. It is a series of ‘can-do’ statements that identify, not only what a candidate *can* do, but will likely be able to *continue* to do.

There are six proficiency levels:

- Level 0 - No proficiency
- Level 1 - Survival
- Level 2 - Functional
- Level 3 - Professional
- Level 4 - Expert
- Level 5 - Highly-articulate native

The levels are used to identify language training and assessment requirements of troop contributing nations for

NATO operations, and for staffing international headquarters. They are also used to identify minimal language standards set by NATO’s International Staff for nations wishing to contribute to NATO operations, or to engage themselves with NATO in other capacities. BILC teams are regularly invited to advise nations on the management and design of military language programs in order to meet NATO language requirements defined by the International Staff, or by the International Military Staff.

The levels apply to four skill sets:

- Skill L [CP in French] Listening
- Skill S [EO in French] Speaking
- Skill R [CE in French] Reading
- Skill W [EE in French] Writing

Scores are reported numerically in that order. Therefore, a level of 3232 identifies the holder as having a Professional proficiency in Listening and Reading (the receptive skills), and a Functional proficiency in Speaking and Writing (the active skills).

The excerpt that follows is the STANAG 6001 level descriptor for Speaking, one of the four skill sets, at the Professional proficiency level (Level 3):

Able to participate effectively in most formal and informal conversations on practical, social, and professional topics. Can discuss particular interests and special fields of competence with considerable ease.

Can use the language to perform such common professional tasks as answering objections, clarifying points, justifying decisions, responding to challenges, supporting opinion, stating and defending policy. Can demonstrate language competence when conducting meetings, delivering briefings or other extended and elaborate monologues, hypothesising, and dealing with unfamiliar subjects and situations. Can reliably elicit information

and informed opinion from native speakers. Can convey abstract concepts in discussions of such topics as economics, culture, science, technology, philosophy as well as his/her professional field. Produces extended discourse and conveys meaning correctly and effectively. Use of structural devices is flexible and elaborate. Speaks readily and in a way that is appropriate to the situation. Without searching for words or phrases, can use the language clearly and relatively naturally to elaborate on concepts freely and make ideas easily understandable to native speakers. May not fully understand some cultural references, proverbs, and allusions, as well as implications of nuances and idioms, but can easily repair the conversation. Pronunciation may be obviously foreign. Errors may occur in low frequency or highly complex structures characteristic of a formal style of speech.

“During the 1960s and 1970s, both Canada and the US had been wrestling with language standards and had some concrete recommendations to make to BILC.”

However, occasional errors in pronunciation, grammar, or vocabulary are not serious enough to distort meaning, and rarely disturb the native speaker.

At this level of proficiency, conventional phonology, morphology, and syntax are not considered of paramount importance. This descriptor could apply aptly to the language of many competent native speakers. Higher level skills of organizing thought and argument, ease of expression, and a broad scope of discourse is much more important than pronunciation. Although an accent and occasional lapses may be apparent (phonology and morphology, and perhaps syntax and lexis), it does not detract from the high quality of expressive confidence (a psycholinguistic dimension) and cultural awareness (sociolinguistic dimension).

Compare the above with an excerpt from Speaking at the Survival level (Level 1):

Can typically satisfy simple, predictable, personal and accommodation needs; meet minimum courtesy, introduction, and identification requirements; exchange greetings; elicit and provide predictable, skeletal biographical information; communicate about simple routine tasks in the workplace; ask for goods, services, and assistance; request information and clarification; express satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and confirmation. Topics include basic needs such as ordering meals, obtaining lodging and transportation, shopping. Native speakers used to speaking with non-natives must often strain, request repetition, and use real-world knowledge to understand this speaker.

“Higher level skills of organizing thought and argument, ease of expression, and a broad scope of discourse is much more important than pronunciation.”

overall score indicates an individual’s level of proficiency. Assessment is conducted nationally. As much as possible, nations separate *teaching staff* from *assessment staff* to avoid negative test ‘washback,’ that is, the practice of ‘teaching to the test.’ Based upon the assessment results assigned by nations, members are assigned to international staff or operations. Occasionally, the discrepancy between national scores and the required linguistic proficiency leaves something to be desired. The gap in effectiveness in interoperability was analysed in detail by NATO’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Naples, which identified language as a major shortfall in 2010. This shortfall includes not only non-English speakers using English on operations, but the persistent use of non-standard English by native speakers in an international setting. This situation has not changed noticeably in the interim. Another analysis conducted by BILC members in 2010 indicated that part of the problem was the inaccurate Standardized Language Profiles (SLP) attached to NATO positions. As SLPs become unattainable, nations do their best to fill positions with members who are barely qualified, and the inflation of requirement is met by the consequent inflation of profiles in a rising spiral of real costs.



BILC Seminar, 2011

Photo courtesy of the author/NATO

At this level, the weaknesses in conventional phonology, morphology, syntax, lexis and semantics are apparent, as are psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic appropriateness. Proficiency is minimal.

Sub-Levels between 1 and 3 are 1+, 2, and 2+. ²⁰ Trained and experienced oral interaction raters *can*, and regularly *do*, discriminate among these levels with consistent accuracy. Results of assessments by untrained or inexperienced raters, on the other hand, are inconsistent and unpredictable. ²¹

Listening skills, reading comprehension, and writing skills have parallel level descriptors. In combination, the

What is being done to encourage standardized interpretation and application of the standard? To meet the demands for standardized assessment in an expanded NATO, raters are trained at a central school in Garmisch Partenkirchen, Germany, to apply STANAG 6001 norms. ²² The Language Testing Seminar is a two-week seminar developed by BILC, offered several times a year, aimed at developing competency in the development and administration of language proficiency tests based upon STANAG 6001 Edition 4. The Advanced Language Training Seminar is a three week course for experienced testers. It covers program management as well as more in-depth elaboration of the purposes and means of conducting assessment.

To provide tools for local authorities to correct ‘rater drift’ (inconsistencies) within nations, in 2003, BILC initiated a project called the Benchmark Advisory Test (BAT).²³ Initially a one-skill benchmark to allow nations and NATO bodies to align their results of reading assessments with an objective norm, the BAT was expanded through services (complemented by BILC engagement) contracted by Allied Command Transformation to provide benchmarks in all four linguistic skills. The BAT has been used by several nations to align national test results to STANAG 6001 norms.

In addition to the Professional Seminars, Language Testing Seminars, and Advanced Testing Seminars, since 2009, more localized seminars are held by neighbouring nations to address specific and common concerns in assessment and learning. The most recent was held in Copenhagen in September 2012, where workshops dealing with providing learning opportunities for developing listening skills and assessing those skills were hosted by the Danish Ministry of Defence. Others have been hosted in the Balkans (Zagreb and Sarajevo) and the Baltic (Stockholm). These intensive workshops encourage common understanding and procedures.

Throughout its close to 50-year history, BILC has continued to fulfill its goals: to host meetings, publish research and findings; encourage multi-lateral and bi-lateral collaboration, and advise members (and now *partners*) on management and governance of language programs. BILC has no budget of its own, but does rely on Allied Command Transformation, the International Staff, and other bodies to provide subsidies to encourage participation of Partners for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and concerned nations. Attendance at the annual Conference numbers around a hundred language professionals from ‘twenty-plus’ nations and NATO bodies such as SHAPE and IS each spring, graciously hosted by different nations, and supported by voluntary national contributions. Professional Seminars are equally well attended. The LTS and ALTS are fully booked well in advance, and the locally-hosted seminars dealing with individual issues have been successful in pulling together regional professionals who could not normally attend the professional development activities of the larger international meetings. BILC continues to sponsor the NATO standard for languages, STANAG 6001 Edition 4, provides regular training opportunities for assessors and designers of assessment tools, provides advice on program design, management, and governance through assistance visits to nations requesting its aid, and provides liaison on language issues to the International staff at their request, as well as formally to ACT. Collaboration among members and partners has allowed the unprecedented rapid development of effective programs in Dari and Pashtu, as well as quick development and distribution of phrasebooks in lesser known languages.

For Canada, BILC provided a sounding board for language program development in the 1980s, a program to which the nation still doggedly adheres, continuing professional

development of testing personnel, ready access to resources for training, education, and assessment that we could not afford on our own, and a Canadian reputation as an honest and expert broker in an area of enquiry, language, that is highly sensitive, and, as Canadians are particularly aware, very political.

The Secretariat of BILC, its executive arm, is currently held by Canada and led by staff from the Canadian Defence Academy in support of CDA’s mission and vision statements, “... to lead Canadian Forces professional development, uphold the profession of arms and champion lifelong learning

to enable operational success,” and to be “... a world leader in military professionalism, leadership and professional development, critical to the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces.” The three previous Secretariats have been held by the UK, Germany, and the US. Two current Associate Secretaries from the US (from the previous Secretariat) are located in Garmisch Partenkirchen in

the Partner Language Training Center Europe (PLTCE) at the George Marshall Center. They are responsible for assistance visits and the training of testers.²⁴ Over the past five years, the Secretariat has been witness to a shift in focus of BILC from assessment and the classroom itself to educational systems in general. The passion and professionalism of the contributors to BILC is a hallmark of the organization. Over the next few years, the role of BILC is expected to become more strategic as well as operational. The move from JSSG to ACT demands a much more rapid response time than in the past, especially as ACT is now in the process of reorganizing language education policy to better reflect the principles of Smart Defence. There is little choice: resources are dying up yet demand is increasing, but many nations are still delivering teacher-centred, subject-centred curricula that are wasteful and increasingly irrelevant to new generations of learners. Some potential for strategic changes to come in order to ensure that STANAG 6001 Edition 4 is interpreted and applied consistently across nations and NATO bodies is an analysis of SLPs in NATO headquarters, on-line verification tests of profiles before postings to international HQs, and official recognition and endorsement of courses of study that have a proven track record of success. These steps alone, by encouraging closer adherence to standards, would improve interoperability in short order. Although the gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan seemed to mark a lull in international conflict for NATO, experience has taught us that crises arrive unexpectedly from volatile areas. Interoperability is not a dead issue. BILC will be intimately involved in resolving the continuing issue of language shortfalls in interoperability by providing the advice of a broad spectrum of language professionals working collaboratively in a military environment, and by communicating among ourselves the ways and means of opening opportunities to learn and maintain common language proficiency across nations. BILC’s original mandate, to inform and advise, has never been so crucial.

“For Canada, BILC provided a sounding board for language program development in the 1980s...”





The BILC Conference 13-18 May 2012, Prague

NOTES

1. <http://www.defence.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581> Accessed 7 September 2012.
2. "Smart Defence is at the heart of this new approach. The development and deployment of defence capabilities is first and foremost a national responsibility. But as technology grows more expensive, and defence budgets are under pressure, there are key capabilities which many Allies can only obtain if they work together to develop and acquire them. We therefore welcome the decisions of Allies to take forward specific multinational projects, including for better protection of our forces, better surveillance and better training. These projects will deliver improved operational effectiveness, economies of scale, and closer connections between our forces. They will also provide experience for more such Smart Defence projects in future. But Smart Defence is more than this. It represents a changed outlook, the opportunity for a renewed culture of cooperation in which multinational collaboration is given new prominence as an effective and efficient option for developing critical capabilities." Rasmussen, "NATO after Libya: The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times," in *Foreign Affairs*. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67915/anders-fogh-rasmussen/nato-after-libya>. Accessed 25 September 2012.
3. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-C3E6796F-71B30D8E/natolive/official_texts_87594.htm?mode=pressrelease. Accessed 31 May 2012.
4. Morton Svindall, "Education and Training: A Harmonized Landscape," in *Transformation* at <http://www.act.nato.int/transformer-2012-01/the-transformer-issue-2012-01>. Accessed 3 October 2012.
5. Damien Bedding, "The origins of BILC up to 1981," asks the question "Why BILC? I quote: '... was proposed at the recent language conference at Mannheim, after multi-lateral private discussions, as a neutral, self-explanatory title with an easily remembered, and pronounceable abbreviation.'" *BB* 1999, p. 9 20.
6. *BB* 1973, p. 11.
7. The BILC website is in the process of migration from CDA to ACT NATO. A link can be found at www.bilc.forces.gc.ca. The mission and vision statements approved in 2010 parallel the original intentions expressed in the memorandum of 1966.
8. The United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, United States, France, and Italy.
9. Belgium, Canada, and the Netherlands. Canada had announced its intention to join in 1966, but only did so formally at the January 1967 conference at Eltham Palace.
10. Damien Bedding, "The Origins of BILC up to 1981," *BB* 1999, p. 1.
11. *BB* 1999, p. 19. SHAPE moved from Paris to Mons, and NATO Headquarters moved to Brussels.
12. Bedding, *Ibid*.
13. Cliff Rose, *BB* 1999, pp. 25-33, provides a summary.
14. "L'enseignement des langues dans la fonction publique du Canada," *BB* 1967, pp. 14 -15. « *Malgré la valeur indéniable de ces deux méthodes, il est évident que, dans leur forme actuelle, ne VIF ni LFI ne répondent entièrement aux besoins de nos étudiants. C'est pourquoi une équipe de chercheurs et de spécialistes travaillent actuellement à combler les lacunes de ces méthodes.* » Clearly, funding was not an issue.
15. *Ibid*.
16. *BB* 1966, p. 53.
17. The files were scattered over the years, but conference proceedings from 1967 to 1999 were digitized by Dr Christopher Hüllen and given to the Canadian Secretariat to mount on the website that had been transferred from DLIFLC to CDA in 2009. There are a few gaps, but these are being filled as materials are resurrected from dusty files and digitized.
18. An excellent primer on language assessment is Bachman and Palmer's *Language Testing in Practice* from the Oxford University Press (2004).
19. Herzog, "An Overview of the United States Government Language Proficiency Scale" *BB* 1999, p. 89, at http://www.bilc.forces.gc.ca/conf/2010/BILC%20Reports%20Archives/1999_BILC%20Report.pdf
20. Within BILC, and in some quarters of NATO, the need to assess level 4 proficiency is seen as too complex and too infrequently required to apply, but the descriptors for the four skill sets are contained in STANAG 6001 Edition 4. A BILC Study Group is attempting to resolve the quandary.
21. Julie Dubeau, *An Exploratory Study of OPI Ratings across NATO Countries Using the NATO STANAG 6001 Scale*, at <http://www.bilc.forces.gc.ca/rp-pt/doc/OPIraterSTUDY.pdf> Accessed 8 November 2011.
22. The course is described at <http://www.bilc.forces.gc.ca/lt-el/index-eng.asp> Accessed 8 Nov 2011.
23. The BAT is described in more detail at <http://www.bilc.forces.gc.ca/lt-el/index-eng.asp> Accessed 8 November 2011.
24. <http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/en/nav-college/nav-col-ptlce.html> Accessed 25 September 2012.



UN photo #313990 by John Isaac

United Nations Headquarters, New York City

AFTER AFGHANISTAN: CANADA'S RETURN TO UN PEACEKEEPING

by Michael Byers



Duncan Cameron/Library and Archives Canada/PA-212238

The Honourable Lester B. Pearson as Prime Minister of Canada

Introduction

"We need action not only to end the fighting but to make the peace."

– Lester B. Pearson

Spoke by Lester B. Pearson in 1956, these words grace the side of the peacekeeping monument in Ottawa. They also provide an insight into the true nature of this difficult and often dangerous task.

Pearson knew a great deal about war. He served in both the army and air force during the First World War.¹ During the Second World War, he served as a diplomat in both London and Washington. During the Korean War, he served as Minister of External Affairs. When Pearson spoke about making the peace, he was drawing a distinction from two other types of missions: the defence of one's country from outside attack, and forward-leaning interventions aimed at defeating opponents overseas.

Professor Michael Byers, PhD, holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British Columbia. The author of *War Law and Intent for a Nation*, he has been a Professor of Law at Duke University and a Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford. He has also taught as a Visiting Professor at the Universities of Cape Town, Tel Aviv, and Novosibirsk.

Defending the country from outside attack is the fundamental role of the Canadian Forces (CF), and they must be well trained and equipped for that purpose. Some overseas missions will also be necessary: during the Cold War, the principal duty of Canadian soldiers was not to make the peace, but to guard against the Soviet threat. From sailors in the North Atlantic, to fighter pilots on patrol over West Germany, to technicians at DEW-line stations across the North, they protected both Canada and our NATO allies.

Other overseas missions will take place in circumstances where there is no real military threat to Canada. Most recently, Canadian soldiers served bravely in a forward-leaning ‘counterinsurgency’ mission in Afghanistan. A mission that from a security perspective was optional, since al-Qaeda had relocated elsewhere by 2005 and the Taliban posed no significant threat to Canadians in Canada. As Canadian historians David Bercuson and Jack Granatstein opined in 2011: “Canada did have one core reason ... to be in Kandahar from beginning to end. Ottawa wanted to take on a dangerous and heroic mission in a difficult struggle in order to achieve influence in determining the course of that struggle. That was so that Canada would no longer be seen in Washington and Brussels as a free rider... ”²


Peacekeeping is also optional, insofar as it does not address direct threats to this country. It is something that Canada traditionally did, not only to curry favour with the United States, but to promote our long-term interests in international peace and security.

For almost four decades between 1956 and 1992, Canada was often the single largest contributor of UN peacekeepers. Its involvement then began to slip, and today, Canada occupies 57th place with only 11 military personnel and 116 police officers participating in UN peacekeeping missions.³ Logistical and personnel constraints in Kandahar were only partly responsible for this downward trend, which began well before 2005.⁴

Instead, the retreat from peacekeeping has been a political decision, as was demonstrated in 2010 when the United Nations wanted to place Canadian Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie in command of its 20,500-soldier force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It

“For almost four decades between 1956 and 1992, Canada was often the single largest contributor of UN peacekeepers.”

was initially reported that the Canadian Forces were “... angling to take command of the UN’s largest peacekeeping mission,”⁵ and the required deployment of just one general and a couple of dozen Canadian troops “... would be small enough not to make any impact on resources.”⁶ But then the politicians stepped in, and, before long, Department of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Catherine Loubier was explaining: “We’re fully engaged in Afghanistan until 2011, and that’s what we’re concentrating on for now.”⁷ Canada did keep nine soldiers in that UN peacekeeping force, and nearly two years later, the head of that contingent was reporting some progress – while calling for continued Canadian involvement in the Congo.⁸



Canada's rank among contributors to UN peacekeeping

Walter Dorn

This article accepts that the Canadian Forces play several essential roles. My argument is simply that peacekeeping should represent a larger proportion of our discretionary missions than it does today. To that end, I question some of the arguments made in favour of Canada’s disengagement from peacekeeping by examining them within an updated context, since much has changed during the past decade, including in the way in which the UN approaches peacekeeping. A strong case for reengagement can now be made – and that creates the need for a reappraisal.

Peacekeeping actually works

For more than a decade, Jack Granatstein and others argued that peacekeeping is passé, and counter-insurgencies are the new reality.⁹ They often pointed to the failed UN missions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, where peacekeepers were forced to stand by – due to ‘toothless’ mandates and inadequate equipment or numbers of personnel – while thousands of innocent civilians were abused and killed. They often overlooked the core reason for those failures of the early-1990s, namely, a lack of political will, not on the part of the UN as an organiza-

tion, but on the part of its member states. For example – and as Granatstein has himself identified – the UN ‘came up short’ in Rwanda, due to a lack of political will on the part of the members of the Security Council, especially France and the United States.¹⁰

date, UNIFIL was equipped with tanks, artillery, and surface-to-air missiles. In addition, UNIFIL’s commanding officer is ‘double-hatted’ to also serve as the UN head of mission, eliminating any potential confusion between the military and political leadership. UNIFIL is currently composed of soldiers from 36 countries, including major contingents from Italy, France, and Spain, with maritime support provided by Germany and Denmark. Significantly, a number of the main contributing nations are NATO members – although Canada, with its ideally-suited bilingual English-French military, is conspicuously absent. Since 2006, UNIFIL has successfully prevented a return to all-out hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah.



Canadian Forces members serving in Lebanon as part of UNIFIL, 2008

There have been many other successful UN peacekeeping missions. For example, from 1992-1993, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) stabilized and administered an entire country, ran an election, and managed a transition to a power-sharing government with strong public support, while sidelining the notorious Khmer Rouge. The UN Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) from 1992 to 1994, and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) from 1999 to 2002, had similar mandates and successful outcomes. The UN Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) from 1991 to 1995 successfully demobilized the FMLN guerilla organization, as well as military and police units implicated in serious human rights abuses, and also trained a new national police force. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) from 2005 to 2011 led to the end of the civil war, a referendum, and the relatively peaceful secession of South Sudan.

There was also a learning process underway, as the end of the Cold War enabled the UN to take on more robust and complex peace operations.¹¹ As a result of that process, UN peacekeeping has evolved significantly since the early-1990s, as evidenced by changes made to the operation in Lebanon.¹² The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was initially formed in 1978. In the summer of 2006, after two months of intense fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, the Security Council increased the number of troops in UNIFIL from around 2000 to a new authorized level of 15,000 personnel. It also provided an expanded and much more robust mandate, one that authorized UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems necessary within its capabilities to ensure that its area of operations (AO) is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.¹³

Consistent with this robust ‘take all necessary action’ man-



Thousands fleeing fighting in Kadugli, Sudan, seek refuge in an area secured by UNMIS, 09 June 2011.

Several independent analyses confirm that modern peacekeeping works, more often than not. From 2003 to 2005, the RAND Corporation compared eight state-rebuilding missions conducted by the United States, and eight by the UN in terms of inputs, such as personnel, funding, and time, and the achievement of the goals of peace, economic growth, and democratization. The study showed that seven of the UN missions succeeded, whereas only four of the American missions triumphed. It also identified several limitations to UN missions, including that they need at least some degree of consent and compliance from the parties to the conflict, and should not exceed 20,000 troops. However, it then concluded:

Assuming adequate consensus among Security Council members on the purpose for any intervention, the United Nations provides the most suitable institutional framework for most nation-building missions, one with a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degree of international legitimacy.¹⁴

The point with respect to low cost bears emphasis: UN peacekeeping accounts for less than one percent of global military spending.¹⁵ In 2012-2013, the UN will spend a total of \$7 billion on its 15 missions involving more than 80,000 soldiers.¹⁶ In 2010-2011, Canada alone spent an equivalent amount on its Afghanistan mission, with roughly 2500 soldiers deployed there.¹⁷

The RAND Corporation's research has been verified by Professor Virginia Page Fortna of Columbia University, who, in 2008, published a book-length investigation into whether peacekeeping works.¹⁸ She determined: "... peacekeepers make an enormous difference to the prospects for peace, not only while they are present, but even after they depart."¹⁹


Some critics of peacekeeping argue that most conflicts in the post-Cold War era are civil wars requiring more robust forms of intervention than the UN is able to provide, and that this explains the move to NATO in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. However, the Human Security Report reveals a marked decline in political violence worldwide since the end of the Cold War, including decreases of more than 70 percent in both international conflicts and 'high-intensity' civil conflicts.²⁰ It examines the various possible reasons for this decline, and concludes:

[T]he key factor was the liberation of the UN from the paralyzing rivalries of Cold War politics. This change permitted the organization to spearhead an upsurge of international efforts to end wars via mediated settlements and seek to prevent those that had ended from restarting again. As international initiatives soared - often fivefold or more - conflict numbers shrank. Indeed, high-intensity conflicts declined by some 80 percent between 1991 and 2008.²¹

UN Peacekeeping at all-time high

Today, there is no shortage of peacekeeping missions where Canadian soldiers could make a valuable contribution. Back in 2006, the Under-Secretary-General of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations acknowledged Canada's competing demands in Afghanistan, while expressing a desire to see more Canadian 'blue helmets' in the future, because UN peacekeeping operations depend upon universality, and the demand has not diminished.²² Indeed, in the last two years, the UN has deployed more peacekeepers than at any time in the organization's history, with more troops in conflict zones than any actor in the world, other than the US Department of Defense. As mentioned earlier, there are currently more than 80,000 blue-helmeted soldiers from 115 countries deployed in 15 separate peacekeeping operations, from Kosovo, to Lebanon, to the Congo.²³

"Several independent analyses confirm that modern peacekeeping works, more often than not."



Military and Police Personnel on UN Peacekeeping Missions

Walter Dorn

Unlike the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, most Canadians have not heard of these missions - in part because they are successful, and therefore, considered less newsworthy than failures. The member states of the UN, however, are clearly aware of the successes, for they continue to establish and fund more missions.

Reuters RTR2DPKG by Larry Downing



General Stanley McChrystal speaks to the media in Washington, D.C., 10 May 2010.

Canadians in general remain strongly supportive of peacekeeping. In an October 2010 poll conducted by Nanos Research for the Toronto *Globe and Mail*, 52 percent of Canadians rated UN peacekeeping as an important role for Canada's armed forces, with 25 percent giving it a '10 out of 10' on a scale of importance.²⁴ In comparison, only 21 percent of Canadians rated overseas combat missions as an important role for the military.

Lessons from Afghanistan

Canada joined the US-led counter-insurgency in southern Afghanistan in 2005, eventually deploying more than 2500 troops to Kandahar Province. The mission was definitely not peacekeeping, since it lacked impartiality and went beyond the minimum use of force.²⁵ Put forward by opponents of peacekeeping as a better fit for the Canadian Forces, the Afghan mission can hardly be described as a success. Indeed, in this author's opinion, the security situation in Afghanistan is significantly worse today than it was in 2005.

As US commander General Stanley McChrystal stated in 2009: "Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating."²⁶ According to the United Nations, 2010 was the bloodiest year since 2001 for Afghan civilians.²⁷ The number of NATO casualties has also climbed, from 131 in 2005, to 521 in 2009, to 711 in 2010 – before leveling off at 566 in 2011.²⁸

In an effort to exit the counter-insurgency, Canada and the US are now

seeking to expand and train the Afghan army and police, which is a daunting task. The attrition rate of the Afghan army is 24 percent; in other words, nearly one-quarter of Afghan soldiers leave the army each year.²⁹ Undoubtedly, some of those leaving the Afghan army will reappear as better-trained insurgents. In addition, 86 percent of the soldiers are "... illiterate, and drug use is still an endemic problem."³⁰ Adding to the challenge, the Taliban are systematically targeting recruits and trainers, including by the tactic of infiltrating the ranks of the recruits and then turning their guns on their classmates and instructors.³¹ In 2012, NATO significantly reduced the number of joint operations between Afghan and Western forces because of the frequency of these "green-on-blue" attacks.³²

Complicating matters further, corruption is so pervasive that Afghanistan is tied with Myanmar for third-most-corrupt country (just behind North Korea and Somalia) in Transparency International's 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index – a widely respected measure of domestic public sector corruption.³³ According to Transparency International: "Widespread corruption in Afghanistan continues to seriously undermine state-building and threatens to destroy the trust of the Afghan people in their government and their institutions while fueling insecurity."³⁴

To conclude this section, it is worth repeating an uncomfortable but important point. In 2005, the counter-insurgency mission in Kandahar was portrayed as a desirable step away from UN peacekeeping for Canada and the Canadian Forces. Today, the mission has fallen significantly short of its objectives, leaving Afghanistan more dangerous than it was before. With the counter-insurgency alternative having experienced a hard death, it is time to re-consider Canada's relationship to peacekeeping – and return to a much more active UN role.



Opening of the 67th General Debate of the UN General Assembly, 25 September 2012.

UN photo #527586 by Marco Castro

A niche for Canada

Most UN peacekeeping missions today have more robust mandates, more soldiers, and better equipment than the missions of the early-1990s. But they tend to lack well-trained soldiers from the developed world: a weakness that can be ascribed, in part, to Canada's disengagement from peacekeeping. A relatively small number of well-trained, highly disciplined Canadian soldiers could act as force-multipliers in UN missions, by providing leadership and mentoring, and by serving as role models for less-well-trained developing country troops. Canada still trains developing country soldiers through the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre, but this is no substitute for a presence in the field.

Contrary to the line of argumentation that took us into the counter-insurgency in Kandahar, if Canada wants to 'punch above its weight' militarily, UN peacekeeping missions are a good place to start.

Moreover, when Canada acts on behalf of the international community, it bolsters its reputation, thus generating what Joseph Nye of Harvard University calls "soft power" – the ability to *persuade* rather than to *coerce*.³⁵ Soft power is the principal currency of diplomacy for middle-power states. Canada's history, our international reputation for independence and objectivity, our highly trained, experienced, diplomatically skilled soldiers – all these attributes enable us to 'punch above our weight,' especially when we are not punching in the exact same place and time as the United States.

Sadly, our soft power has declined considerably in the past decade. In September 2010, for the first time in its history, Canada lost one of its regular bids for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. According to many international observers, our abandonment of UN peacekeeping was a contributing factor in the defeat.³⁶ As a result of losing that seat – to Portugal, no less – Canada has been absent from the top table for key decision-making on Libya, Syria, Iran, and North Korea, in what has been an important period of time for international peace and security.

Conclusion

As Jack Granatstein acknowledges, even the UN peacekeeping operation in Cyprus (which is often stereotyped as nothing more than traffic policing) was sometimes quite dangerous: "The Canadian Airborne Regiment fought a major



U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice speaks during a news conference in Islamabad, Pakistan, 04 December 2008.

Reuters RTR228TL by Mian Kursheed

"In an effort to exit the counter-insurgency, Canada and the US are now seeking to expand and train the Afghan army and police, which is a daunting task."

battle against invading Turkish troops in 1974 and sustained - and inflicted - casualties in this fight with a NATO ally at the Nicosia airport."³⁷ Those who argue against, and sometimes belittle, a Canadian role in UN peacekeeping do a disservice to the thousands of Canadian veterans who served in these missions, and particularly the 114 who were killed. Peacekeeping requires diplomacy, discipline, and often courage. Peacekeepers must be able to negotiate when possible, and to fight when necessary. Achieving that balance and acquiring those skills are difficult and valuable tasks.

Some critics even propagate the myth that peacekeeping is for 'wimps,' a myth that found its ultimate expression in US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's October 2000 comment: "We don't need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten."³⁸ Rice was a member of the US administration that failed to develop a peacekeeping plan for post-intervention Iraq, with unfortunate consequences for Iraqi civilians, US and allied military personnel, and ultimately, the global position and reputation of the United States.

Canada did not make the mistake of joining the war in Iraq. We should also avoid Rice's mistake of denigrating, and disassociating ourselves from the essential and often successful contributions made by UN peacekeeping. Canada served honourably in many UN missions; we should do so again.

Author's Note: The two graphs in this essay were provided by Walter Dorn, Associate Professor, Canadian Forces College. I am also grateful for assistance from Stewart Webb, Research Associate at the Salt Spring Forum.



NOTES

1. "Lester Bowles Pearson – Biography," available at: < http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1957/pearson-bio.html >.
2. David J. Bercuson and J.L. Granatstein, "Lessons Learned? What Canada Should Learn from Afghanistan," Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, October 2011, p. 32, available at: < <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Lessons%20Learned.pdf> >. For similar analyses, see: Bill Schiller, "The Road to Kandahar," in the *Toronto Star*, 8 September 2006; Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Penguin, 2007) pp. 178-196; Murray Brewster, *The Savage War: The Untold Battles of Afghanistan* (John Wiley and Sons, 2011) pp. 54-55; Doug Saunders, "Canada picked its Kandahar moment," in the *Globe and Mail*, 7 January 2012.
3. UN Department of Peacekeeping, "Monthly Summary of Contributions," 30 September 2012, available at: < http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2012/sep12_1.pdf >; UN Department of Peacekeeping, "Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations," 30 September 2012, available at: < http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2012/sep12_2.pdf >.
4. See: A. Walter Dorn, "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?" in *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7-32.
5. Matthew Fisher, "After Afghanistan, Canadian troops may provide peacekeeping in Congo," in the *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 March 2010.
6. David Pugliese, "A Potential Congo Mission and Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie," in the *Ottawa Citizen* blog, 3 April 2010, available at: < <http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2010/04/03/a-potential-congo-mission-and-lt-gen-andrew-leslie/> >.
7. Campbell Clark, "Canada rejects UN request to lead Congo mission," in the *Globe and Mail*, 30 April 2010.
8. Stephanie Levitz, "Too early to tell if Congo violence has passed, Canadian soldier says," in Canadian Press, 3 January 2012, available at: < <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/too-early-to-tell-if-congo-violence-has-passed-canadian-soldier-says/article2289875/> >.
9. See, for example, Denis Stairs *et al.*, "In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World," in *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute*, 2003, pp. 27-29, available at < <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/In%20The%20National%20Interest%20-%20English.pdf> >; J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (HarperCollins, 2004); Sean M. Maloney, "From Myth to Reality Check; From Peacekeeping to Stabilizations," (September 2005), *Policy Options*, pp. 40-46.
10. J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (HarperCollins, 2004) ("If the Security Council's veto-wielding members didn't care about an issue, nothing would happen. In Rwanda, the French and Americans didn't, and hundreds of thousands died as a result.").
11. Ramesh Thakur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 39-41.
12. See the UNIFIL website at: < <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/> >.
13. UNSC Resolution 1701, 11 August 2006, available at: < <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/mandate.shtml> >.
14. James Dobbins *et al.*, *The UN's Role in Nation-Building, From the Congo to Iraq* (RAND, 2005) p. xxxvii.
15. *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (Oxford University Press, 2011) p. 74.
16. UN Department of Peacekeeping, "Peacekeeping Fact Sheet," 31 August 2012, available at: < <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml> >.
17. Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, "Fiscal Impact of the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan," 9 October 2008, available at: < http://www.parl.gc.ca/PBO-DPB/documents/Afghanistan_Fiscal_Impact_FINAL_E_WEB.pdf >.
18. Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton University Press, 2008).
19. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
20. *Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War* (Oxford University Press, 2011).
21. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
22. UN Department of Peacekeeping, "Press Conference by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, UN Headquarters, New York, 4 October 2006," unofficial transcript available at: < http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/articles/pr_JMG.pdf >.
23. UN Department of Peacekeeping, "Peacekeeping Fact Sheet," 31 August 2012, available at: < <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml> >.
24. Campbell Clark, "Canadians pick peacekeeping over combat," in the *Globe and Mail*, 25 October 2010.
25. See: A. Walter Dorn, "Peacekeeping Then, Now and Always," in the *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 4, (Winter 2005-2006), pp. 105-106.
26. *Washington Post*, "COMISAF Initial Assessment (Unclassified) – Searchable Document," 21 September 2009, available at: < <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html> >.
27. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, "Afghanistan Annual Report 2010 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict," March 2011, available at: < <http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/March%20PoC%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf> >.
28. See: < <http://icasualties.org/oef/> >.
29. Ahmed Rashid, "The Way Out of Afghanistan," in *New York Review of Books*, 13 January 2011, available at: < <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/jan/13/way-out-afghanistan/?pagination=false> >.
30. *Ibid.*
31. See: Michael Byers & Stewart Webb, "Training Can Be Dangerous: A Realistic Assessment of the Proposed Canadian Mission to Train Afghan National Security Forces," Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives & Rideau Institute, April 2011, pp. 8-9, available at: < http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2011/04/Training_Can_Be_Dangerous.pdf >.
32. David Stringer & Slobodan Lekic, "NATO says solo patrols 'temporary,'" Associated Press, 19 September 2012, available at: <http://www.leaderpost.com/news/NATO+says+solo+patrols+temporary/7263555/story.html>
33. Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2011 Results," available at: < <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/> >.
34. *Transparency International*, "Afghanistan: Setting a solid anti-corruption roadmap," 26 January 2010, available at: < <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/SNAA-82B7QM?OpenDocument> >.
35. Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (Public Affairs, 2004).
36. See, for example: "Canadian politicians point fingers at each other for UNSC seat loss," in the *People's Daily*, 13 October 2010, available at: < <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90852/7165578.html> >; "Snubbed," in *The Economist*, 14 October 2010, available at: < <http://www.economist.com/node/17254504> >; Colum Lynch, "Blame Canada!" in *Foreign Policy*, 18 October 2010, available at: < http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/18/blame_canada >.
37. J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (HarperCollins, 2004).
38. Michael R. Gordon, "Bush would stop U.S. peacekeeping in Balkan fights," in the *New York Times*, 21 October 2000.



Padre Mike Allen (right) holds a 5-year-old boy, as Sergeant Bill Burfitt, a medic with the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team, administers medication after his examination. Kandahar, Afghanistan, 07 September 2005.

RELIGIOUS LEADER ENGAGEMENT: AN EMERGING CAPABILITY FOR OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

by Steven Moore

Introduction

For decades, military chaplains have deployed with their troops to conflict and post-conflict environments around the globe, some still convulsing from the horrific violence that has time and again pitted neighbour against neighbour. The principal role for these clerics in uniform continues to be the provision of support for the troops entrusted to their care. Concomitant with this operational ministry has been an undeniable impulse to engage religious leaders and their faith communities with the view to aiding them in any way possible. This inherent desire of chaplains to make a difference in the lives of others has led to increasing involvement with indigenous populations in theatres of operation. In one manner or another, Religious Leader Engagement (RLE) has been a successful form of civic engagement in active conflict zones, in peace support operations, with its emphasis on stability and reconstruction, and in post-conflict environments, where brokered cease-fires led to mission mandates enforcing fledgling peace agreements between former belligerents. Historically, where conditions were favourable, chaplains have advanced peaceful relation

among fractured communities through humanitarian assistance. In more recent times, creating a safe space for dialogue has led to encounters between religious leaders, where conflict, or its residual effects, have left inter-communal relations either strained or non-existent. Shared ritual events and collaborative activities have emerged from such exchanges, engendering trust and renewing cooperation across ruptured ethnic divides. It is this reframing of relation that provides the impetus for beginning the journey of reconciliation. *Networking, partnering*, and in some instances, *peacebuilding*, RLE advances what Brigadier-General Jim Simms, Canadian Army Chief of Staff Land Strategy, identifies as essential to the Comprehensive Approach: It is "... about people, organizations and relationships - building understanding, respect and trust...cultivat[ing] involvement by key non-military actors."¹

Padre (ret'd) S.K. Moore, CD, PhD, completed doctoral studies (2008) in the religious peacebuilding of chaplains, inclusive of field research at the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team. As the Director of Development of the Integrative Peacebuilding Module Program at Saint Paul University, Ottawa, he is leading a team of subject matter experts in building an on-line program designed to equip civilian and military personnel for today's complex operational environment.

The shaping of RLE has been a shared journey of a number of military chaplaincies, each testifying to engagement unique to their particular context and presenting circumstances - Canada, the United States, France, New Zealand and Norway having documented their accounts. Australia and South Africa also speak of similar occurrences with local/regional religious leaders and their communities. These have been *ad hoc* experiences; chaplains advancing the cause of peace where religious leaders have demonstrated a desire to transcend conflict and reach across ethno-religious divides in an endeavour to create a more promising future for their collective peoples.

The above provides a sense of the emerging operational development of RLE as a capability. The remainder of this article will expand upon this theme in three distinct yet related areas: (1) to articulate a number of the causal factors contributing to religion becoming a more forceful element of contemporary conflict and, concurrently, its potential for peaceful applications; (2) to acquaint the reader with RLE as an endorsed capability under development, a collaborative endeavour of the CF Army and Chaplain Branch; and (3) to provide more clarity to a number of the more challenging questions implicated in institutionalizing RLE as an operational construct resulting from the RLE Seminar War Game conducted at the Canadian Army Staff College, Fort Frontenac, CFB Kingston, 16-20 April 2012.

Religion's Resurgence

Stretching back decades, western liberal, Marxist, and secular thinkers have spoken compellingly of religion's retreat from the political and social space to the private sphere, where it would dwindle in influence and relative obscurity. Their rhetoric today tends to "... stress the fact that religion has not so much disappeared as it has changed in its dimensions and function."² Increasingly, westerners are coming face-to-face with non-western societies suffused with religion. "In regions of the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, for example, it is not uncommon for political leaders and government officials to demonstrate (and sometimes exaggerate) the depth of their formal religious commitment."³ Some scholars openly refer to religion's 'recovery' as its 'return from exile' in international relations.⁴ Citing religion's resurgence, Katrien Hertog, PhD, senior peacebuilding trainer and facilitator at the London-based NGO *International Alert*, provides the following synopsis.

Evidence of religious resurgence became very clear in the Shi'ite-led revolution in Iran, the liberationist movements in Latin America, the emergence of Jewish fundamentalism in Israel, The Christian Right in

the United States, Hindu nationalism and Muslim communalism in India, the resurgence of religion in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism, the Islamic revival in the Middle East since the 1970s, Islamist opposition movements in Algeria, Pakistan, Egypt, and Indonesia, and ethno religious conflicts in Sri Lanka, Sudan, Bosnia, Kosovo, or Lebanon.⁵

Arguably, the forceful reappearance of religion in international affairs has created more than a small stir within the halls of power of Western countries, where more secularist approaches to resolving conflict are practiced. Calls for the inclusion of religious methods of peacebuilding have begun to surface, interestingly enough, originating from both religious and secular sources.⁶ Reticence within diplomatic circles to employ religious actors as credible partners in conflict resolution is long-standing. The all-too-common response from non-religious actors is 'for an institution that professes much goodness, there appears to be more than a small degree of evil associated with its activities, both historically and in the contemporary context.' Notwithstanding the numerous examples of such duplicity in the name of religion, this thinking tends to be reductionist, and, as such, is not always helpful in considering the complexities associated with religion, conflict and peace that face government leaders today. David Smock of the United States Institute of Peace notes that although religion is often an important factor of conflict in terms of marking identity differences, and motivating and justifying violence, religion is not usually the sole or primary reason of conflict. "The reality is that religion becomes intertwined with a range of causal factors - economic, political, and social - that define, propel, and sustain conflict."⁷ He contends that religious disagreements must be addressed along side the above if reconciling differences is to be achieved. Of encouragement is the recognition that many of the approaches to mitigating religious violence are found within faith traditions themselves.



Padre Murray H. Bateman (right) and Major Luis C. Cavallo (in background) offers Afghan men cards wishing them 'Eid Mubarek,' or 'Blessed Eid,' after they are welcomed to Camp Nathan Smith, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 26 September 2008.

DND photo AF2008-K108-66 by Master Corporal Karl McKay

Religious Extremism as a Driver of Conflict

Exacerbating contemporary conflict are extreme expressions of religion. While purely religious conflict is rare, there is a rise in hostilities with explicit reference to religion. For those implicated, the clash frequently becomes a struggle between good and evil, rendering violence a sacred duty.⁸ Today's unprecedented co-optation of religion as a means of deepening existing cultural and political fault lines aids in fueling the justification of militancy and terrorism.⁹ Militant extremism motivated by a religious imperative embraces violence as a divine duty or sacramental act. Holding to markedly different notions of legitimization and justification than their secular counterparts, these organizations indulge without compunction in greater bloodshed and destruction than terrorist groups with solely a political agenda. Noting the role of religious leadership, anthropologist Pauletta Otis explains: "The complexities of conflict may be compounded further when religious leaders who, with their incendiary language, contribute to the congealing of adversarial identity markers, exacerbating the polarization of communities even more."¹⁰ As a vehicle of influence, religion is known for its efficacy, frequently exploited by political leaders prone to supplement their anemic rhetoric with religious ideology as a means to motivate local populations to extreme patriotism and violent behaviour.¹¹

In recent decades, religiously inspired violence has become more pronounced, mainly due to a strategy of elevating religious images to the realm of divine struggle, thus creating in the minds of ardent followers the specter of cosmic war. R. Scott Appleby, Professor of History and Regan Director of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame notes: "Rather than break down barriers, in short, religion often fortifies them... Constructed as inseparable from ethnic and linguistic traits, religion in such settings lends them a transcendent depth and dignity. Extremists thus invoke religion to legitimate discrimination and violence against groups of a different race or language."¹² Harnessing such emotive themes is the mainstay for many waging worldly political battles. Convincing youth to commit horrific acts of violence against vulnerable civilian populations becomes much less arduous when such atrocities

are deemed to be "... sanctioned by divine mandate or conceived in the mind of God. The power of this idea has been enormous. It has surpassed all ordinary claims of political authority and elevated religious ideologies to supernatural heights."¹³ Today, extreme religious expression has given terrorism remarkable power through *spiritualizing* violence.¹⁴ It is this hollowing out of the faith experience that so often precipitates the congealing of 'us' and 'them' attitudes among the 'faithful,' rendering individuals and groups vulnerable to the persuasion of politically ambitious leaders to commit acts of violence against the 'evil other.'



Captain Yves Joseph, a Canadian Forces padre from Montréal, who is originally from Haiti, addresses this crowd in Creole, thereby playing an important role in fostering ties. Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 14 February 2010.

Religious Contributions to Peacebuilding

A broad spectrum of individuals and organizations - external and indigenous actors, increasingly inter-religious - now collaborate in various venues on a number of levels to bring the irenic attributes of religion to bear on conflict and violence. The impetus of this surge to include religious approaches in resolving conflict - despite the incongruous portrayal religion frequently presents - is the recognition that it possesses social and moral characteristics that often serve as constructive forces for peace and conflict transformation.¹⁵ Where religion is a factor in conflict, those endeavouring to bring structural, economic, political, and social change have begun to reflect on these connections.¹⁶ In today's *new wars*,¹⁷ "... there is clearly now a greater imperative to dialogue not just to get to know the religious other, but to form bonds of inter-religious solidarity against the hijacking of religions to legitimate violence."¹⁸ Among the approaches under consideration is the need to discern ways to "... integrate the wisdom, spirit and techniques of the world's religious traditions into the politics


"Where religion is a factor in conflict, those endeavouring to bring structural, economic, political, and social change have begun to reflect on these connections."

and practice of contemporary conflict management, resolution, and prevention.”¹⁹ Instances where leadership has failed to appreciate religion as an element of a presenting conflict have, in some cases, led to unfortunate decisions with disastrous results, culminating in missed opportunities.²⁰ In societies where, due to conflict, centralized authority has ceased to function altogether, religious communities often represent the only remaining institutional and social structure functioning with any degree of credibility, trust, and moral authority among the people.²¹ The role and training of religious leaders often positions them to better interpret an ongoing conflict. Due to their closeness to the situation, acquaintance with many of the actors, and ease with the language and an appreciation of the issues, religious leaders offer an invaluable perspective of the conflict at hand.²²

Kofi Annan, former General Secretary to the United Nations, recognized the unique position religious organizations held in local communities and the potential inroads to resolving conflict they offered globally. In his 2001 Report, *Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General*, he stated the following:

Religious organizations can play a role in preventing armed conflict because of the moral authority that they carry in many communities. In some cases, religious groups and leaders possess a culturally based comparative advantage in conflict prevention, and as such are most effective when they emphasize the common humanity of all parties to a conflict while refusing to identify with any single party. In addition, religious groups could mobilize non-violent alternative ways of expressing dissent prior to the outbreak of armed conflict.²³

Annan clearly identifies religious leaders, living authentically among the people within local communities the world over, as a valued resource in conflict intervention. These are individuals *tolerant* of the *other*, possessing moral integrity and courage, cognizant of local culture, and capable of inspiring the people to more peaceful means of resolving conflict. This gives added credence to Appleby’s contention that although exploitive leaders frequently appeal to religious identity in order to stir ethnic and tribal division, it is also true that religion may be invoked as a means of transcending differences and unifying rival tribes.²⁴



Kofi Annan speaks at a news conference held at the UN European headquarters in Geneva, 30 June 2012.

Reuters RTR34EWC by Valentin Flauroud

The Operational Role of Chaplains

Today, military leaders increasingly acknowledge the strategic merit of building rapport and establishing cooperation with the religious segment of society as being critical to the accomplishment of mission mandates. It is under Commanders’ authority and in accordance with their intent that chaplains contribute to meeting these operational objectives through engaging religious leaders and their faith group communities. *Networking, partnering*, and, in some instances, *peacebuilding* endeavours among local clerics have proven to be effective means to garnering the much-needed trust of these revered community leaders.

As a multi-faith community, military chaplaincy represents numerous religious traditions, each with its own understanding and interpretation of belief, based upon the sacred texts and teachings of their particular faith tradition. At the core of this inter-faith collaboration resides a *hermeneutics of peace* that recognizes the pursuance of peace and justice as a sacred priority by peaceable means where possible.²⁵ Religious leaders in uniform, these men and women of faith often witness the horrific acts of violence and its effects known to conflict and post-conflict environments, manifest in the tragic loss of life and livelihood, often accompanied by the staggering movements of refugees in search of safety. It is circumstances in time and space such as these that challenge one’s belief and time-honored traditions, precipitating new self-understandings of chaplaincy. Demonstrative of this expanding *hermeneutics of peace* is the *impulse* among chaplains to draw upon the understanding, imagination, and requisite values of their collective faith and traditions to aid conflicting groups in *re-humanizing* the *other*.




Figure 1 – Operational ministry of chaplains

The term Operational Ministry describes the overall role of chaplains in operations: in support of the troops and among local indigenous populations. The primary purpose for a chaplain's presence with a deploying contingent is to administer the sacraments, and to provide pastoral support for the troops - the base of the pyramid designated as *Internal Operational Ministry* in Figure 1. It has *always been* and must *continue to be* the principal focus of deploying chaplains. Also benefiting mission mandates depicted is the depicted *External Operational Ministry* that sees the future role of chaplains extended to the strategic realms of: (1) advising Commanders in terms of the Religious Area Analysis (RAA) of an Area of Operations (AO); and (2) engendering trust and establishing cooperation within communities by engaging local and regional religious leaders - the domain of RLE.

Religious Area Analysis (RAA)

The intent of RAA in operations is to determine the basis for *what people do* and *why they do it* with respect to religion. As credentialed clerics, the advanced theological training of chaplains and additional skills development positions them to better interpret the nuances of religious belief that often escape detection - something that could be very costly to a mission. In grasping something of the meaning and reality of the faith perspective, chaplains are more apt to appreciate how the belief system of the grassroots person/community may colour their response to given mission initiatives, plans of action, troop movements, and so on. The nature of command often necessitates sending troops into harm's way. As such, the availability of all information pertinent to the decision-making process is vital. Advising commanders

of the possible pitfalls or backlashes of given courses of action with respect to religious communities is a crucial aspect of their role.

Chaplains at the captain level are now undergoing skills development training in RAA at the CF Chaplain School and Centre (CFChSC) at CFB Borden. The intention is to equip them to provide the religious terrain analysis of an AO for Commanders in the field. Delving into the religious domain, additional granularity has been to the Horn of Africa (HoA) scenario developed by the Chief of Force Development (CFD), and adapted to the *Chaplains in Deployed Operations* course. Plenary instruction, coupled with syndicate work over the course of a week focuses upon the Sunni and Shia *intra*-faith differences and tensions in the HoA region. Each syndicate presents their findings to 'the Commander': four points of significant interest gleaned from the open source research, and one point resulting from *networking* among the religious communities in the AO. In this sense, RAA becomes a living document, due to interfacing with the local religious leadership - a deterrent to what can become sterile analysis. As an operational capability, deploying chaplains will possess the knowledge, and, increasingly, the skills to accumulate and categorize information relating to the religious practices and traditions of indigenous populations within an AO. This information will be gathered from as wide a range of resources as practicably possible in the amount of time allotted prior to deployment. As chaplains become more intentional regarding to RAA in theatres of operation, *peacebuilding* opportunities with religious communities will lead to *partnering* with other entities, both within the military milieu and the Whole of Government environment. Based upon the operational experiences of others, the following translates as a theoretical construct of RLE with an emphasis on application - praxis.




Figure 2 – Religious leader engagement

Religious Leader Engagement (RLE)

Perhaps perceived as an imposing diagram at the outset, Figure 2 below unpacks in stages in actual presentation. Due to the brevity of this article, the core elements of the RLE construct will be the main focus: building relation, JIMP, the tolerant voice of religion, encounter, and collaborative activities. Additional aspects will be drawn upon for clarity and continuity as needed.

JIMP

The RLE construct finds its origins in the Public space of the Joint, Inter-agency, Multinational, and Public (JIMP) principle, "... an [Army] descriptor that identifies the various categories of players (i.e., organizations, interest groups, institutions) that inhabit the broad environment in which military operations take place."²⁶ Others may be more familiar with the language of the Comprehensive Approach, which describes this operational space as well. The P, or the Public space, hosts a number of organizations and activities in operations, of which the indigenous population therein is without question the most consequential. Local religious leaders are undoubtedly centres of gravity within indigenous populations - middle range actors who, in non-western societies, where the lines of separation between faith and the public space are markedly less defined, enjoy elevated profiles at community and regional levels. This owes its origins to the seemingly seamless nature existing between religious communities and local culture, and, at times, politics. Due to the common ground of the faith perspective, chaplains are able to contribute much as a result of their ability to move with relative ease within religious circles.

Building Relation

Engaging the *other* is all about building relation. Often a prominent local religious leader is a voice of reason within their community and frequently among other faith groups, as they move across ethno-religious lines easily. John Paul Lederach, a professor of International Peacebuilding at Notre Dame writes: "The centrality of relationship provides the context and potential for breaking violence, for it brings people into the pregnant moments of the moral imagination: the space of recognition that ultimately the quality of our life is dependent on the quality of life of *others*."²⁷ Civic engagement of this nature is not an end in and of itself, but should be viewed as one in a series of engagements over an extended period of time as relation develops. Building sufficient levels of trust will require time. The objective of such engagement is not to look for 'quick fixes' or 'bandage solutions' that will unravel if constant 'life support' is not there. The long view must be considered as the most effective approach to achieving lasting results.

The Tolerant Voice

Identifying the *tolerant voice* among religious leaders is key to initiating dialogue. These are faith group leaders - community leaders - often desirous of moving beyond conflict, thus transcending the present hostilities and intransigence that pit their respective identity groups against one another. Known as *middle-range actors*, they enjoy the confidence of the grass roots while moving freely at the higher levels of leadership within their own communities. Their ease of movement affords them relationships that are professional, institutional, some formal, while other ties are more a matter of friendship and acquaintance, hence a high degree of social capital within communities.²⁸ More notable still, "... middle-range actors tend to have pre-existing relationships with counterparts that cut across the lines of conflict within the setting...a network or relationships that cut across the identity divisions within the society."²⁹

Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Sir Rupert Smith of Britain states that contemporary conflict tends to be timeless. The operational objective has become more to win the will of the people, which leads to opponents adopting more of a guerrilla warfare approach. This, in turn, creates greater complexity, making it far more demanding to reach a condition where a strategic decision can be made and solutions found.³⁰ Iraq and Afghanistan have embroiled the international community in protracted conflict, reinforcing Smith's contention that the post-conflict phase of missions has become exceedingly difficult to attain. Where the will of the people is the center of gravity, those of *tolerant voice* within religious communities may offer a way forward. Even in the most damaging conflicts, there remain those individuals who resist passing on the violence. Rather, they see it as a clear sign of the futility and evil of violence itself. The imperative is to seek ways of supporting these rare individuals who potentially represent a way forward for the fractured fraternities that leave their communities torn and estranged.³¹



Captain Mike Allen talks to a group of young children while they wait to be seen at a free medical clinic for the local population of Kandahar, 07 September 2005.

DND photo AR2005-A01-162a by Sergeant Jerry Kean

Encounter: The Fragile We of Working Trust

Facilitating the bringing together of local leadership, most often religious, is the essence of *encounter*. Creating that safe space for dialogue where none has existed provides occasion for altered perspectives to emerge. It is in *encounter* that the rigidity of long held stereotypes and the constant barrage of propaganda begin to lose their strength. Here one does not simply see the *other* from one's own perspective but such exchanges facilitate viewing oneself through the eyes of the *other* - a double vision of sorts.³² Where the willingness to engage the *other* begins, a *re-humanizing* of the *other* has a chance to emerge - seeding reconciliation.

The possibility of future cooperation is built on such exchanges. As trust develops between religious leaders and their communities, damaging effects of inter-communal violence may be lessened among groups due to the channels of communication established across ethnic lines via the religious community leadership. Collaborative activities among faith groups may be one approach to initiating such collaboration. In contexts where conflict is ongoing or still fresh in memory, civic engagement - *encounter* - may be the best we can hope for as a beginning. Civic engagement that engenders integrative processes is one approach among others to aid in creating and sustaining inter-communal structures that will rebuild conflict-stricken communities.

Collaborative Activities: Towards Personal Trust and Integration


In circumstances where security and opportunity have been favorable, commanders have authorized chaplains to undertake more intentional *peacebuilding* activities among religious communities. Chaplains from a number of countries have brought religious leaders together who, due to existing tensions, have been incommunicado for a number of years. Dialogue, and, in some instances, collaborative activities have resulted. Social psychologists currently focusing on the dynamics of inter-group reconciliation note the saliency of *supra-ordinate* goals to such processes. These are jointly agreed-upon objectives that benefit both communities, yet neither group can accomplish alone, achievable only through *inter-communal* cooperation. With thorough needs analysis - an evaluation process facilitated by the chaplain involving the local religious leadership and military/civilian program developers - a

“Leadership must keep before them that every gesture, every movement in improved relations, however small, is a success in and of itself.”

shared project with the right fit may be selected. As such, nascent integration takes root. Through cooperation of this nature, an identity more inclusive of the *other* begins to develop. It is in such an atmosphere that conflict is transcended, new narratives are written and the healing of memory begins.

Further to their research, a growing number from the social psychology community note that success in improved inter-group relations has often occurred when ‘bottom-up’ attempts at the small-group level have brought together middle- or lower-level leaders (middle range actors/boundary spanners) for face-to-face consultations.³³ Transformation occurs more at the interface between individual-level and group-level processes. ‘Bottom-up’ reconciliation is often the most effectual - as individuals interact, social networking evolves, influencing greater numbers. This represents a cross-section of people joining together in common cause - *collaborative activities*. It is not unusual that unofficial, lower-level channels of communication and cooperation come to the fore when official levels have become mired down. An additional aspect of ‘bottom-up’ movements is the amount of trust that may develop across community lines.

Extended seasons of collaboration create opportunities for building trust. Whereas some contend that trust is a prerequisite for cooperation, field research suggests that it may also be a product of collaborative activity.³⁴ Establishing trust may also be a way of beginning emotional healing, a level of reconciliation necessitating a higher level of trust: it moves beyond the stage of monitoring if commitments are being honored (co-existence), to ‘resembl[ing] the trust of friends or



Captain Robert Lauder from London, Ontario, a padre with the Canadian Forces Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), speaks with teachers about children's school needs at a displaced persons camp near Garhi Dopatta, Pakistan, 01 November 2005.

DND photo IS2005-2259a by Sergeant Frank Hudec

family,' commonly referred to as *inter-personal* or simply *personal trust* (integration). Through continued interaction old attitudes are replaced by new perceptions of the *other*, an internalization that 'over time' leaves its mark on identity. Although old frictions may rear their heads - eventualities over which one has no control - the ties forged through such inter-communal collaboration leaves those involved less vulnerable to such situational changes.³⁵

Of import to any engagement of this nature is the necessity of 'top-down' involvement. Any progress made among individuals and small groups must be embedded within structures, requiring the aid of higher-level leadership. Where chaplains are able to *facilitate* such initiatives between religious/community leadership, *partnering* with their Inter-agency (JIMP) colleagues will be crucial to sustaining such endeavours - integrative processes that create local ownership.

Leadership must keep before them that every gesture, every movement in improved relations, however small, is a success in and of itself. Given the right circumstances, such positive change impacts human social life with a steady accumulation of positive increments of change. International *peacebuilder*, Rabbi Marc Gopin of George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia cautions not to confuse "long-term ends with short-term tasks."³⁶ This is sage counsel for a difference exists between first order goals and those of higher order. In a conflict or post-conflict environment, the former - civil dialogue, cooperation, working trust, i.e. peaceful coexistence - is "evaluated on its own merit without any regard as to how events unfold in the long-term," a situation which may sustain a degree of unpredictability. High order goals look to what may be accomplished over the long-term: "... justice, the satisfaction of basic human needs, and the creation of a peaceful society that is egalitarian."³⁷ Realizing such profound objectives often take decades if not a generation or more.

Implementing Religious Leader Engagement

As an operational construct, RLE may be generalized from one context to another: expeditionary, humanitarian and domestic operations. Since its endorsement as a capability under development by the Army Capability Development Board (ACDB) in June 2011, RLE has moved through the Concepts phase of the capability development process to that of Design. Concomitant with the presentation was an appreciable degree of discussion among the Board members as to the potential benefits and possible impediments to eventual RLE implementation as an operational capability. Most notable were questions relating to

Information Operations and Influence Activities. Of concern was the possible erosion of the chaplains' protected status under the Geneva Conventions. In endorsing the concept of RLE, the Board charged the Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs (DLCD) with addressing these concerns and reporting their findings to the ACDB.

A collaborative effort was mounted between DLCD and the Chaplain Branch spanning the following autumn (2011) and winter (2012), culminating in a RLE Seminar War Game (SWG) at the Canadian Army Staff College, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario (16-20 April 2012). Representatives from related fields convened for four days of syndicate and plenary deliberation on two fictional scenarios featuring RLE in operations in the Horn of Africa region. Among these were senior members from: the Chaplain Branch (eight members, inclusive of Chaplain General McLean); Senior Mentor [a colonel (ret'd) US Army Chaplain]; Influence Activities Task Force (three); Information Operations (three); Judge Advocate General (one, the JAG); Social Psychologists (four, Defence Research and Development Canada); Conflict Studies, Saint Paul University, Ottawa (one); Defence Analyst (one); Operational Researchers (two); and DLCD (six). The following represents an abridged overview of the findings of these deliberations.



In syndicate at the RLE Seminar War Game, April 2012

Photo courtesy of the author

JAG

Process dictated that the legal perspective come early in order to provide a frame of reference for the scenarios prepared for syndicate discussion. The two terms, *religious personnel* and *ministry*, and their application in the context of conflict, were discussed at length. According to International Humanitarian Law, the term *religious personnel* refers to military or civilian persons *exclusively* engaged in the work of their *ministry* and attached to specific types of organizations,³⁸ i.e., the national forces chaplaincy of a signatory country to

the Geneva Conventions. Notable here is the Convention's usage of the word *exclusively* in reference to the *ministry of religious personnel*. It must be understood, where chaplains facilitate dialogue or collaborative activities between estranged religious leaders and their faith communities, the purpose is to seek consensus in the pursuance of peace, the resolution of conflict and reconciliation with their consent - peacebuilding activities that may be viewed as exclusive and legitimate *ministry*. JAG posited that *exclusively* engaging in such *ministry* would not jeopardize the protected status of chaplains. Safeguarding the integrity of RLE as *ministry* holds much promise for creating good will and improving relations between religious communities engulfed in the on-going conflict of their respective identity groups, or living with its residual effects - post-conflict environments.

Salutary to the understanding of RLE as *ministry* is the notion of *intent*, which alludes to the motivation behind such initiatives, the crux of such initiatives. The question that must be posed is, "What is its purpose?" Of necessity, the first order effect of RLE must preserve *benevolence* as its essential tenet - the incentive of seeking the *well being* of other persons. In so doing, the integrity of such *ministry* is assured. In order to guard against straying into activities that constitute contributing to or supporting hostilities, RLE must function within the bounds of *ministry* that proposes ameliorating the lives of *others*. This embraces seeking consensus in the pursuance of peace and the resolution of conflict and reconciliation. Endeavours of this nature are not designed to attack the opposing force's will to fight, and, as such, would not be considered supporting the use of force. In this light, the chaplain's engagement in RLE does not put in jeopardy his/her protected status as a non-combatant. RLE is best understood to be a unique chaplain capability conducted by credentialed religious personnel within boundaries of discrete religious interaction - a stand-alone line of operation alongside other lines of operation.

Influence Activities

On the surface, similarities may appear to exist when comparing RLE with an Influence Activity (IA) - both are leader engagements, producing some degree of influence as an interactive, personal, and pragmatic method. RLE has as its goal to contribute to the easing of social tensions and resolving conflict by engaging those of *tolerant voice* (middle range actors) within religious communities. For some, such *ministry* may appear to be analogous with the act of *influencing*. As indicated above, the difference lay in *intent*. As a first order effect, the *intent* of IA is in direct support of hostile activities simultaneous with and complementary to fires. This represents operational space that is incongruent with the purpose and *intent* of RLE and antithetical to the protected status of chaplains as non-combatants. The 'thin edge of the wedge' emerges when considering the more 'soft' IA capabilities, such as Public Affairs (PA) or CIMIC activities, which may be seen as somewhat complementary with RLE initiatives. In addition to IA and PA, Key Leader Engagement (KLE)³⁹ poses as a natural means of embedding chaplains for RLE *ministry*. By way of contrast, any association with Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and Military Deception would taint RLE, thus undermining its effectiveness as a peacebuilding capability. In this regard, RLE is unique in terms of its content, expectations and the credentials of those engaged in its *ministry*. Its intended purpose is not to leverage relationships with religious leaders for military advantage. The aspiration of engagement is not simply to shape outcomes, rather to appreciate the exceptional nature of religion as a catalyst to bridging divides - sometimes within faith communities, at other times, across ethno-religious boundaries - with the first order effect of the *well being* of the *other*.

Information Gathering for Intelligence Purposes

Concurrence was reached early into the SWG that chaplains providing specific information to be fed into a larger Intelligence collection platform would be in violation of 'direct participation' in hostilities, thus jeopardizing the chaplain non-combatant (protected) status. More general information identifying perceptions, attitudes, or local issues would fall within the parameters of Religious Area Analysis, and not part of an intelligence debriefing or hostile act planning session. With this as a basis of understanding, the focus shifted to the issue of transparency due to the sensitive nature of information that may be made known to the chaplain. Albeit hypothetical, the potential for a chaplain to be caught in an ethical bind of this nature is credible - maintaining the trust of a religious leader versus divulging information that may be vital to the mission, or, more precarious still, the lives of others.



Photo courtesy of the author

Building relation, establishing trust - Captain Imam S. Demiray with the Ulema Council of Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. In the form of a Shura, this was the first visit of the regional religious leaders to the PRT. DFAIT Political Advisor Gavin Buchan in foreground.

DND photo IS2010-5000-035 by Corporal Julie Béliste



Captain Shaun Turner, DART company padre (left), and two other Canadian servicemen, pose with two proud Haitian children during Operation *Hestia*, Jacmel, Haiti, 22 January 2010.

Conclusions

The international response to today's protracted conflicts has given rise to the advent of the Comprehensive Approach, with its JIMP emphasis focusing here primarily upon the Inter-agency and the Public Space aspects of operations. Inter-agency - Whole of Government for others - proposes intensified collaboration of military and civilian entities as a means of enhancing stability and reconstruction efforts. Even more fundamentally, support for adoption of a comprehensive approach stems from a growing consensus that outward-focused, integrated, and multi-disciplinary approaches to security threats and challenges must become the new norm, given the complex problems and challenges posed by a multi-dimensional security environment.⁴⁰ Military chaplains have already established a track record

An ideal solution to the handling of sensitive information by chaplains does not exist, should it fall into their hands. It becomes a question of determining the most satisfactory approach among lesser desirables. In the event that a chaplain came to possess sensitive information that he/she deemed vital, the consensus was the most effective means of protecting the source (chaplain) and the integrity of the process (religious context and actors) was to exercise the chaplain's specialist officer status and report to the commander directly. Due to his/her grasp of the total mission, it was determined that the commander is best suited to decide in what manner to dispense with such information.

in working constructively with religious leaders in theatres of violent conflict, thereby contributing to the peace process. As RLE becomes more institutionalized, the probability of specialist chaplains embedded in PRT-like organizations holding to a civil-military configuration is on the horizon. Concomitant with greater civil-military integration is the incorporation of a 'Phase 0' into campaign planning, with its aspiring emphasis upon prevention by attending to strategies designed to preclude and resolve conflict before it has a chance to ossify -

The above represents the more salient points of discussion during the RLE Seminar War Game - a collective effort of the principal stakeholders in its development. The findings presented here are not to be viewed as conclusive or binding. RLE is an evolving domain and, as such, further research is needed accompanied by continued dialogue among the principals in order to fully appreciate the nuances of this emerging operational capability. That said, one must not diminish the *clarity brought* and *ground gained* through the purposeful exercise of the RLE SWG.



Transcending conflict - Padre G. Legault with Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Muslim religious leaders in Glamoč, Bosnia, 2003.

Photo courtesy of the author

operational objectives for the future. These are consequential shifts in focus indicative of a move to greater inclusivity. Converging with such openness, RLE at tactical and operational levels represents an added dimension of mission effectiveness now recognized by leadership at strategic levels. The concept of chaplains with specialized training, conducting RLE-type activities within religious communities, collaborating with their Whole of Government partners, has come of age. As government departments and agencies move toward incorporating a religious element within their approach to

peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts, serious reflection must be given to the unique contribution chaplains bring as an operational resource.

Editor's Note: Portions of this article are taken from the forthcoming publication by this same author: Military Chaplains as Agents of Peace: Religious Leader Engagement in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments.



NOTES

1. Jim Simms (2011). "The Joint Interagency, Multi-national and Public (JIMP) Environment: Military Operations in a Crowded Battlespace," in M. Rostek and P. Gizewski (eds.), *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill and Queen's University Press, 2011), p. 80.
2. Katrien Hertog, *The Complex Reality of Religious Peacebuilding: Conceptual Contributions and Critical Analysis* (Lexington Books: Lanham, Maryland, 2010), p. 75.
3. R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 3.
4. See Fabio, Petito, and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (eds). *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) cited in Megan Shore, *Religion and Conflict Resolution: Christianity and South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (Surrey, England, and Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2009), p. 23.
5. Hertog, p. 7.
6. See Liora Danan and Alice Hunt, *Mixed Blessings: U.S. Government and Engagement with Religion in Conflict Prone Settings* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), at <http://csis.org/publication/mixed-blessings>; USAID, *Religion, Conflict & Peacebuilding: An Introductory Programming Guide*, at http://112.238.75.62/search?q=Religion%2C+Conflict+%26++Peacebuilding&btnG=Search&q=0&ud=1&sort=date%3AD%3AL%3Ad1&outpu t=xm l_no _dtd &oe=UTF-8&ie=UTF-8&client=default_frontend&proxystylesheet=default_frontend&site=lpa_collection; R. Scott Appleby and Richard Cizik, *Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Foreign Policy* (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2010), at http://www.thechicago-council.org/Files/Studies_Publications/TaskForcesandStudies/Religion_2010.aspx.
7. David Smock, *Religion in World Affairs: Its Role in Conflict and Peace*, Special Report 101 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008), p. 3.
8. Hertog, pp.10-11.
9. Appleby and Cizik, p. 17.
10. Pauletta Otis, "Religion and War in the Twenty-first Century," in R. A. Seiple & D. R. Hoover (eds.), *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), p. 20; Appleby adds: "Rather than break down barriers, in short, religion often fortifies them...Constructed as inseparable from ethnic and linguistic traits, religion in such settings lends them a transcendent depth and dignity. Extremists thus invoke religion to legitimate discrimination and violence against groups of a different race or language." R. Scott Appleby, p. 62.
11. Marc Gopin, *To Make the Earth Whole: The Art of Citizen Diplomacy in an Age of Religious Militancy* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2009), pp. 37-38.
12. Appleby, p. 62.
13. Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 146, 216.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
15. Cynthia Sampson, "Religion and Peacebuilding," in I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (eds.), *Peacemaking in International Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), p. 275.
16. Judy Carter and Gordon S. Smith, "Religious Peacebuilding" in Harold Coward and Gordon S. Smith (eds.), *Religion and Peacebuilding* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), p. 280.
17. Mary Kaldor states that today's *new wars* are generated more around identity issues. The claim to power on the basis of a particular identity is among the principal drivers of today's conflicts: national, clan, religious or linguistic. Such claims often hearken to the past, which leans towards identity politics becoming more exclusive and fragmented—sure footing for conflict. See Mary Kaldor, "Introduction" in *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2nd Edition* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 7-8.
18. Robert Schreiter, "The Theology of Reconciliation and Peacemaking for Mission," in H. Mellor & T. Yates (eds.), *Mission—Violence and Reconciliation* (Sheffield, England: 2004), p. 25, cited in Sebastian C. H. Kim, Pauline Kollontai and Greg Hoyland (eds.), *Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity* (Hampshire, England and Burlington, Vermont: 2008), p. 37.
19. Carter and Smith, p. 280.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Sampson, p. 275.
22. Andrea Bartoli, "Christianity and Peace," in Howard Coward and Gordon S. Smith (eds.), *Religion and Peacebuilding* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), p. 158.
23. Kofi A. Annan, *Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary General, A/55/985–S/2001/574*, United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, 2001, Agenda Item 10, para 147, at <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/un-conf1prev-07jun.htm>
24. Appleby, p. 61.
25. Informed by David Little, *Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 438.
26. Peter Gizewski (Strategic Analyst), LCD OR Team, and Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek (DLCD- Land Futures), "Toward A Comprehensive Approach To CF Operations: The Land Force JIMP Concept," in *Defence R&D Canada: Centre for Operational Research and Analysis*, DRCD CORA TM 2007-60, September 2007, p. 8.
27. John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 35.
28. John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United Institute of Peace Press, 1997), pp. 41-42.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
30. Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), pp. 289-292.
31. Marc Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon: the Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 270.
32. For more on Wolf's "double vision" see Chapter Three, Part 3 "Reconciliation as Embrace," dissertation of Major S.K. Moore entitled, *Military Chaplains as Agents of Peace: The Theology and Praxis of Reconciliation in Stability Operations* (Ottawa: Saint Paul University, 2008), pp. 117-143.
33. Baron, p. 283.
34. R.M. Kramer and P.J. Carnevale, "Trust and intergroup negotiation," in R. Brown and S Gaertner (eds.), *Intergroup Processes* (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 432-450, cited in Baron, p. 287.
35. Herbert C. Kelman, "Reconciliation from a Social-Psychological Perspective," in Arie Nadler, Thomas E. Malloy and Jeffrey D. Fisher (eds.), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 25.
36. Marc Gopin, *To Make the Earth Whole*, p. 64.
37. *Ibid.*
38. See *Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels*, Joint Doctrine Manual, B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, 2001, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of National Defence, Canada, GL-16, at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/oplaw-loiop/loac-ddca-2004-eng.pdf>.
39. Key Leader Engagement is an Influence Activity used at commander's discretion. It may be defined as "the conduct of a deliberate and focused meeting with a person of significant importance in order to achieve a desired effect." Land Force Doctrine Note 2-09 Key Leader Engagement (KLE) – Approval Draft, October 2009, p.1.
40. Lieutenant-Colonel (ret'd) Mike Rostek, excerpt from an unpublished article.



PATRIOTISM AND ALLEGIANCES OF THE 22ND (FRENCH CANADIAN) BATTALION, 1914–1918

by Raphaël Dallaire Ferland

Introduction

On 27 April 1916, Major Georges P. Vanier, who at the time was in the trenches at St-Éloi with the 22nd (French Canadian) Battalion, wrote in his diary: “On my 28th birthday, the newspapers are reporting a revolt in Dublin. Regrettable....” For the Irish, 1916 was the year of the Easter Rising, in which intellectuals encouraged the people to oppose British authority, expressed their fear of conscription, and called for Ireland’s independence. For the 22nd Battalion, 1916 was the year of the Battle of Courcellette. That battle would make the military reputation of the battalion, which was acting “... for the honour of all French Canadians [translation].”¹ The nationalisms² of two peoples who had so much in common would, that year in Europe, take opposite directions: while the Irish rebels were fighting for the right not to go to war as part of the British Empire, the 22nd Battalion was fighting as part of a quest for recognition within that same empire and its colonial army, the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF).

This article, which is primarily based on an analysis of war diaries, explores the patriotic sentiment and the allegiances within the 22nd Battalion, the only French-Canadian unit deployed to the front during the First World War. How did

the Van Doos (the English nickname for the 22nd Battalion, and later, the Royal 22e Régiment; from the French for 22, “vingt-deux”) feel about their homeland, Canada; their adopted mother country, Britain; their mother country, France; and their French-Canadian nation?

Canada

The town of Saint-Jean, Quebec, was chosen as the training site for the 22nd Battalion in October 1914, but its initial commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Mondelet Gaudet, decided that it was too close to Montreal and the city’s many temptations, so in March 1915, he moved the battalion to Amherst, Nova Scotia.

When they arrived in Amherst, the Van Doos found the streets almost deserted and the shops closed.³ However, that initial coldness between English Canadians and French Canadians did not last. According to Captain Georges

Raphaël Dallaire Ferland is working on his master’s degree in international history at the Institut des hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID) in Geneva, Switzerland. He conducted his research in the Royal 22e Régiment archives in Quebec City under the supervision of Professor Desmond Morton.

Francoeur, it was Amherst's priest who, hearing of the festive reputation the 22nd Battalion had acquired at Saint-Jean, "... had told the girls and everyone not to come and see the soldiers [translation]."⁴ Gradually, the Nova Scotians ventured out of their houses and, in the end, all the authors studied praised the hospitality extended by the people of Amherst.⁵ At the send-off of the *Saxonia*, which was to take the battalion to England, the mayor delivered a speech praising the French-Canadian soldiers. According to *La Presse* reporter Claudius Corneloup, "... the city's brass band played the 'Marseillaise,' and our soldiers, touched by that mark of consideration, sang 'God Save the King.'"⁶ English Canadians, out of respect, associated French Canadians with France, while French Canadians associated their Anglophone counterparts with the British monarchy. Georges Vanier seems to have been particularly moved by that very Canadian patriotic

moment: "The sight was impressive as we drew away to the sound of 'O Canada' played by our band. Quietly we left the wharf, the people waving flags, handkerchief [*sic*] and hats. It was the most 'living' moment of our existence so far."⁷

"Once the battalion arrived at the front, wrote Georges Francoeur, there was considerable cooperation between the Van Doos and the rest of the CEF."

Two days later, when the 22nd Battalion relieved the Yorkshire Light Infantry Regiment, "... the officers were as courteous as could be, giving us all the information we needed."⁸ All the authors studied offer similar examples of cooperation between French Canadians and English Canadians. Waging war on the same front, where a battalion's survival depended to some

extent upon the rest of its brigade, its division, and its corps, created solidarity between French Canadians and English Canadians.⁹ The only exception found in this study was a complaint from Major-General R.E.W. Turner, on 21 August 1916, that the Van Doos did not talk much to the 75th (Toronto) Battalion. The problem, which may have been due to the language barrier, was quickly solved after the 22nd's commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas-Louis Tremblay, intervened.¹⁰ Of course, Tremblay was competitive and was quick to note the blunders of the other battalions,¹¹ but there is nothing to indicate that the same kind of competition did not exist between the Anglophone units, and Tremblay's zeal can be explained by his awareness that, through his battalion, he was representing an entire 'race.' In reality, the friction between divisions (which cooperated less directly than the battalions within the same division) seemed more intense than that between French Canadians and English Canadians. On 23 and 24 June 1916, Tremblay complained about the 1st Division, which had falsely accused the 2nd Division of abandoning the trenches at Mont Sorrel: "Men from the 25th Bn [part of the 2nd Division] have already sent a number of men from the 7th Bn [part of the 1st Division] to the hospital [translation]."





Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas-Louis Tremblay

If one can speak of Canadian patriotism among the Van Doos, it mainly took the form of a passive sense of belonging: without exception, the authors examined in this study speak of Canada, not Quebec, as their homeland. Their patriotism was passive in the sense that it rarely motivated them to fight.¹² For them, Canada was the land to which they felt attached, where their nostalgia was focused—especially during major holidays. On Christmas Day 1915, Francoeur tried to capture the mood of his platoon: “All of us have left behind in our dear Canada a family we think of often, and on this day we very much wish we could be with them to revive old memories [translation].” Vanier, in a letter to his mother, described a traditional Canadian celebration (“... we sang Canadian songs and ate Canadian dishes”). On New Year’s Day, wrote Francoeur, “... we thought of our beautiful Canada, and we wonder what the New Year has in store for us—a speedy return to our country, or a wooden cross [translation]!”¹³ He, like all the authors studied, longed to return to his “country,” not to Quebec, where his family was waiting for him.

For French Canadians, Canada represented a dream of comfort, where their ‘near and dear ones’ awaited their return to hearth and home. That dream found expression in the “Ballade des Chaussettes,” a song about socks composed by a French Canadian that, according to Francoeur, was very popular in the trenches:

... Your socks are going to Berlin
 We’re taking your Canadian socks
 And we know how to wear them
 Marching in step, singing “O Canada”
 And our blood must go with them ...
 [translation]¹⁴

Britain

On the other hand, the Van Doos expressed no apparent patriotism or allegiance toward their ‘adopted mother country,’ Britain. Monarchist rhetoric was never used in a motivational speech before a battle, and it seems to have been expressed very rarely in personal diaries. While there might not have been any open hostility toward the Crown, there was no great enthusiasm for it, either. Arthur Lapointe’s indifference upon his arrival in England was typical: “I looked out the window at this country that was unknown to me, but a thick fog cast a melancholy pall over everything before me. What a contrast to our departure from Canada!”¹⁶



Repairing trenches, 22nd Infantry Battalion, July 1916.

That feeling of alienation was exacerbated during the soldiers' ten-day annual leaves. In London, hospitality for the Canadian troops was provided by Protestant organizations where only English was spoken,¹⁷ so it is understandable that some of the Van Doos preferred the French capital to the English capital. Some Van Doos also mentioned being constantly watched because it was so unusual for the British to see a Francophone battalion within a colonial army.¹⁸ Tremblay tells of how, in Dover, England, he and his brothers-in-arms were stopped, questioned, and followed by British soldiers on motorcycles. In his view: "In Dover, we became suspect because we spoke French."¹⁹

Of all the authors studied, only Vanier—whose mother was Irish and who condemned the Easter Rising—expressed a sense of belonging to Britain. On 5 August 1915, he described Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden's visit to the East Sandling camp: "... this gathering of Canadian officers [have] come from every part of the Dominion and belong to every walk of life, united in the Mother Country and proclaiming the solidarity of the English peoples."²⁰ The fact that Vanier made no distinction between the 'mother country' and the 'adopted mother country' can be attributed to his dual identity as French Canadian and British (the Republic of Ireland had not yet been proclaimed). Of all the authors studied, he is the only one to refer to the imperial troops as his "brothers-in-arms."²¹

"The relationship between the British Army and the 22nd Battalion seemed to be less tight-knit than that between the English Canadians and the French Canadians."

In a diary entry on 2 September 1915, Vanier described a royal inspection as: "... a moving spectacle. The best day of my military life [translation]." He was not the only Van Doo to be impressed by a royal visit.²² However, even though a passive respect for British traditions may have helped the 22nd Battalion enter into the spirit of the CEF, the battalion did not practise those traditions actively. Although Thomas-Louis Tremblay had fought long and hard for the right to send his battalion to cover themselves with glory on the battlefield, he never competed for royal favour. He mentions that, on 14 August 1916, when the 24th and 25th Battalions were vying to obtain a visit from King George V, he "... made no overtures at all; it would have been pointless in any case [translation]."

The relationship between the British Army and the 22nd Battalion seemed to be less tight-knit than that between the English Canadians and the French Canadians. None of the authors studied (except Vanier, as cited earlier) relates such stories of cooperation between the British and the French Canadians. On the contrary, Tremblay reports friction. On 17 July 1916, he writes that at Dickebusch, in Flanders, a group of British soldiers mocked some signallers from the 22nd Battalion, saying, "'Look at the darn Colonials.' Sgt Lavoie arrested the seven 'blokes,' to the section's great amusement ... That Lavoie is a good man and a real '*Canayen*' [translation]." Similarly, Tremblay wrote in his diary entry for 2-16 January 1918 that a soldier "... punched and knocked down three English policemen in Bailleul because they were insulting the 22nd; he would die for his battalion [translation]." In Tremblay's view, the honour of his battalion was more important than being polite to the imperialists.

Thus, despite Canadian propaganda efforts, the Van Doos had much stronger patriotic feeling for France than for Britain.

France

On 13 September 1915, Captain Francoeur wrote: "We are on our way to France, our hearts full of fighting spirit, with the firm resolve to conquer or die. Duty calls us, and we must obey ... May God protect France [translation]!"

Francoeur's brothers in arms wholeheartedly shared his euphoria. Vanier noted in his diary on 14 September 1915: "I am left with an indelible impression of the passage [from England to France]. In France at last ... I could not have hoped for more [translation]!" According to his entry for the next day, that enthusiasm was widespread among the members of the 22nd Battalion: "The men ... are very uncomfortable in a baggage car ... with no seats or lights ... they are not complaining; on the contrary, when we pulled out of the station at Le Havre they were singing the '*Marseillaise*' and '*O Canada*' [translation]."

But once they were deployed at the front in the French campaign, the Van Doos quickly realized that their idealism was unreciprocated. Many people who lived in the French



Major Georges Vanier, circa 1918.



Officers of the 22nd Battalion watering a horse, under the close supervision of a dog.

countryside did not even know French Canadians existed. All of the authors studied mention this culture shock, but Vanier reflected upon it at greater length: “The people hardly understand how we happen to speak French and wear khaki. Very many of the French inhabitants were ignorant of our political existence as a race apart in Canada ... We have opened their eyes and their hearts.”²³ Francoeur presented himself as an ambassador for Canada, but Vanier positioned the 22nd Battalion as an ambassador of the French-Canadian ‘race.’

On 17 September at St-Omer, a French headquarters sent an interpreter to the 22nd Battalion. Obviously, the 22nd sent him back.²⁴ Despite this misunderstanding, the personal diaries examined here do not show indifference on the part of the French toward their North American cousins, but rather a certain ignorance—which, however, did not extend to all of France. Tremblay, writing on 11 March 1916, reported: “We had a visit from a party of ten French officers. They were very interested in our men, who reminded them of their countrymen from Picardy and Normandy [translation].” In the end, the initial surprise turned to a more welcoming attitude, and the *marraines*—French women who wrote encouraging letters to the Van Doos and who might offer them hospitality during their leaves—made leaves in France more agreeable than those in London, which were constrained by the language barrier.²⁵

In addition to their hospitality, the French impressed the diarists with their military bravery. Vanier wrote, “The French are splendid, their dash and determination are wonderful and I feel like saluting every man and

French peasant class: “The more I see of it ... the more my admiration for the French nation and my faith in the triumph of Latin civilization grow [translation].”²⁷ In his diary entry for 27 March 1918, he explains the reason for his admiration: “Being in contact with these poor people who are fleeing from barbarism ... is inspiring; we consider it a great privilege to be able to contribute, even in the smallest measure, to the defeat and expulsion of the savages [translation].” Thus, the idealism about France that had existed before the war grew on the European front when Vanier came into contact with the people of that beloved nation.



In the trenches. 22nd Infantry Battalion, July 1916.


The French Canadians' patriotic feeling for France, their mother country, seemed to elicit a sense of duty. On 17 September 1915, Vanier wrote in his diary: "Never in my wildest flights of imagination could I have foretold that one day I would march through the country I love so much in order to fight in its defence." He expressed similar sentiments in a letter to his mother dated 27 January 1916, in which he also referred to the war of 1870 to show that the destinies of France and the 22nd Battalion were interwoven. And that sense of duty was felt not only by officers. On 3 June 1917, Lapointe wrote an account of a mass celebrated at the church in Petit-Servins:

The emotion was palpable among the civilians who attended the military mass, when one of our guys started singing, in a warm and penetrating voice, the hymn "Dieu de clémence, ô Dieu vainqueur, sauvez, sauvez la France." The battalion then took up the chorus, and, in the midst of the voices that rose powerfully to fill the nave, there was something that sounded like a sob. [translation]

Such devotion for a country other than one's own had its effect on the people of France. When the Van Doos sang while passing through Bully-Grenay the night before an advance, the villagers came out to meet them, kissed them, and wished them "success against the dirty Boche." In Captain Henri Chassé's view: "It was a magnificent and charming spectacle to see old France applaud young France, ready to die for her [translation]."²⁸ The French Canadians were receptive to the gratitude of a people for whom they said they were willing to sacrifice themselves. One can see how such a scene could spark the men's fighting spirit. When it was announced that they were leaving for Flanders on 10 November 1917, Lapointe wrote: "The good news of our return to France was welcomed with immense joy." Their patriotic feeling for France seemed to have a salutary effect on the morale of the troops.

The admiration, friendship, and sense of duty that the Van Doos developed for the people of France were a recurring theme in our authors' writings for the duration of the war, and those feelings were not the result of a momentary burst of enthusiasm generated by the crossing to the mother country. Upon returning to Canada, Lapointe ended his diary with these words: "Despite the horrible nightmares that sometimes disturb my sleep, I can console myself with the thought that I have been useful to my country and have paid my debt of gratitude to old France [translation]."²⁹

"The admiration, friendship, and sense of duty that the Van Doos developed for the people of France were a recurring theme in our authors' writings for the duration of the war."



Library and Archives Canada, Acc. No. 1985-28-789

French Canada

As mentioned earlier, although the Van Doos saw Canada as their native land, the French-Canadian nation was the one for which they were fighting. At the time of his departure from Amherst on 21 May 1915, Tremblay placed that idea in its historical context: "We can no longer see the beautiful land of Canada, and we are more determined than ever to prove that the French-Canadian blood flows just as purely and warmly in our veins as it did in those of our ancestors [translation]." Although Francoeur was occasionally an exception to the rule when he spoke of fighting for Canada, he expressed his patriotism toward French Canada more strongly: "If we soon have the opportunity to show all of our allies what a French-Canadian regiment can do in a bayonet charge, we

are ready and we are only waiting for the order to advance. Then every country will know our worth [translation].”³⁰ The 22nd (French Canadian) Battalion, by making the people it represented a part of its name, had given the Van Doos something meaningful for which to fight. Tremblay also wanted the members of the battalion to share his point of view:

I am confident that the French Canadians will defend all their trenches with fierce vigour and will hold on at any price, even the price of death. Let us not forget that we represent an entire race and that many things—the very honour of French Canada—depend upon the manner in which we conduct ourselves. Our ancestors bequeathed to us a brave and glorious past that we must respect and equal. Let us uphold our beautiful old traditions.³¹ [translation]

That was what Tremblay considered to be his mandate as commanding officer of the 22nd Battalion.³²



22nd Battalion resting in a shell hole on their way to the front line, September 1917.

And he felt that he had fulfilled that mandate with the victory at Courcellette. Before the battle, a war council had been held at the division headquarters. The lieutenant-colonel had had to argue for “... the honour of leading his battalion at Courcellette. He got his way [translation].”³³ Just before launching the decisive attack, he rode along the trench on horseback and delivered this speech to his troops:

We are about to attack a village called Courcellette. We will take that village, and once we have taken it, we will hold it to the last man. This is our first big attack. It must succeed, for the honour of all the French Canadians whom we represent in France [translation].”³⁴

The final moments before an attack were no time to give a political lecture; the only objective was to rouse the troops’

fighting spirit. Tremblay chose to speak of French-Canadian honour because he believed that the idea could galvanize his men, and that his pride in his ‘nationality’ would strike a chord with them. The 22nd Battalion was not obliged to lead the attack on Courcellette; the commanding officer fought for the opportunity because he believed that the benefits would outweigh the sacrifice of human lives.³⁵

Although this French-Canadian patriotism involved a sense of duty and pride at participating in the major issues facing the Western world, Tremblay saw it as more than just a matter of personal satisfaction. Clearly, recognition was also important to him. That explains his indignation on 18 September in response to the lack of interest shown by his superior, the Commander of the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Brigadier Archibald Cameron “Batty Mac” Macdonell, to the events at Courcellette, as well as his obvious appreciation of the generals’ compliments and the ovations from the other CEF troops. Tremblay wrote that he felt very ill less than

24 hours after being relieved at Courcellette—on 23 September, he was evacuated for treatment of his hemorrhoids, and he did not return to the front for five months. One wonders at the strength that enabled him to take part in the battle, which he led from in front rather than staying in the rear, away from the bullets. Tremblay and Vanier, who were both convalescing at the same time, were keen to read about the exploits of the 22nd Battalion in the French and British newspapers. Tremblay mentions the *Times* of London (21 and 25 September), the *Manchester Guardian*, the *Mirror*, the *Standard* and the *Daily Mail*, among others: “Their version of the attack is not quite accurate ... The important thing is that the battalion is mentioned

in the English newspapers as a unit that distinguished itself at the front [translation].”³⁶

From then on, the battalion’s pride crystallized around the Battle of Courcellette, which became the model to be emulated. When he returned from sick leave on 14 February 1917, Tremblay reaffirmed his mandate: “As I retake command of my battalion, I am full of confidence in the future, realizing ... more than ever my weighty responsibilities, determined to ensure that the glory of Courcellette did not fade [translation].” (Coincidentally, the complete motto of the Royal 22e Régiment today is “Je me souviens du passé, j’ai confiance en le futur.” [I remember the past; I have confidence in the future.]”) On 14 August 1917, Lapointe reported a speech Tremblay delivered before the Battle of Hill 70, and added his own comment that shows the influence the commanding officer had on the morale of his troops:



The Right Honourable Georges Philias Vanier became Governor General of Canada at the end of a distinguished career as a soldier and diplomat.

“Tomorrow, you will fight as you fought at Courcellette and at Vimy, and back home our people will be proud of you.” Our commanding officer is not very eloquent, but all the soldiers of the 22nd know his legendary bravery, and every word he speaks has great significance for us [translation].³⁷

In the same vein, after his return from sick leave, Tremblay began to speak of the “old originals,” the veterans of Courcellette, whom he used as an example for the new recruits. During his absence, under the acting command of Major Arthur Edouard Dubuc, discipline had slackened, particularly after the arrival of 220 new officers and men in September 1916, and 380 in October 1916 to replace those lost at Courcellette and in the Regina Trench. The reinforcements arrived so quickly that there had not been time to instil in them the esprit de corps of the “old originals,” a spirit that had been cultivated since the beginning of training back in Saint-Jean a year earlier. As renowned Canadian historian Desmond Morton has noted, seven Canadian soldiers executed by firing squad during the First World War were French-Canadian, and five belonged to the 22nd Battalion—an over-representation. Jean-Pierre Gagnon points out that all of the executions were carried out on the recommendation of a single commanding officer: Thomas-Louis Tremblay. To restore the discipline that had been eroded during his five months of convalescence, and to preserve the hard-earned reputation paid for by the blood of the men who had died in combat, Tremblay took the drastic

step of executing deserters and criminals.³⁸ It is important to realize that the consequences of a defeat for the 22nd Battalion on the European front would have been very serious, given the experimental nature of the first Francophone battalion. Perhaps there would not be as many French-Canadian units, and bilingualism would not be so widespread in the Canadian Forces today if the 22nd Battalion had brought shame to the French-Canadian nation. In any case, the executions and his insistence upon leading his battalion to the front³⁹ demonstrate that Tremblay’s nationalism went beyond mere thought and speech: he followed through—sometimes radically—with decisions and concrete actions.

In 1917, the Van Doos’ nationalism was expressed primarily in reaction to the news from home of French-Canadian protests against conscription, which culminated in riots in Quebec City in 1918. Clearly, the soldiers of the 22nd were not ignorant of the Canadian political situation. On 7 February 1917, Lapointe wrote: “I know people back in Canada ... who will spit with contempt when they think of us, and will repeat ... that we have no reason to risk our lives for France and England. However, if those countries had been left to fend for themselves, what would have happened?” Without claiming that the 22nd Battalion had come to save France and Britain by itself, Lapointe was aware that its presence compensated for the indifference of Francophone Quebecers back home to the situation in Europe. On 27 November 1917, Tremblay related his hostile altercation with Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook, over disgraceful articles about the 22nd Battalion that had appeared in the British newspapers. The rest of the entry in his war diary countered Beaverbrook’s criticism, praised the 22nd Battalion, and admitted that



Brigadier-General Thomas-Louis Tremblay, later in the war.



CWM 19710261-0056 by Alfred Bastien, Beaverbrook Collection of War Art, © Canadian War Museum/Canada/ PA-002764

'Over the Top,' the 22nd Canadian Infantry Battalion at Neuville-Vitasse on the heavily-fortified Drocourt-Quéant Line, August 1918.

English Canada would like more French Canadians to enlist. But, above all, it asserted that "... right now, the 22nd is saving Quebec's reputation." Tremblay's traditional mandate had expanded: now, in addition to representing the French-Canadian nation, the 22nd Battalion would have to compensate for Quebec's feeble contribution to the Allied war effort. On 5 August 1918, as was his habit, Tremblay protested to his general concerning the fact that the 22nd was to be relegated to a secondary role during an attack at Amiens. He ended by admitting: "Perhaps the practical situation at home is the cause of my disappointment [translation]!" Four months earlier, during an anti-conscription riot on 1 April, four Quebec civilians had been killed by troops from Ontario.

Conclusion

The presence of the Van Doos on the Western Front ultimately shattered Quebec's *isolation from* and *indifference to* major international issues. From the time they landed in France, the French Canadians were not fighting for the survival of their people, but were attempting to achieve glory by contributing to the Allied war effort. Tremblay, Vanier, Lapointe, Francoeur, and some of their brothers-in-arms openly affirmed their patriotism and their national allegiances. This study has documented a break with French Canada's "nationalism of resistance"—which was expressed primarily through anti-conscription sentiment—

and a shift to "participatory nationalism," as revealed in the war diaries [and letters-Ed.] of members of the 22nd (French Canadian) Battalion. In the midst of the turmoil caused by the exaggerated and sometimes imperialistic nationalisms that were among the causes of the Great War, this "participatory nationalism," which recognized the superiority of France, was distinguished by the fact that it aspired to fulfilment and recognition, rather than dominance.



Canada. Department of National Defence/Library and Archives Canada/ PA-003778/Canada/ PA-002764

The 22nd Canadian Infantry Battalion crossing the Rhine River at Bonn, December 1918.

NOTES

1. At least, that was the vision of his commanding officer, Thomas-Louis Tremblay, as expressed in a speech to his troops just before the Battle of Courcellette. Thomas-Louis Tremblay and Marcelle Cinq-Mars, (eds.), *Journal de guerre (1915–1918)* [War diary, 1915–1918] (Quebec City: Athéna Éditions (Collection Histoire militaire) and Royal 22e Régiment Museum, 2006), 15 September 1916 entry.
2. The term ‘nationalism’ is used in this article to refer to the sense of honour and duty toward French Canada. Thinkers who promoted the idea of a French-Canadian nation (i.e., Abbé Lionel Groulx) were not prominent in the public sphere at the time. Authors of the time, and more specifically, the authors of the war diaries and letters examined here, expressed nationalism more in terms of pride and patriotism.
3. Joseph Chaballe, *Histoire du 22^e bataillon canadien-français, Tome 1: 1914–1919* [History of the 22nd French Canadian Battalion, Volume I: 1914–1919] (Montreal: Éditions Chanteclerc, 1952), p. 42.
4. Account preserved in *Les archives audio de la Première Guerre mondiale [First World War Audio Archive]: Georges Francoeur*, at <<http://www.veterans.gc.ca>>, accessed 11 August 2011.
5. Tremblay, 20 May 1915: “Our men and our officers freely admit that our stay in Amherst was more pleasant than our stay in the province of Quebec [translation].”
6. Claudius Corneloup, “L’Épopée du vingt-deuxième” [The epic of the 22nd,] *La Presse* (Montreal), 1919, p. 17.
7. Georges Vanier, letter to his mother, 21 May 1915.
8. A/R22eR, FPA69, Georges-Ulric Francoeur, *Journal de guerre, 1915–1916* [War diary, 1915–1916], 4 October 1915.
9. After Courcellette, Corneloup (p. 61) wrote, “Quietly but genuinely moved, the men of the 22nd and the 25th, the first French and the second English, no longer wanted to be separated [translation].”
10. On 21 August, Tremblay wrote, “I gave instructions accordingly. The result was quite amusing. A soldier who did not swear told his little story in about three minutes; the one who swore a blue streak took about six minutes. Some ‘Six-Bits’ [nickname of the 75th] are splitting their sides tonight [translation].”
11. In particular, see the entry for 14 May 1916 on the laxity of the 20th Battalion concerning the repair of a parapet, or the entry of 6 June 1916 on the carelessness of the 12th York Battalion of Infantry concerning reconnaissance missions.
12. However, it is worth mentioning two exceptions to this trend. Both are from Francoeur’s diary. On 5 October 1915, he wrote that the Boche “... would have their hands full if we are ever ordered to advance; they will find out what young Canadians can do [translation].” On 24 October, during a mass at the church in Locre, Captain Doyon, the battalion chaplain and member of a church that was anxious to preserve the established political order, explained to the troops, “... if we must die, let our death serve the Homeland [translation].”
13. Georges Francoeur, *Journal de guerre*, 31 December 1915. This opinion was echoed elsewhere—for example, in Francoeur, *Journal de guerre*, 26 December 1915 and 17 January 1916; and Georges Vanier, letter to his mother, 23 May 1915.
14. Quoted in Francoeur, *Journal de guerre*, date unknown, 1916. Given the prevalence of trench foot, one can understand why the fantasy of the comforts of home was expressed in a song celebrating dry socks.
15. A.J. Lapointe, *Souvenirs d’un soldat du Québec: 22^{ème} Bataillon, 1917–18* [Memories of a Quebec soldier: 22nd Battalion, 1917–18] (4th edition) (Drummondville, QC: Les Éditions du Castor, 1944), 6 February 1919.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
17. Corneloup, p. 65: “His character, his sentiment, his race, his very religion barred him from entry; and even if he dared to try his luck, the French Canadian would be met with shrugs and pity [translation]!”
18. *Ibid.*, p. 33: “Belonging to another race ... this battalion ... seemed lost in the midst of this formidable army raised by England ... no battalion ... was more watched or more criticized [translation].”
19. Tremblay, *Journal de guerre*, 18 July 1915.
20. Georges Vanier, letter to his mother, 5 August 1915.
21. Georges Vanier, letter to his mother, 14 September 1915.
22. On 27 October, concerning the visit of King George V, King Albert of Belgium, Maréchal Ferdinand Foch and General Joseph Joffre, Francoeur wrote: “We were so surprised to see them and we were so busy watching them pass by that I wonder whether we presented arms. I don’t think so [translation].”
23. Georges Vanier, letter to his mother, 14 September 1915.
24. Robert Speaight, *Georges P. Vanier: Soldat, diplomate, gouverneur général* [Georges P. Vanier: Soldier, diplomat, governor general] (Montreal: Éditions Fides, 1972), p. 40.
25. Tremblay maintained this opinion despite his amazement when he (a single man) discovered that his *marraine*, of whom he had had such high expectations, was a fat old lady! For more on French hospitality, see Vanier, letter to his mother, 14 September 1915; and Vanier, *Journal de guerre*, 15 September 1915 and 17 November 1915. For another mention of French ignorance, this time not in the countryside, but in Paris, see Francoeur, *Journal de guerre*, 14 March 1916.
26. Georges Vanier, letter to his mother, 30 September 1915. See also his diary entry for 16 September 1915.
27. Georges Vanier, letter to his mother, 14 January 1918.
28. Lapointe, 14 August 1917; Henri Chassé, quoted in Speaight, p. 66.
29. Lapointe, 1919 (inserted as a preface to the diary).
30. Georges-Ulric Francoeur, *Journal de guerre*, 20 December 1915.
31. Quoted in Speaight, p. 53.
32. At the time of his appointment on 26 February 1916, he reiterated this mandate: “I am perhaps the youngest Bn commanding officer at the front. My battalion represents an entire race; it is a heavy responsibility. Nonetheless, I have confidence in myself and I feel that my men respect me. My acts will be guided by our inspiring motto, ‘Je me souviens’ [translation].”
33. Corneloup, p. 51.
34. Tremblay, *Journal de guerre*, 15 September 1916.
35. On 18 September, Tremblay wrote, “Unfortunately, the proportion of men killed is large, perhaps 40%. We have paid dearly for our success; our consolation is that those sacrifices were not made in vain, that one day our nationality will benefit from them [translation].”
36. Tremblay, *Journal de guerre*, 27 September 1916. See also Vanier, *Journal de guerre*, 21 September 1916; letter to his mother, same day; and letter to his mother, 24 September 1916.
37. The diary of the 22nd Battalion continues the account of Tremblay’s speech: “Tonight the eyes of French-Canada are turned towards us, and I expect every man to do his duty, and more than his duty, that the hopes of those who have put their trust in us may not be disappointed.” *Appendix M to August War Diary*, p. X, August 1917.
38. Desmond Morton, *The Supreme Penalty: Canadian Deaths by Firing Squad in the First World War*, quoted in Jean-Pierre Gagnon, *Le 22^e bataillon (canadien-français) 1914–1919* [The 22nd (French Canadian) Battalion, 1914–1919] (Quebec City: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 1986), p. 279. Gagnon discusses the issue on pages 279–308.
39. In addition to Courcellette, Tremblay pushed to be allowed to lead his battalion at the front of the attack on Vimy Ridge, but the brigadier-general wanted to give other battalions a chance to distinguish themselves as the 22nd had at Courcellette (see *Journal de guerre*, 27 March 1917). On 1 July 1917, Tremblay writes that despite his promotion to brigadier-general, he continued to exercise his influence in the effort to have “his” battalion lead a mission at Lens.



Photo courtesy of the author

Canadian Navy personnel in training.

CANADA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE NATO TRAINING MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN: A SAILOR'S EXPERIENCE

by Commander Hugues Canuel

Introduction

Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan was concluded more than a year ago, alternatively celebrated as a great and noble achievement and decried as a wasteful expenditure of lives and resources by different segments of the media.¹

Much less coverage was allotted to the simultaneous effort undertaken by the Canadian Forces (CF) to mount a training mission in the Kabul region as troops were being withdrawn from the Kandahar province. Operation *Attention* would become central to the country's commitment to the NATO effort in Afghanistan and all elements of the CF were called upon to provide personnel in support of that endeavour.

I was deployed as part of the stand-up of Operation *Attention*, Canada's contribution to the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. From July 2011 to March 2012, I wit-

nessed the tremendous challenges involved in the transition of the Canadian mission in that war-torn country, from a combat role in the south, to that of training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANST) in the Kabul region. This short article aims to provide a sailor's perspective on the many dimensions of the operation based on his recent experience in various advisory and staff duties with the UN-mandated, NATO-led coalition.

As the debate on the future of the allied effort continued, I was assigned to the contingent provided by the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) during that pivotal period. Such experience cannot be presented as typical of the hundreds of individuals that eventually deployed for Operation *Attention* in 2011-2012. Nevertheless, it was representative of the smaller group employed in senior positions within the headquarters of the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), whether as staff officers or advisors to units of the ANSF. This article will attempt to provide an insight into this recent experience,

VIEWS AND OPINIONS

addressing those practical and procedural aspects that may not have received as much coverage in the mainstream media. First, however, it may be appropriate to lay out some of the background to the mission and its rapid evolution through the course of the rotation.

Background

Operation *Attention* designates the Canadian Contribution Training Mission – Afghanistan (CCTM-A), in which most personnel are assigned to NTM-A, the training pillar of the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF). NTM-A delivers training and professional development to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and its subordinated Afghan Air Force (AAF), the Afghan National Police (ANP), as well as the various ministries involved in the security sector. Such work is conducted alongside that of ISAF's two other main pillars, IJC – ISAF Joint Command, responsible for operations – and ISAF SOF, which coordinates both the employment of coalition Special Operations Forces, and the development of such capability within the ANA and ANP.²

As CCTM-A grew in strength to about 925 all ranks through the later half of 2011, Mission Elements (ME) were established in different camps distributed throughout the capital region, as well as two satellite teams in Mazar-e-Sharif in the north and Herat in the west.³ The headquarters of NTM-A are accommodated in Camp Eggers. This secured compound, named after US Army Captain Daniel W. Eggers, who was killed near Kandahar on 29 May 2004, is located in the capital's downtown area next to ISAF Headquarters (ISAF HQ) and the seat of the Afghan ministries.⁴

The Canadian 'footprint' in Camp Eggers grew through the summer of 2011 from a dozen personnel to nearly one hundred (including all military and civilian police personnel), while the NTM-A structure itself was quickly changing. Such evolution was required to meet the changing focus of the allied mission. Formally activated on 21 November 2009, NTM-A is mandated to "... support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as it generates and sustains the Afghan national security forces, develops leaders, and establishes enduring capacity in order to enable accountable Afghan-led security." This required an initial emphasis upon recruitment and expansion, but priorities have since evolved to the areas of instruction skills ("train the trainer"), leadership, literacy, accountability and institutional development.⁵



Photo courtesy of the author

Commander Hugues Canuel in Afghanistan. Kabul is in the background. This sailor does not appear to be pointing to open water...

This evolving focus greatly affected the Canadian mission during the initial rotation of Operation *Attention*, especially for those personnel employed in Camp Eggers. Senior officers and non-commissioned members (NCMs) were integrated in the NTM-A command team, while others served in staff positions or in advisory duties with elements of the Afghan security forces. Junior operators and technicians were also employed, with the movement teams taking coalition representatives through the streets of Kabul on a daily basis. Several of these individuals would eventually be reassigned during their tour in order to meet NTM-A's evolving priorities, as well as the increasing maturity of the ANSF formations, including myself, who went from advisor to successive staff appointments. This path provided a unique insight into the various components of the NATO training mission, allowing me to work with elements of both the ANP and the ANA and making for a remarkable tour that shaped the observations formulated below.

Pre-Deployment Training

Such flexibility in employment while in theatre was greatly facilitated by the short but effective period of pre-deployment training required for all personnel assigned to Operation *Attention*. While a joint mission, the Canadian Army is the Primary Force Generator for this operation, responsible for the coordinated generation of those CF elements meant to be employed by the Commander Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (since then consolidated in the Canadian Joint Operations Command).⁶ For this inaugural rotation (Roto 0), the army assigned force generation duties to the Commander Land Forces Western Area (LFWA), home of the 1st Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1CMBG) at Canadian Forces

VIEWS AND OPINIONS

Base Edmonton. As the designated Mounting Unit responsible to generate the mission's National Command and Support Element (NCSE) as well as a variety of other sub-elements, 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3PPCLI) took a leading role in conducting the required pre-deployment training.

This task was most challenging in two ways. First, the deployment of Canadians was staggered over the course of several months in order to facilitate the in-flow of hundreds of personnel newly assigned to NTM-A. This commenced in April 2011 with the most senior leadership, including Major-General Michael Day – assigned the role of Commander CCTM-A as the senior Canadian deployed and that of NTM-A Deputy Commander-Army (responsible for the training and fielding of ANA units) – and the out-going Commanding Officer of 3PPCLI, Colonel Peter Dawe, who would be established in Camp Phoenix with the bulk of the NSCE staff to fill his duties as Deputy Commander CCTM-A.⁷ This, in turn, signified that training would also be staggered as required for the successive waves of personnel that deployed from May to October 2011 under the guidance of 3PPCLI individuals who were themselves getting ready to leave.

One must praise the tremendous effort put forward by LFWA and 3PPCLI authorities in coordinating pre-deployment training under such strenuous conditions.⁸ This was especially true of the program conducted by Warrant Officer "Chuck" Cote in May-June 2011 for a disparate group of nearly 100 personnel of all ranks and trades from across the CF, with a wide range of backgrounds in terms of overseas deployments and combat experience. There is little doubt that the team achieved the best results to be expected given the many unknowns that still surrounded the mission at the time and uncertainties as to the employment of those personnel nominally designated for advisory duties and staff appointments at NTM-A.

As a naval officer with no combat arms background or prior experience in a theatre of operations such as Afghanistan, I most appreciated the training related to those common skills and general awareness required to survive – literally – during the mission. Much was gained from weapons handling, combat first aid, and convoy procedures. Cultural awareness instruction was also beneficial. Some commented prior to the deployment about the need for more structured training for those bound for advisory duties, but, following actual experience garnered as an advisor, I am of the opinion that such requirement may not be germane, at least for senior naval

officers and NCMs. The mix of skills and experience that such individuals bring to the operation is likely sufficient to discharge their responsibilities effectively as there is no single model that can be applied to all situations. Advisors, especially those serving at the ministry level or in the superior headquarters of ANSF formations alongside very senior Afghan officials, must adapt their style and approach to the situation at hand and respond positively to the personalities of the individuals to whom they are they are assigned, rather than attempt to impose some pre-formulated answer to the problems at hand.



Major-General Michael Day hands over command of the Canadian Contribution Training Mission – Afghanistan (CCTM-A) to Major-General Jim Ferron in Kabul, Afghanistan, 24 May 2012.

DND photo ISX2012-0013 by Warrant Officer Jim Ryall

Experience as Advisor

The Afghan National Civil Order Police is one of several components of the ANP. Somewhat similar in concept to a European gendarmerie, ANCOP has a large role in counter-insurgency operations, tasked to maintain the rule of law and order, by utilizing proportionate armed capability. This force is organized geographically into regional brigades and battalions to provide support to other elements of the uniformed police and/or to operate jointly with the ANA as required for specific operations. ANCOP units seek to restore and maintain civil order in designated areas, especially during sensitive or dangerous disturbances and riots, conducting operations that require a higher level of training and tactics, as well as special capabilities, such as serving as a mobile quick reaction force.⁹

ANCOP had been the focus of considerable effort on the part of NTM-A since standing up in 2009, so that it was one of the better developed elements of the ANP by the summer of 2011. It was rapidly realized that the Canadian naval contingent assigned to ANCOP headquarters for Operation *Attention* could be better employed in view of more pressing require-

ments. Most of these individuals were reassigned to other such priorities, save for the advisors to the G1 (Personnel) and G4 (Logistics), as it was deemed that they continued to make a valuable contribution in these areas where the police force still experienced major difficulties in terms of policy making and operational planning.

Originally appointed as Advisor to the ANCOP Chief of Staff, I was also transferred after only two months in theatre, but this brief experience nevertheless provided a valuable insight into the ANP and the operations of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI). Of note, one of the better references with which personnel assigned advisory duties with the ANP and the ministry should be familiar is the *Afghan MoI Advisor Guide* referred to in the previous endnote. Although somewhat dated in terms of the NTM-A organization and structure, it still provides valuable practical guidance to prospective advisors as, well as an excellent introduction to the police elements of the larger ANSF.

Experience as Staff Officer

My next assignment was as Special Police Staff Officer to the Assistant Commanding General – Special Police and Protection Force (ACG SPPF), a newly established ‘one-star’ organization under the NTM-A Deputy Commander-Police (DCOM P). Advisors to regular police elements are assigned to the Assistant Commanding General – Police Development (ACG PD) and ISAF SOF provides those involved with special police elements. ACG SPPF was instead tasked with providing force development and integration support to various elements, such as the Afghan General Directorate Police Special Units (GDPSU). This component of the ANP provides specialist tactical capabilities to support counterinsurgent and counternarcotics operations, as well as activities against organized crime through the provision of sophisticated capabilities, such crisis response units of the SWAT model, covert intelligence and surveillance, and close personal protection for government figures and judicial authorities.¹⁰

Symbolic of the dynamic evolution of the NTM-A structure, ACG SPPF was dissolved in November 2011, at which point I was again transferred to a new entity, the Deputy Commander-Special Operations Forces (DCOM SOF).¹¹ This one-star organization, reporting directly to Commander NTM-A, came into existence as a result of the decision to centralize support within NTM-A for special elements of both the ANP (GDPSU and the Afghan Local Police – ALP) and the ANA (where all such units are centralized under the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command – ANASOC).¹² Within DCOM SOF, I remained involved with force integration, dealing with questions related to force structure (through the management of unit *tashkil*, the Afghan Manning document somewhat similar to the western Table of Organization and Equipment) and force development in terms of seeking coalition funds for equipment and infrastructure.

This last assignment proved most challenging, especially as ANASOC was one the last elements of the ANSF still growing towards its final composition as envisioned for the post-2014 period. I had to develop an in-depth familiarity with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and ANA authorities and structures, reach out to the staffs of the NTM-A Deputy Commander-Army (DCOM A) and the Deputy Commander-Air (DCOM Air) as they were both involved in ANASOC development, and very quickly familiarize myself with the ANASOC units and their assigned coalition advisory teams.¹³ Such knowledge was essential to discharging duties mainly concerned with the rationalization of the structural and equipment needs for both police and army special forces, and it required repeated appearances in front of the various boards and senior authorities whose support was essential to secure the requisite coalition funds in support of such initiatives.



DND photo AT2011-T029-06 by Master Corporal Chris Ward

Members of Malalai Company, the all-female Afghan National Army Officer Candidate Course, take their graduating officer's oath at Kabul, 23 November 2011.

VIEWS AND OPINIONS

These costs are accounted for through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), which "... provides funding to grow, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF."¹⁴ This is the tool whereby coalition contributions are budgeted and expanded upon in the broad categories of infrastructure, equipment, training, and sustainment. ASFF was approved to nearly \$12(US) billion for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 but will be dramatically reduced in the forthcoming years as the growth of ANSF elements will cease in 2012 and the provision of new equipment, infrastructure, and so on should be completed by 2014. This greatly complicates the task of standing up ANASOC and completing the equipping of special police units, since justifying expenditures for new projects came under very close scrutiny in the first months of 2012, a trend that is likely to endure. Nevertheless, the growth and training of Afghan special police and army units are central to the ISAF campaign plan to successfully achieve its mission in an insurgency environment. DCOM SOF will likely remain at the forefront of the NTM-A effort through the next two years, making it a great challenge for those employed in that most dynamic element of the training mission.

Experience as Camp Senior

As outlined earlier, most Operation *Attention* personnel are employed in different ISAF/NTM-A organizations and dispersed through various camps as required to enable the NATO mission. Nevertheless, they also respond to the Canadian chain of command, most often through the establishment of formal Mission Elements. The situation was slightly different in Camp Eggers, whereby, despite the presence of a large Canadian contingent, personnel were working in such a wide array of functions that they did not operate as an ME *per se*. Nevertheless, a 'Camp Senior' was appointed in order to coordinate Canadian activities in the compound, as well as to serve as a liaison with both the camp authorities as the designated "Senior Canadian Representative," and the national chain, through the NCSE in Camp Phoenix. I had the privilege of assuming this role after two months in theatre, and, although an all-consuming secondary duty, this additional responsibility proved a most rewarding challenge.

As I was not attributed the formal powers and authority of a designated Commanding Officer, I approached this particular duty very much as I would have as the Executive Officer (XO) of a ship deployed at sea. Much of my time was dedicated to circulating information, from the NCSE to the Eggers Canadians and vice versa in terms of conveying policy decisions, upcoming national events/visits, the coordination of material and logistical support, and so on. I worked closely with the senior Canadian officers in the DCOM P and DCOM A chains to identify those opportunities to reassign personnel to new duties, leveraging their skills and experience to place them in positions of best interest for the Canadian mission. I was repeatedly involved in facilitating administrative and disciplinary processes as required by NCSE, ranging from alternate dispute resolution to the coordination of medical and compassionate repatriations, the administration of the Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS), and staffing recommendations for honours and awards.

Another area of interest was that of morale and welfare. Maintaining a coherent, positive team spirit was challenging at times as the Canadians were not employed as a single contingent. This made the coordination of social activities and Canadian-specific events difficult to arrange, but nonetheless worthy of the effort in order to sustain personnel through this lengthy deployment. I dedicated much time in reminding Canadians of the requirement to maintain the proper dress and deportment, as well as overt enthusiasm towards the mission, as we came to form the second largest national contingent in Camp Eggers. This also led me to volunteer to chair the Senior National Representatives Committee, wherein I interacted closely with agents from the twenty-nine contributing nations represented in the compound and involved in facilitating liaison with camp authorities in order to resolve quality of life issues, services available to personnel, cultural sensitivities, and so on.

Conclusion

One may wonder whether a naval officer or NCM is truly suitable for employment as an advisor or a staff officer involved in the development of the security forces of a landlocked country in the throes of an insurgency. The performance of the RCN contingent deployed for Operation *Attention* Roto 0 put such question to rest. Subject to gaining the 'survival skills' discussed in the pre-deployment training section, naval officers and senior NCMs have the hands-on leadership, detailed planning, and administrative abilities required to make a valuable contribution in a multitude of roles. Short of advising on actual police and army tactics, these individuals are certainly capable of providing worthy advice to senior Afghan officers employed in formation headquarters and ministerial positions on matters of strategic and operational planning, budgeting, personnel policies, and so on. Appointments at NTM-A headquarters require those same abilities and staff skills as would be necessary in similar employment in service or joint headquarters.

Despite many frustrations and the uncertainties that surrounded the first months of the mission, Operation *Attention* turned out to be a remarkable and highly rewarding experience. Canada assumed a very important role during this initial rotation and achieved remarkable strategic effect within the coalition and among the ANSF. Such influence is bound to grow as troop-contributing nations reduce their footprint in the forthcoming years, and Canadians continue to leverage their professionalism, both as advisors and staff officers throughout the NTM-A structure. Although the drudgery of the work in Camp Eggers may remind one of the frustrations routinely encountered in headquarters at home, it is important to remind oneself that such contribution remains at the heart of the Canadian training mandate in order to facilitate the successful conclusion of the NATO mission.

Commander Hugues Canuel, CD, is currently a member of the Directing Staff at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. He was deployed to Kabul, Afghanistan from July 2011 to March 2012. The views expressed therein are his alone; they should not be construed as those of NATO nor those of the Canadian government or the Department of National Defence.



DND photo HS2011-T021-12 by Master Corporal Chris Ward

Afghan National Army soldiers perform the *Attan*, the national dance of Afghanistan, during a graduation ceremony at the Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTTC).

NOTES

1. The CF deployed to Kandahar under the guise of Operation *Athena*. This deployment was only closed down in December 2011 as the Mission Transition Task Force remained in place to conclude Canadian activities at the Kandahar Airfield but combat operations had officially ceased in July. For a background on Operation *Athena*, see <http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/athena/index-eng.asp>.
2. On the ISAF command structure, see <http://www.isaf.nato.int/isaf-command-structure.html>.
3. The Canadian mission has a “legislated personnel cap” of 950 CF members, but numbers of deployed personnel at any given time varies, based upon operational requirements. For a detailed breakdown of Mission Elements as of 24 May 2012, see <http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/fs-fr/cctma-cmfa-eng.asp>. Note that the Herat ME was stood down earlier this year, and government announced that a further 100 CF personnel would be repatriated without replacement over the course of the summer 2012.
4. See the US Department of Defense *Welcome Packet - Camp Eggers*, available on line at <http://ntm-a.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/NTM-A-Welcome-Aboard-Package-15-Jun-11.pdf>.
5. On the change of focus that occurred through 2011, see two articles penned by the former commander of NTM-A, Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell: “Building the Security Force That Won’t Leave,” in *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 62 (3rd Quarter 2011), pp. 74-80, available at http://ntm-a.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/JFQ62_74-80_Caldwell-Finney.pdf; and “Helping the Afghans Help Themselves,” in *Proceedings* (July 2011): pp. 32-37, available at http://ntm-a.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/20110701-Proceedings_Helping-the-Afghans-Help-Themselves.pdf.
6. The new command is actually a merger of the separate entities that previously directed and supported missions overseas and operations at home. See DND backgrounder on “Canadian Forces Transformation: New Operational Command and Control Structure,” available at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=4195>.
7. Major-General Day was later appointed Deputy Commanding General – Operations, making him the Deputy Commander of NTM-A with training responsibilities for all components of the ANSF. He was replaced in that role on 24 May 2012 by Major General Jim Ferron. See DND News Release at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=4218>.
8. Given the scale of the task, many personnel also had to conduct individual training at the Canadian Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, Ontario.
9. NTM-A/CSTC-A, *Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) Advisor Guide*, Version 1.0, dated 9 May 2011, p. 1-4 and 1-5, at http://ntm-a.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Afghan_MoI_Advisor_Guide_Version_1.0_9_May_2011.pdf.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-6.
11. The mandate of DCOM SOF is cited in the DND Fact Sheet *NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan* found at <http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/fs-fr/NTMA-eng.asp>.
12. For a short overview of the nascent ANASOC, see US Department of Defense, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, issued April 2012, pp. 24-25. Available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf.
13. Including another body of advisors provided by the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A). This US entity is not part of NTM-A. Among other duties, it provides Special Forces elements that advise and train the Afghan Local Police, as well as components of ANASOC. For some (admittedly limited) information on this command, see <http://www.socom.mil/default.aspx>.
14. US Department of Defense, *Report on Progress*, p. 44.



DND photo HS2010-H003-110 by Corporal Rick Ayer

Her Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) *Montréal* passes an iceberg in Strathcona Sound near Nanisivik, Nunavut Territory, during Operation *Nanook*.

FORWARD OPERATING LOCATION NANISIVIK – HALIFAX'S GATEWAY TO CANADA'S ARCTIC

by Sylvain Lescoutre

In an effort to strengthen territorial claims in the Arctic, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced on 10 August 2007 that Canada would build a deep-sea military port in Nanisivik, Nunavut. The port will enable the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) to extend its operational range in the Arctic by enabling re-supply, refuel, and transfer of goods and personnel inside the eastern entrance of the Northwest Passage. Shortly thereafter, the federal government released the *Canada First Defence Strategy* (2008), and *Canada's Northern Strategy* (2009), and committed to procuring Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) for the RCN to operate in northern waters.

The establishment of military sites in the Arctic is not new:

- Canadian Forces Station Alert, located on the northern tip of Ellesmere Island, has been collecting signal intelligence since the late-1950s;
- In 1970, Canada established a permanent military command in Yellowknife, which continues to operate as the Joint Task Force North Headquarters; and
- The Distant Early Warning - (DEW) Line was an integrated chain of radar and communication centres from

western Alaska across the Canadian Arctic to Greenland that Canada operated in cooperation with the United States under the NORAD Agreement from the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s; It has since been upgraded to the North Warning System.

However, the designated deep-sea port in Nanisivik will be the RCN's first permanent, albeit seasonal, Arctic naval facility. Its selection is noteworthy for Halifax as a potential future mounting base to Canada's Arctic.

Nanisivik is located on the banks of the Strathcona Sound in Baffin Island, in the territory of Nunavut. The closest inhabited settlement, Arctic Bay, with a population of slightly over 800, is located 20 kilometres west of Nanisivik. The town of Nanisivik came to the forefront of the news when, in June 1974, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development signed an agreement with private industry to develop a lead-zinc mine. It was a pilot project to test the feasibility of conducting year-round mining in the Arctic, and it initially anticipated a twelve year production run.

In fact, the mine began production in October 1976, and continued successfully for 26 years until 2002, when low zinc prices made it no longer profitable. The project employed, on

VIEWS AND OPINIONS

average, 200 people, and, in addition to the construction of a deep-sea port, a town was purpose-built to support the operation of the mine. Since the mine closed, most of the facilities have been demolished, and Nanisivik's population was reduced to zero.

This deep-sea port is currently part of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans inventory. Because it offers a comparatively sheltered waterfront and good navigational passage in from Lancaster Sound, Nanisivik became the choice location to support naval operations in the Arctic, as called for in *Canada's Northern Strategy*. Following the initial announcement, detailed planning for the project took place in Ottawa, and consultations were initiated with local stakeholders.

With costs initially pegged at \$100 million, it was anticipated that construction would commence in the summer 2010, with the port to begin operation in 2015. However, the project has suffered several delays, due to reduced funding and challenges encountered during the environmental review.

Last year, during a visit to Arctic Bay, the project manager of the Nanisivik Naval Facility (NNF) announced that the construction of the new facilities would be delayed until 2013, to become fully operational by 2016.

Furthermore, to expedite the construction of the NNF, Ottawa decided to reduce the scope of the project by reducing

the amount of naval fuel stored on site to only one season's worth of operation, using the existing wharf facilities, and deleting the two-storey site fabricated shore support building, among other things.

This substantially reduces the scope of the project, but the NNF will still meet its essential mission to re-fuel the Arctic vessels on an 'as-required' basis. With the expected delivery of the first AOPS in 2015, the Naval Facility in Nanisivik should be ready to receive the first vessel tasked with arctic patrol operations. It is anticipated that the majority of these vessels will be based in Halifax. The functional direction and management of the NNF will be exercised by the RCN's Maritime Forces Atlantic Command (MARLANT), also in Halifax.

With Halifax being the principal shore base for Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker operations, and CFB Halifax's Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre hosting the establishment of an AOPS Centre of Excellence, Halifax is poised to become the future mounting base and gateway to Canada's Arctic.

Colonel (ret'd) Sylvain Lescoutre *recently retired from the Royal Canadian Air Force after 37 years of service. His final assignment was as Defence Attaché at the Canadian Embassy in Ankara, Turkey. He is a member of the Royal United Services Institute (NS) Security Affairs Committee.*

DND photo HS2010-H003-122 by Corporal Rick Ayer



HMCS *Montréal* (right), Canadian Coast Guard Ship *Henry Larsen* (left), and HMCS *Goose Bay* in Strathcona Sound near Nanisivik during Operation *Nanook*.

DND photo WT2012-0177-006 by Corporal Tina Gillies



WARRIOR NATION?

by Martin Shadwick

“F or an increasingly vocal set of commentators,” notes Jennifer Welsh in a thought-provoking analysis in the June 2012 *Literary Review of Canada*, “the tendency of the Harper government to elevate our experience in armed conflict and to depict the world as one marked by danger and epic struggle is part of a broader campaign to transform Canada into a ‘warrior nation’.” Orchestrated by right-wing elements within the government, the military, academia and the media, the perceived “militarization” seeks to “fundamentally shift how Canadians think about their country and its history.” Part and parcel of this campaign, as controversially portrayed by Ian McKay and Jamie Swift in *Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety* (Between the Lines, 2012) and Noah Richler in *What We Talk About When We Talk About War* (Goose Lane, 2012) are attempts to marginalize and belittle Canada’s peacekeeping role and legacy, and, as Welsh notes in her June 2012 review, “efforts to increase military spending, inculcate greater respect for soldiers and ‘martial values,’ rebrand Remembrance Day as a celebration of war and instil more muscularity into Canada’s foreign policy.”

Other perceived elements of the campaign - some explored, others not, by McKay, Swift and Richler - include the “militarization” of the Arctic (as reflected in more frequent military deployments in the north and the Harper govern-

ment’s plans for a northern training centre, a naval refuelling facility, a fleet of Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPs), and other enhancements), the “militarization” of disaster relief (the substantial Canadian military response to the Haitian earthquake of 2010 was seen by some academics to have nefarious neo-colonial objectives), an increased military presence at citizenship and national sporting events, a much-enlarged military and military history component in *Discover Canada* (i.e., the study guide for would-be citizens of Canada), and efforts to promote the study of military and security issues at Canadian universities. Still other elements include a new generation of military recruiting ads (decried as inherently and deliberately misleading in some circles), Ottawa’s efforts to commemorate the bicentennial of the War of 1812 (“an enormous amount of money,” argued Dan Gardner of the *Ottawa Citizen*, for “propaganda so crude and jingoistic it would make old Victorian colonels roll their eyes”), the restoration of “Royal” to the official titles of Canada’s air force and navy, and, argues Noah Richler, the “forcefully imposed establishment sentiment” to “support our troops” in Afghanistan. Indeed, note some critics, the post-9/11 mission in Afghanistan provided Ottawa with a useful opportunity to jettison the notion that Canada’s armed forces could shovel snow in Toronto or keep the peace in Cyprus, but not engage in the heavy-lifting of real-world combat operations. Even the October 2012 rebranding of the Canadian Museum of Civilization as the Canadian Museum of History occasioned

COMMENTARY

concern in some quarters. A *Toronto Star* editorial of 18 October 2012, for example, cautioned the Harper government to avoid turning the rebranded institution into "... a shrine devoted to glorifying the military and the monarchy."

Many observers will reject the assertions and arguments of McKay, Swift, Richler *et al* as delusional, or, at the very least, grossly exaggerated. They would note, for example, that the precipitous decline in the number of Canadian military personnel assigned to United Nations peacekeeping operations pre-dated the arrival of the Harper government, and add that peacekeeping experienced some decidedly lean years under prime ministers as disparate as John Diefenbaker and Pierre Trudeau. On the so-called "militarization" of the Arctic, they would posit that the Harper plan for a northern training centre, a northern refuelling facility and six-to-eight AOPS would not in absolute terms have substantially increased the very modest number

of regular force personnel stationed in the far north. Now, with all three projects descope and/or significantly behind schedule, the notion of a "militarized" Canadian Arctic appears utterly bizarre. Moreover, as Welsh points out, "there are real questions" to be asked about the financial sustainability of McKay and Swift's "warrior nation project." For "some inconvenient data, one need only consult the 2012 Harper budget, which illustrates that the regular rises in defence spending that have occurred over the past five years are at an end." A financial brick wall that will spell further noteworthy reductions in Canada's military capabilities hardly appears consistent with the "warrior nation" hypothesis.

Some observers may well accept the argument that "peacekeeping" has been downplayed in recent years, but argue that it was vitally important to disabuse ill-informed Canadians - whose grasp of Canadian diplomatic and military history is at best shaky - of the history-defying myth that peacekeeping has constituted their country's only military role on the global stage. Equally, if not more important was the perceived need to remind Canadians that a multi-purpose defence establishment exists to meet a broad range of commitments, be they non-military, quasi-military or military in nature, and that the latter may, on occasion, involve combat. The ability to apply, or to *threaten* to apply, force on behalf of the nation state and duly constituted international authority remains a central consideration in foreign and defence policy. Even Pierre Trudeau's 1971 white paper on defence, for all its attention to non-military and quasi-military roles - including the counting of caribou in the Arctic - acknowledged the continuing requirement to maintain a combat capability. Moreover, if the newly-enhanced visibility and reduced isolation of the Canadian Forces means that Canadians now have a closer affinity with the men and

women of *their* armed forces, is that necessarily a bad thing in a democracy? Similarly, they would ask, is it inappropriate to require would-be citizens to learn a little more about their new country's diplomatic and military history?



DND photo ET2012-6085-04 by Corporal Brandon O'Connell

Critics of the broader "militarization" and "warrior nation" hypotheses of these books are unlikely to be mollified by many of the micro-level recommendations and findings of Richler, McKay and Swift. A staunch defender of peacekeeping and peace operations, Richler advances "... a forward-looking plan made up of three related components that, in their interrelations and their entirety, would constitute a uniquely Canadian way of preserving the humanitarian internationalist tendencies that are the true target of these critics' complaints." The measures would embrace "the creation of a new regiment under the aegis of the DND that was dedicated specifically to the practice of peace operations rather than wars of existence," a "new college in which at least a minor degree in some form of peace operations was a necessary condition to graduate" and "the creation of a national community corps complementing the new regiment in its developmental activities in foreign territories but also at home." The "... point of a separate Peace Operations (PO) Regiment would be to create a specialized Canadian military force acting as a third party and designed for the particular tasks and challenges of conflict resolution in global theatres in which Canadian interest, not *self*-interest, is the motivation." It would, "... like the regular military, be fully equipped and fully trained and subject to the same rigorous standards of universal service." Richler contends that the "... existence of the regiment would undermine the confusion of war-fighting and humanitarian operations that has allowed the pro-military lobby to argue that 'when Canada does peacekeeping, it's really doing peace-making or peace enforcement, both of which are just synonyms for war'."

Richler's proposal - not new in its fundamentals - is intriguing, but raises both practical and philosophical difficul-

ties. With only one such peace operations regiment, presumably with one or two battalions, how would Canada respond to peace operations requiring more than one or two rotations? A de facto two-tier army composed of regular and peace operations units would inevitably face a complex brew of morale, training and personnel issues. Moreover, as Welsh notes, Richler's characterization of peacekeeping and peace operations centres on "negotiation and nation building," thereby forgetting "... not only that very particular, liberal values inspire those activities, but also that the 'just peace' (his words) he seeks to promote globally is based on a contestable view of justice. So while he may be right in saying that peacekeeping, even in its more muscular form, is not synonymous with war (despite the wish of some Harperites to make it so), it does implicate peacekeepers in activities beyond 'tempering' and 'adjudicating'."

In advancing their hypothesis, McKay and Swift offer questionable interpretations of DND's Security and Defence Forum (SDF), higher military education, and the so-called "military-entertainment complex." For example, they posit that "... what appears to be a spontaneous increase in academic fascination with things military has been deliberately cultivated and funded by the state" via the "powerful" Security and Defence Forum (SDF). This interpretation appears to ignore the age of the Security and Defence Forum (and its predecessor), and exaggerate its importance - if it was all that powerful and influential, why has it recently lost most of its budget and been shorn of most of its original *raison d'être*? Indeed, McKay and Swift's own case might have been better served by arguing that the SDF has been deliberately dismembered in an attempt to blunt academic criticism of Canadian defence policy or the pursuit by academics of innovative, non-traditional approaches to international peace and security. Their attack on higher military education, in part rooted in the belief that the military "acquires legitimacy through the academy," and, in part, presumably, because higher education helps to produce more effective war-fighters, is equally suspect. One would have thought that a better educated officer corps would have been a partial antidote to some of the broader concerns voiced by McKay and Swift. They also argue that the "Highway of Heroes, the ubiquitous yellow ribbons, the talk of coming of age at Vimy Ridge, [and] Remembrance Day" have become "politically charged elements of a military-entertainment complex extolling the new cult of the warrior hero." There is some validity in their unease - the term 'hero' has become far too ubiquitous - but, really, a military-entertainment *complex*?

There are noteworthy areas of commonality in these books. Of the two, Richler's is more tightly focused than its counterpart and,

arguably, less shrill in its analysis. Its lament for the loss of Canada's peacekeeping legacy will find more than a modicum of acceptance - not least from this defence analyst - even if its prescribed corrective measures, such as a dedicated peace operations regiment, appear suspect. The McKay and Swift book is a much weightier tome, and taps into a quite astonishing array of historical and contemporary data. Both adopt inherently controversial positions, and their hypotheses will no doubt be rejected out of hand in some quarters. It would, however, be a serious error in judgment to ignore the thought-provoking themes and arguments put forward by Richler and McKay and Swift. Their assertions should not be unthinkingly rejected, even though their interpretations, particularly in *Warrior Nation*, are at times overblown (and, ironically, undermined) by counter-productive histrionics. One might posit, as well, that some of the developments they condemn more often reflect a coincidental confluence of events than a deliberate right-wing strategy to rebrand the nation.

Moreover, as Welsh in my view has correctly observed, "... the debate about militarization under Harper is an unhelpful distraction from a much more important story about the profound changes that have taken place in the nature of armed conflict. It is this transformation, and its implications for Canada, that should be the focus of our attention." Welsh identifies several transformations of note, but draws particular attention to international data suggesting steady declines in both inter-state and intra-state conflict. This, she notes, "... does not mean that national armed forces, to safeguard our sovereignty and security, are a relic of the past. But it does mean that we need to talk not only about Canada's history of war, and the mistakes of current wars such as Afghanistan, but also of what war is likely to look like for our children and grandchildren."

Martin Shadwick teaches Canadian defence policy at York University. He is a former editor of *Canadian Defence Quarterly*.



DND photo BN2012-0080-03 by Corporal Pierre Habib

Deep Leadership Essential Insights from High-Risk Environments

by Joe MacInnis

Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2012

245 pages, \$29.95 HC

ISBN 978-0-307-36110-3

Reviewed by Bill Bentley

Dr. Joe MacInnis has written a powerful, inspiring book on leadership which, unlike many tomes on the subject, is eminently readable, even exciting. Dr. MacInnis is a Canadian, a physician, scientist, author, and motivational speaker who led the first science dives at the North Pole and built the world's first polar undersea station. He was among the first to dive to the *Titanic*, and has worked with the US Navy, the Canadian Government, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and NASA. He has given keynote presentations on leadership to IBM, Microsoft, GE, National Geographic and the US Naval Academy. The author of ten books, his research has earned him six honorary degrees and the Order of Canada.

Deep Leadership has already received many accolades but two will suffice here to reinforce the message intended in this review. Lieutenant-General Hal Moore (USA ret'd), author of *We Were Soldiers Once... And Young*, describes it as part biography, part instruction manual; it is a unique introduction to a vital subject. A must read book. Dr. Thomas Homer-Dixon, a professor at the University of Toronto and author of *The Upside of Down*, tells us that his stories will give you goose bumps – and lessons in leadership you will never forget.

Two years ago, Vice-Admiral (ret'd) Larry Murray put Joe together with the author of this review at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute at the Canadian Defence Academy Headquarters in Kingston. With the support of the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Institute arranged for Joe to go aboard HMCS *Toronto* in the Caribbean, and to travel to Afghanistan where, supported by then Brigadier-General Dean Milner, he went 'outside the wire' to interview a number of army and air force personnel. These interviews with both officers and NCOs, 42 in all, were then edited by Joe to produce the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute's 30 minute leadership video – *Warrior's Honour*. A number of those interviewed also make their way into the leadership story told in *Deep Leadership*.

Early in the book, Dr. MacInnis tells us that his vision of deep leadership is the ability to make critical decisions to accomplish challenging missions in the abysmal ocean, in outer space, and on the battlefield. Deep leadership, according to Joe, is radically different from business and political leader-

ship. Make a leadership mistake working 4000 metres beneath the ocean, on the International Space Station, or during a military operation in Afghanistan, and you can lose more than money or jobs. You can lose lives – including your own. "That's why I call it deep leadership."

Joe reminds us that leadership is not about a rigid set of rules and standards, it is about relationships; it's about the complex ways that people influence, inform and inspire each other. And in a refreshingly self-deprecating manner, he alerts us to the fact that his book, *Deep Leadership*, is not a science book written by a scientist about leadership. It is a series of observations from an "accidental leader of average intelligence." It is a form of field guide on a subject that Joe feels has an infinite number of practitioners operating on many levels.


The book is essentially divided into two parts. In Part One Dr. MacInnis identifies what he calls twelve traits of deep leadership. But this is not a book based upon the Trait Theory of leadership. Many of the twelve could be better described as characteristics or behaviours. The twelve 'traits' are:

- Cool Competence
- Powerful Presentations
- Physical Robustness
- Hot Zone Humour
- Mental resilience
- Strategic Imagination
- High-Empathy Communication
- Blood Trust
- Fierce Ingenuity
- Team Genius
- Resolute Courage
- Warrior's Honour

Joe then proceeds to illustrate these 'traits' by recounting factual, true stories of "deep" leaders, all of whom he has worked with, and many of whom are his good friends. In the pages that follow, we meet the likes of 'Buzz' Aldrin, the second man to walk on the moon; Scott Carpenter of Mercury fame; Jacques Cousteau; Julie Payette; Kathy Sullivan, the first American woman to walk in space; Walter Cronkite; Captain Carol Bateman, padre of the 1 RCR Battle Group in Afghanistan; Romeo Dallaire; Petty Officer Second Class Kerry Houghton; James Cameron; and Major-General Mike Day, former Commander of Canada's Special Operations Force.

Each of these encounters is stimulating, entertaining, and persuasive.

Part Two of the book turns to Dr. MacInnis's personal advice with regard to how aspiring leaders, or even proven leaders wanting to get better, should proceed.



BOOK REVIEWS

Here, he speaks, not only on behalf of the dozens of deep leaders we have met in the book, but also of his own personal convictions with respect to the way forward to more effective leadership. Joe speaks compellingly about making the commitment, commanding the language, building a library, finding mentors, and seeking opportunities.

Canadian Forces leaders of all ranks will find much of value in this book and much to reinforce what they know and feel about CF leadership doctrine as it is prescribed in *Leading People* and *Leading the Institution*. Repeatedly, the deep leaders in the book refer to fighting spirit, teamwork, self-discipline, physical fitness, and stewardship. All place great emphasis upon what CF leadership doctrine codifies as the Core CF Values –

Duty, Loyalty, Integrity, and Courage. Perhaps this is not surprising, since Dr. Joe MacInnis himself declares that “Military leadership is the fountainhead of all other forms of leadership.”

Deep Leadership should be made a ‘core’ text for all fourth-year RMC cadets, and a major text at the Joint Command and Staff Program at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. It should also be required reading for all NCOs taking the Intermediate Leadership Qualification Course at the NCM Professional Development Center in St. Jean, Quebec.

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Bill Bentley, MSM, CD, PhD, a former infantry officer, is currently the Deputy Director of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute at the Canadian Defence Academy in Kingston, Ontario.

A Season in Hell: My 130 Days in the Sahara with Al Qaeda

by Robert R. Fowler

Toronto: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd., 2011

342 pages, \$36.95 HC


ISBN-10: 1443402044

Reviewed by Rich Nessel

Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler tells his story of captivity at the hands of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) of North Western Africa. *A Season in Hell: My 130 Days in the Sahara with Al Qaeda* is Fowler’s personal, almost-daily account as a hostage of AQIM. Fowler breaks his 2008 - 2009 kidnapping into five distinct parts. Part One is “The Descent into Hell,” chronicling his special mission to Niger, and his eventual capture. “Prisoners of Al Qaeda in the Sahara,” Part Two, provides a detailed description of his captors and their mode of survival in the foreboding desert. Within Part Three, “The Middle Game,” the author recalls the glimmer of hope presented at 80 days into his captivity when he finally receives word from the outside world. In Part Four, “The End Game,” Fowler summarizes the prolonged process leading to his ultimate release. Finally, “The Aftermath” chronicles Fowler’s personal reflections upon his own captivity, intertwined with new up-to-date revelations made available at the time of this book’s release in 2011. Each part of this book describes a set of emotions or like occurrences, giving the book less of a feel as a survival diary, and more that of a summary of experiences.

What makes Fowler’s book significant is the account of the day-to-day operations of an Al Qaeda affiliate. Western academics and intelligence services have posited for years

their hypotheses of the inner workings of AQIM. Fowler gives a detailed first-person account that serves to better inform the theorists with respect to the realities of AQIM. An example is the notion that the Southern forces of AQIM were independent and not strongly tied to the AQIM of Algeria. This opinion was and still is strongly held by both the British and US military intelligence services. One theory is that AQIM is just a bunch of bandits and opportunists, and they are not really focused upon the religious cause of *jihad* , as posited by renowned AQIM researcher Jean-Pierre Filiu in his article “Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb: A Case Study in Opportunism of Global Jihad.” Still other theorists believe that AQIM is an expanding regional threat that has changed its focus from an Islamic Algerian state to the ‘Islamisation’ of the Sahel; as proposed by Modibo Goita in “West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat.” Fowler rebuts all of these claims in detail.



During his captivity, he meticulously observed his captors, and he provides some insights into AQIM itself. First, he posits that AQIM’s leadership is entirely Algerian, while the Sahelians of AQIM are relegated to “enlisted” or subordinate roles. The racial tension is noticeable within the AQIM ranks, specifically against the black Africans.

Fowler’s story is unique, because of his background. As Canada’s longest serving diplomat to the UN and as the former Deputy Minister of National Defence, he provides astute geopolitical context to his personal plight. Fowler was assigned by the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, as the UN Special Envoy to Niger, and this was a selection based upon Fowler’s depth of experience in African affairs. This experience allowed the author to describe the historical implications and the political intricacies involved in his capture. These political ramifications are brought even further to light in the “Aftermath” and appendices, which are not to be missed.

BOOK REVIEWS

Another highlight of *A Season in Hell* is its relevance to hostage training and non-governmental detention. It is apparent that Ambassador Fowler had some hostage training, and he relied upon it for his survival. In this manner, Fowler's book reads similar to Colonel Nick Rowe's *Five Years to Freedom*, or *Out of Captivity*, authored by the Northrop Grumman contractors held by the FARC until 2008. Fowler's ingenuity, demeanor, and unwavering efforts to guarantee his own survival and sanity are noteworthy. Furthermore, they are useful for study and emulation. *A Season in Hell* should be added to the reading lists of hostage training courses, specifically for diplomats, military personal, and civil servants who serve worldwide.

Ambassador Fowler's book does, however, have its shortcomings. This book is not written for academic purposes, because Fowler has chosen to write about his own personal experiences, observations, and opinions, rather than providing the requisite supporting references that would withstand academic rigour. He wanted this to be *his* story, a therapeutic exercise to get this experience committed to paper. Given Fowler's long civil service, which include being the foreign

policy advisor for three Prime Ministers of Canada, his personal opinions carry a great amount of weight.

With only minor discrepancies, Fowler's text is readable, and it provides a never before seen look inside the underworld of Al Qaeda, and its affiliate, AQIM. Further, this book can be used as a foundation for additional research. Chapter Nine in Part Two, entitled "Us and Them," breaks down the fundamental core beliefs and composition of AQIM. The broader implications of this book are cause for re-analysis of our assumptions of the fledging AQ affiliates and their very real Islamist ideology. As Ambassador Fowler discovered, his captors were not merely, "bandits, opportunists, thugs [or] psychopaths... [but] deeply committed religious zealots." Fowler's observation serves as a warning, yet it sets the stage for a renewed campaign to snuff out the remaining embers of Al Qaeda's global jihad.

Major Richard Nessel is a US Army Special Forces officer with several deployments within North Africa under Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara, specifically targeting Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

First Soldiers Down. Canada's Friendly Fire Deaths in Afghanistan

by Ron Corbett

Toronto: Dundurn, 2012

238 pages, \$28.99 (PB)

ISBN-10: 1459703278

Reviewed by Bernd Horn


This is a powerful book. But, it sneaks up on you. Ron Corbett, award winning writer, journalist, broadcaster, and university educator, takes a very personal look at the 17 April 2002 friendly fire incident when two American F-16 pilots mistakenly engaged Alpha Company, of the Third Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, while they were conducting live fire training at Tarnak Farm in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The split-second decision to drop a 500 pound bomb resulted in four dead soldiers and numerous wounded.

The event had a dramatic impact in Canada. The dead soldiers were universally described as the country's first combat fatalities since the Korean War. Canadians publicly mourned their dead. The Friendly Fire incident arguably became a turning point. It graphically symbolized the resurgence of Canadian support for its men and women in uniform, support which had dramatically faltered and had reached an all time low by the end of the 1990s, due to a series of

scandals and loss of trust in the institution by both the government and the people of Canada. The tragic friendly fire incident also helped prepare the nation for the difficult service in Afghanistan that transpired in the years that followed.

Corbett tells this emotional story in journalistic fashion. The text is quick moving and very personal. He uses the commanding officer at the time, Lieutenant-Colonel Pat Stogran, specifically his journey to speak to the families of the fallen, as the vehicle to recount the story. Within this narrative he weaves in the historical details and events, and embeds the personal stories of those affected by the tragedy. He starts by recounting the road to that chaotic night at Tarnak Farms, touching on each of the fallen and their families, and then transitions to the aftermath of the event and the impact it had upon those left behind. In many ways, it is more a story of loss and grief than it is a historical recollection of events. Corbett tackles the difficult issue of grappling with loss, as well as the rationalization of the cost of military operations. The insights at times are quite revealing.

Here is where the book's impact sneaks up on the reader. A fast read, with, on the surface, little 'heavy slogging' to understand political or historical nuance or undercurrents, all of a sudden, the readers find themselves entwined in the personal stories, tragedy, and struggle of those involved directly or indirectly in the friendly fire incident. It brings home the impact that was played out across the country so many times during the ensuing war.



BOOK REVIEWS

For those looking for historical and operational detail on the mission itself, however, the book will 'fall a bit flat.' There is scant attention paid to the actual combat mission. Brief overviews of some of the tasks and operations are given, but they provide little real substance or understanding of the mission or its challenges. The description of the friendly fire incident itself, however, is quite dramatic and moving.

To support the text, the author has included 30 black-and-white photos that depict key personalities, as well as some of the events surrounding the story in question. As indicated earlier, the book really has a journalistic bent. There are

no endnotes, references, or even an index. It is, in the end, a story of some personal journeys through tragedy.

Overall, the book is engaging and powerful. The writing is strong, and the emotional narrative moves quickly. I strongly recommend the book to anyone interested in the event *in general*, and the impact upon those it touched *in particular*.

Colonel Bernd Horn, OMM, MSM, CD, PhD, is *Chief of Staff Strategic Education and Training at the Canadian Defence Academy.*

They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children

by Roméo Dallaire

Toronto: Random House Canada, 2010

307 pages, \$22.00

ISBN 978-0-307-35578-2.

Reviewed by Michael Rostek


Senator Romeo Dallaire entered into the mainstream public fora with his award-winning book *Shake Hands with the Devil*, a compelling and heart wrenching personal account chronicling his time as Commander, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. It was here where he first articulated chilling accounts of his encounter with child soldiers. Today, the use of child soldiers remains prevalent throughout the world, and *They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children* provides an insightful, and, at times, a brutal account of an evil that continues to plague humanity.

Dallaire uses a unique blend of fiction and non-fiction within this book to convey his message of eradicating the use of child soldiers. While this combination of fiction and non-fiction is meshed together somewhat awkwardly, the fiction tends to evoke an emotional response connecting facts with fiction, thereby evoking powerful images, and, in turn, solidifying the message in the conscience of the reader. The chapters dedicated to how a child soldier is made, trained, and used are equally as thought provoking as they are disturbing. Of note, Dallaire highlights that approximately 40 percent of all child soldiers world-wide are girls, as girls are often considered more valuable than boys being used for everything from sex slaves, to cooks, to combatants. The emotional and psychological effects upon professional soldiers encountering, and, at times, killing child soldiers, also fictionalized in the book, are equally vivid and disheartening. Dallaire rightly highlights the intense moral dilemmas present in professional

soldiers *if* and *when* required to kill child soldiers, and he legitimately questions how long professional soldiers can engage in such acts before their 'brains fry.'

Perhaps one of the more controversial aspects of the book is Dallaire's classification of child soldiers as "weapons systems." Dallaire's hypothesis articulates that if child soldiers are a weapon system of choice for commanders, then it should be possible to decommission or neutralize that weapon system in order to eradicate the use of child soldiers, *not* the child. In order to "unmake a child soldier," Dallaire highlights the difficulties associated with the current approach though Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs and he calls for the use of a "comprehensive approach" – bridging gaps, integrating efforts and resource allocation among disparate actors in the field– "... to eradicate the scourge deliberately inflicted on children by adults." Indeed, a comprehensive approach wholly applied to this complex phenomenon seems entirely logical, perhaps offering the best chance for success in eradicating the use of child soldiers. However, as Senator Dallaire has observed throughout this work, the difficulty of bringing the military and humanitarian communities together for this common purpose should not be underestimated.

Dallaire uses the final chapters in the book as a call to action highlighting his Child Soldiers Initiative. In speaking about the book, he has drawn parallels of his life mission to the abolition of slavery, once a commonly-accepted international norm. Slavery was abolished in part through the use of norm entrepreneurs (master enablers of normative change) and the use of several diffusion mechanisms (how international norms make their way into states). *They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children*, and the establishment of the Child Soldiers Initiative anchored at Dalhousie University, clearly represent cogent diffusion mechanisms, and indeed, Romeo Dallaire represents a norm entrepreneur himself. However, it took approximately a century of sustained effort by norm entrepreneurs as well as



the use of a wide variety of diffusion mechanisms to abolish slavery. Let us hope that Romeo Dallaire's call to action achieves equal, but more timely results.

Colonel (ret'd) Michael A. Rostek, CD, Ph.D, is currently the Executive Director of The Royal Military Colleges Club of Canada.

Find, Fix, Finish: Inside the Counterterrorism Campaigns that Killed Bin Laden and Devastated Al Qaeda

by Aki Peritz and Eric Rosenbach

New York: PublicAffairs, 2012

320 pages, \$31.00 (HC)

ISBN 9781610391283

Reviewed by Jordan Fraser

“Find them! Fix them! Fight them! Finish them!” was General Matthew Ridgway's war cry to his demoralized commanders in Korea during the 1950s. Ridgway drew this tenet from a study of Civil War General Ulysses S. Grant, who stated: “The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get him as soon as you can. Strike at him as hard as you can as often as you can and keep moving.” According to Aki Peritz and Eric Rosenbach, this war cry, updated and applied to the war on international terrorism, became the American strategy to fight the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

The authors argue that for the duration of the Cold War, the enemy to which the ‘find, fix, finish’ doctrine was applied was the Soviet Union. However, with the end of the Cold War and the subsequent attacks on the American homeland on 11 September 2001, the American national security apparatus had to go through a very important evolution in its strategic outlook and mindset. In essence, it had to update ‘find, fix and finish’ for the Global War on Terror (GWOT). It is the updating of this strategy, its implementation and consequences, which are the basis of Aki Peritz and Eric Rosenbach's work *Find, Fix, Finish*.

Aki Peritz is a Fellow at the Belfer Center in Washington, DC, and he previously worked for the Central Intelligence Agency's Counterterrorism Center. Eric Rosenbach is currently the Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense of the United States. He has taught courses on counterterrorism at Harvard Kennedy School, and has served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), where he helped lead oversight of American counterterrorism programs. These two clearly have a plethora of knowledge on the subject matter to which this book pertains.

The book begins with a recounting of the days prior to 9/11 in a chapter aptly entitled ‘*Atrophy*,’ where the US Government and relevant federal agencies, while beginning to acknowledge the emerging threat of terrorism, did not rank it very highly on the list of national security priorities. Rogue states, the India-Pakistan tension, and WMD proliferation were seen as higher national security priorities during the mid-1990s. Notwithstanding this, the Clinton administration did issue some presidential directives with regards to how the US Government should deal with a terrorist attack, but these directives would initiate a response to an attack instead of a preventative approach.

With the transition to the Bush administration during the winter of 2001, the threat posed by international terrorism once again appeared on American shores very quickly. The tragedy of 9/11 struck nine months later, and it shocked the American psyche. However, it must be noted that the World Trade Center was also previously attacked in February 1993 by Islamic terrorists. 9/11 was, regrettably, not the first time Islamic terrorists had struck on domestic American soil. Within days, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which allowed the president “... to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”



According to Peritz and Rosenbach, with the onset of the ill-named Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the US had two competing objectives: dismantle the worldwide Al Qaeda network, and kill or capture those responsible for the attacks on New York and Washington. To this end, the US Government employed a spectrum of military means, all-source intelligence operations, Special Operations Forces (SOF), evolving technology, and intimate partnerships with various close allies and friends in key geopolitical regions around the world. In their efforts to kill or capture Al Qaeda leaders, American governments have been driven by necessity to work with difficult, and some would say unsavory, partner governments, such as those in Pakistan and Yemen. The CIA has worked in conjunction with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to capture key Al Qaeda members, even though it is fairly well understood that the ISI is infiltrated with many members that are sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. These capture operations have been essential in allowing the American intelligence community to generate intelligence sources, which are now a critical part of the find, fix, finish paradigm. This has

given the American intelligence community vital insights and information with respect to the personalities, organizations, and operational and targeting methodologies of organizations like Al Qaeda.

One primary theme to which the authors refer is how America can fight an unconventional enemy with brutal and cruel methods of operation whilst maintaining and upholding the values that it holds dear. Peritz and Rosenbach conclude their book by putting the onus upon the American people for the survival of American values and democracy in the midst of the Global War on Terrorism. They state that the survival of the American way of life lies not in the hands of the terrorists, but in the hands of the American people. They must 'to their own selves be true.' They must demand wise action and judgment from their leaders, as well as transparency in the partner-

ships their government makes with foreign governments and intelligence agencies. They must not abrogate or abandon the constitutional and democratic heritage that made their nation great in order to fight a war for their very survival. Time will tell if they can do this, but their history demonstrates that if they desire to, they can do so.

Find, Fix, Finish is a well-documented, researched work, and it is recommended reading for those with an interest in the strategy of the United States in the Global War on Terrorism.

Jordan R. Fraser, BA (Hons) is an MA Candidate in the War Studies program at the Royal Military College of Canada, and works on Parliament Hill.

The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food

by **Lizzie Collingham**

New York: Allen Lane (Penguin Press), 2011

634 pages, \$US 36.00

ISBN 978-0-713-99964-8

Reviewed by **Derek Spencer**

<<Une armée marche sur son estomac>>


- Napoleon Bonaparte¹

Food, like air and water, is absolutely essential to life. We take it very seriously as it helps us define cultures, forms a central part of social contact, and is critical to our individual health and well-being. The developed world today is characterized by vast, year-round abundance, yet we are equally bombarded with images of desperate starvation in the poorest corners of the globe. In the Canadian Forces, it is so important, we have messes on every base, we have 'Cook' as a military occupation on par with infantry soldier, and we employ some officers that are specialized in food services and sciences. Supplying food is essential to effective and sustained military operations such that logisticians know with precision the weight, volume, and transport requirements to feed a combat formation per day.² Food in war is surrounded by operational art and science. Lizzie Collingham's *The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food* is not about that operational art. Her achievement goes much farther. She has approached the subject of food dur-

ing that global and total conflict with a thorough and expert integration of both grand strategic implications and its individual human impacts. During the Second World War, there were 19.5 million military deaths, but 20 million people died of starvation and the diseases associated with malnutrition.³ Stalin may have said that "the Artillery is the god of war,"⁴ but hunger is certainly a force that cannot be ignored.

Lizzie Collingham has, in this book, created no less than a comprehensive and lucid treatment of the science and politics of food during the Second World War in four parts. In a way, it is a step behind the backdrop of well-known battles and political conferences to view that global war through a new lens always focusing upon food. The first part, entitled "Food the Engine of War," is a historical analysis of Germany and Japan from the late 19th Century through to the inter-war period. Her analysis of changes in agricultural practices and diets provides a context for the aggression of the Axis and their wartime operations.

The second part, the "Battle for Food," discusses the strategic policies and practices of all the Allies and Axis nations. It constitutes the largest part of the book, and covers in depth rationing, embargoes, food production, and the far-reaching impacts of dietary and food processing science. Collingham creates a language around food and hunger as a weapon of war. What else is an embargo but starvation as a form of attack upon an industrial population, delivering an effect, albeit slower than but similar to bombing? What else is rationing but a defensive measure to preserve the strength and capacity of military and industrial capability? It is here that Collingham introduces the concept of exporting starvation. Typical Second World War histories talk about the Battle



BOOK REVIEWS

of the Atlantic, or the Nazi capture of the Ukraine during Operation *Barbarossa*. Instead, Collingham provides us with a fresh perspective by looking at how, for instance, changes in the use of the British mercantile fleet caused severe famine in Mauritius. This was taken to far more brutal extremes by the Axis forces with the extraction of food resources in Korea and China to support Japanese war efforts.

In the third part, Collingham discusses the "Politics of Food." She thoroughly discusses the various rationing methods of each major power, as well as the Combined Food Board arrangements between the US and Britain. Also, she outlines in crisp and informative detail the emergence of the science of nutrition, from the 1930s to its exponential improvement during the war. This is the part that examines the Victory Gardens planted in practically every backyard, and story upon story of ersatz and alternate foods. It is here that we truly understand that the Second World War quest to develop a cheap and healthy source of protein to accommodate the scarcity of meat meant that the 'taste of war' was the potato. These stories and explanations are where Collingham excels. Both her use of powerful eyewitness accounts well matched with formal scientific studies show how industrial workers were demonstrated in many countries to be more productive if they were well fed. In some nations, such as in the Soviet Union and Japan, this fact did not result in more food, whereas in the US and Britain, governments went so far as to develop policies aimed at social welfare.

It is in the last part, "The Aftermath," wherein Collingham does a surprising thing. After this comprehensive and academic journey through all matters concerning food, it is expected that she would cast a new light on the war's conclusion. Indeed, she maintains that while victory was delivered around the world and the yoke of oppression was lifted from the shoulders of millions, hunger existed everywhere. Millions had half as much food available in 1945 than they did in 1939, and there was an overall 12 percent drop in global food production.⁵ Rationing continued in Britain until 1950, for example. In fact, during the war, bread and potatoes were available in unlimited quantities, but in 1946, its British Labour Government imposed restrictions upon these commodities. That farm, storehouse, and factory of democracy, the United States, that had fed, fuelled, and armed the Allies, was arguably the only nation better off in this respect after the war. However, what was surprising in this part of the book was Collingham's discussion of our present day food issues. It is valuable and interesting to learn that many characteristics of modern food production and distribution were born during the Second World War, such as soya and corn replacements in processed food, new canning techniques, refrigeration ships for shipping meat, and dehydrated eggs and milk. However, it is entirely different to move into a discussion with respect to

food shortages in the 21st Century and a proposed need to return to rationing. While her arguments are sound and observations have merit, in a book dealing with the Second World War, this felt like the wrong place for her 'to get on her soap box.'

Upon reflection, certain observations about this book become apparent. Without a doubt, Collingham was successful in portraying the human cost of starvation through an excellent mix of detailed statistics and first-person accounts. She drew upon Mass Observation and the Harvard Project with great effect. Mass Observation was a program that issued diaries and questionnaires to 3000 people in Britain during the Second World War. The Harvard Project collected transcripts of interviews from Soviet defectors in 1950-1951. Collingham used these and many other sources to exquisitely detail the human face of hunger during the war.

Perhaps the most significant criticism is that she stretches her thesis concerning the importance of food too far. No issue seemed to be free of its influence. Without question, Collingham is a reigning expert on food, both historically and scientifically. Her previous book, *Curry: a Tale of Cooks and Conquerors*, is masterful, and her discussions of nutrition and food science display passion and understanding. Unfortunately, her knowledge of military operations is a little less expert. She did apply her expertise in research to understanding the various campaign operations, and even provided an appropriate set of maps (many military historians would do well to learn from that inclusion). She does, however, overly apply food causes. For instance, German and Japanese aggression was driven by a concern about the need for access for all raw materials, such as oil and strategic metals, as well as food. Also, while the Japanese army suffered defeat after 1943 to a large extent from starvation, the Soviets also operated under conditions of extreme privation. Their victories point to a weakness in the food thesis.

Overall, however, this book is a must read for those interested in a full understanding of the Second World War. It is a fascinating tour 'behind the wizard's curtain' by an expert guide. Collingham has provided a complete view of this aspect, drawing upon an array of primary sources, from national statistics, to eyewitness accounts, expertly integrated. She should be applauded for applying her passion and expertise in this manner to improve our understanding of this significant historical period.

Major Derek Spencer *recently served as the Current Plans Officer within the Department of Geospatial Intelligence, and is currently employed as the Chief CIED at the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Headquarters in Istanbul, Turkey.*

NOTES

1. *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations: A Collection of Passages, Phrases, and Proverbs Traced to Their Sources in Ancient and Modern Literature* (17th Edition) ISBN: 978-0316084604, pp. 371-373.
2. 44.3 short tons of food per U.S. infantry division per day in 1943. Stephen Patrick, *The Normandy Campaign* (Wieser and Wieser, 1986). ISBN 0-7251-0521-6.
3. Collingham, p. 1.
4. <http://www.military-quotes.com/artillery%20quotes.htm>
5. Collingham, p. 467.